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ABSTRACT 
The four studies summarized in the present thesis were conducted within the overarching 
framework of asking how and by which means individuals manage and influence their own 
cognitive development. Two aspects were addressed specifically: First, the development of 
individual differences in the extent to which individuals deliberately engage in cognitive 
activities and, hence, influence their own cognitive performance. Second, the development of 
individual differences in the metacognitive skill of subjectively estimating one's own 
cognitive performance and its potential influence on cognitive development. Following the 
elaboration of the theoretical background in chapter 1, in chapter 2, the following questions 
were addressed in detail: Are there age differences between young and old adults in Typical 
Intellectual Engagement? Are presumptive differences related to known age differences in 
related constructs? (Study 1). How does Typical Intellectual Engagement develop across five 
years in old age? Are there interindividual differences in the development of Typical 
Intellectual Engagement? (Study 2). Chapter 3 examines the accuracy of metacognitive 
subjective memory complaints in populations of individuals for whom the management of 
their lowered cognitive resources may be decisive for their everyday functioning (Study 3). In 
these populations of memory clinic outpatients the accuracy of complaints may be decisive to 
trigger extra-effort to ensure normal everyday functioning, because formerly highly 
automatized processes might then need deliberate effort and resource allocation. Due to that, 
the processes should be more salient in groups of outpatients and might, thus, be better 
assessable. In Study 4 the question whether the relation between subjective and objective 
cognitive performance is assessed more adequately by investigating commonalities in change 
was addressed. The empirical evidence of Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate substantial 
interindividual differences in Typical Intellectual Engagement that are not captured by ability 
measures or potentially related personality trait measures. Studies 3 and 4 reveal that 
v  
  
cognitive complaints are more strongly related to specific cognitive domains than to global 
cognitive measures. Also, the relation between the constructs is higher when taking a change-
oriented approach. However, overall, it remains moderate. In chapter 4, all findings are 
integrated in an overall discussion. Shortcomings of the present studies and theoretical 
implications are addressed. Suggestions for future research directions focusing on the 
functional relevance of cognitive abilities, metacognitve skills and intellectual engagement 
are made.  
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INTRODUCTION  1  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Demographic changes show that, in Switzerland, life expectancy at birth for men and 
women has increased from 68.7 years and 74.1 years in 1960 to 80.1 years and 84.5 years in 
2010, respectively (Bundesamt für Statistik, 2010, 2011). At the same time, research on 
ageing has added empirical evidence to the growing awareness that development in old age 
does not just equal decline but also comprises the possibility of increase and of maintenance 
of high levels of functioning (for an overview see Lehr, Thomae & Diehl, 1987; 
Lindenberger, Smith, Mayer & Baltes, 2010; Steverink, Westerhof, Bode & Dittmann-Kohli, 
2001). Cognitive ageing has received a great deal of attention because it is essential for 
subjective wellbeing (Lawton et al., 1999) and represents an important prerequisite for 
preserving a high functional level in all other areas of daily living in old age (Baltes & Lang, 
1997). Therefore, one central goal of ageing research is to understand the mechanisms that 
underlie cognitive changes across the adult lifespan. 
Overall, broad consensus exists on the fact that cognition changes across the lifespan 
(e.g., Baltes, Cornelius, Spiro, Nesselroade & Willis, 1980; Verhaeghen & Salthouse, 1997). 
Generally, decline in performance as a function of age has been the most persistent finding 
across various cognitive domains (e.g., Craik & Bialystok, 2006; Deary et al., 2009; Gallucci 
et al., 2009; Salthouse, 2009; Verhaeghen, Salthouse, 1997). This is especially true for the 
³IOXLG´ domains such as speed and reasoning, whereas for knowledge stability or even 
increase has been found with decrease starting only very late in life (e.g., Schaie 1996; 
Singer, Verhaeghen, Ghisletta, Lindenberger & Baltes, 2003; Zimprich & Mascherek, 2010). 
Many of the existing and widely recognized theories that try to account for cognitive changes 
mainly draw on cognitive variables to explain cognitive changes. That is, changes in basic 
cognitive functions, such as speed of information processing, are postulated to explain 
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changes in specific cognitive functions (e.g., Cattell, 1987; Craik & Byrd, 1982; Hasher, 
Stoltzfus, Zacks & Rypma, 1991; Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Salthouse, 1996). However, these 
theories can neither account for all variance in cognitive development nor the large 
interindividual differences between individuals who are endowed with the same level of 
abilities. Hence, other theories take environmental demands and unique person characteristics 
other than cognition into account to explain differences in cognitive ageing. The main focus 
of these theories lies on the personal agency of individuals. The theories describe the 
engagement in everyday activities and the dispositional tendency to engage in specific 
activities to influence cognitive development. Also, ability management through 
metacognitive functions is addressed. Ability management refers to the monitoring and self-
evaluation of cognitive functioning. Based on that, individuals can deliberately adjust effort 
in order to maintain desired functioning (e.g., Ackerman, 1996; Anstey & Christensen, 2000; 
Cattell, 1987; Cavanaugh, Feldman & Hertzog, 1998; Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000; Rowe & 
Kahn, 1997; Scarmeas & Stern, 2003).  
Before embarking on the four studies of this thesis that will investigate aspects of 
individual, non-cognitive variables, in what follows I will discuss the role of non-cognitive 
aspects in cognitive development and will present theories that have included non-cognitive 
factors (1.1). Next, I will outline the concept of Typical Intellectual Engagement as one 
important person characteristic influencing cognitive development (1.2) and, lastly, I will 
focus on and further elaborate on metacognition, especially subjective self-reports and their 
relation to cognitive functioning (1.3.). In a brief excursus I will then discuss some 
methodological issues of examining change in developmental research and the concept of 
measurement invariance (1.4.). From this, the research questions of the current work will be 
derived (1.5.), and the studies then will be presented in two chapters (2 and 3). Finally, a 
comprehensive discussion of the four studies will be provided (4). The discussion intends to 
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integrate the empirical evidence of all studies, deriving their theoretical implications, and 
providing suggestions for future research. 
 
1.1.Development in context 
+HUW]RJ¶VHultsch, Hertzog, Small & Dixon, 1999; Salthouse 1991) adage ³use 
LWRUORVHLW´trenchantly illustrates the central point of theories that emphasise the importance 
of environmental demands and individual factors other than intellectual abilities for cognitive 
development. In the last years, theories have emerged that underscore the influence of 
motivational and personality factors on cognitive ageing. 2QDYHU\JHQHUDOOHYHO%DOWHV¶and 
%DOWHV¶(1990) Selection, Optimization, and Compensation (SOC) model aims at explaining 
individual differences in ageing in terms of individually chosen goals in which to invest 
increasingly limited resources. The SOC model (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Baltes & Carstensen, 
1996; Freund & Baltes, 1998) can serve DVDJHQHUDOIUDPHZRUNWRXQGHUVWDQGDQLQGLYLGXDO¶V
competence to deal with losses and challenges effectively across the lifespan. The selection-
process concerns the focus on fewer goals in the presence of limited resources (e.g., Freund 
& Baltes, 1998). Optimization is concerned with the investment of resources in order to 
achieve higher levels of functioning in the domain of the chosen goal (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; 
Baltes, Staudinger & Lindenberger, 1999) and, finally, compensation describes dealing with 
losses and restructuring abilities in order to maintain a certain level of functioning in the non-
selected domains (Freund & Baltes, 1998). All three aspects refer to beneficial processes 
between psychological characteristics and the external context of an individual (Gestsdottir, 
Lewin-Bizan, von Eye, Lerner & Lerner, 2009; Lerner, 1982). By contrast, the concept of 
successful aging (Rowe & Kahn, 1997) advocates WKHLGHDRIWKH³PD[LPL]DWLRQRIIXQFWLRQDO
VWDWXV´ S Rowe and Kahn stress the importance of lifestyle factors and individual 
agency. Individuals are described as active parts in designing their own aging process (Weir, 
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Meisner, Baker, 2010). Together with theories that propose lifelong plasticity and the 
multidimensionality as well as the multidirectionality of development, the individuals¶ 
spheres of influence and their individual characteristics come into focus (Baltes, 1987; Baltes 
& Schaie, 1976; Willis, Schaie & Martin 2009). In lifespan developmental research the 
concepts of multidirectionality and multidimensionality advocate the integration of gains and 
losses throughout the lifespan. Different subcomponents of, for instance, intellectual abilities 
follow different developmental trajectories. Development is not simply marked by one-
dimensional growth defined as increase in size or efficacy (see Baltes, 1987). Rather, for 
different abilities gains and losses may emerge at any stage of the lifespan in different 
manners. The theories referenced define the scope where individual influences can manifest 
themselves in the course of development. While the theories referenced demonstrate the 
extent of individual influence in a general framework of lifespan development, other theories 
have come up that explicitly address personal variables in the context of cognitive 
development (cf., Ackerman, 2000; Cattell, 1987; Hess, 2005). 
In a comprehensive review on contextual factors influencing memory, Hess (2005) 
named proximal factors (such as everyday activities, unique occupational experiences, 
personality, and motivation) and distal factors (such as occupational roles, participation in 
culture) that act on cognitive development throughout the adult lifespan. The distal factors are 
addressed more formally in the environmental complexity hypothesis (Schooler, 1984; 
Schooler & Mulatu, 2001; Schooler, Mulatu & Oates, 1999). In his theory, Schooler 
postulated that complex environments are cognitively more demanding. To the extent that the 
cognitive effort to get along in this environment is rewarded with success, the positive 
reinforcement leads to higher motivation to engage in cognitive demanding activities or live 
in cognitive demanding environments. What Hess describes as proximal factors is 
functionally integrated in the concept of cognitive reserve (Scarmeas & Stern, 2003). 
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Scarmeas and Stern postulated that the type of daily activities significantly influences the 
resilience an individual develops to attenuate cognitive decline. Referring to the concept of 
plasticity of cognitive abilities they postulated that performing highly demanding activities, 
living in a constantly changing environment, or deliberately training cognitive processes 
results in a permanent use and preservation of cognitive abilities (Scarmeas & Stern, 2003). 
Research has shown that high levels of (cognitive) activities can function as a buffer against 
cognitive decline (Colcombe & Kramer, 2003; Ghisletta, Bickel & Lövdén, 2006; Hertzog, 
2009; Hultsch et al., 1999; Scarmeas et al, 2011; Schooler & Mulatu, 2001; Stine-Morrow, 
Parisi, Morrow, Greene & Park, 2007). These effects are present even in old age (cf., 
Schumacher & Martin, 2009) and may pertain over a long period of time. Kåreholt, 
Lennartsson, Gatz and Parker (2011) showed that cognitive engagement in midlife was 
positively related to cognitive performance up to 20 years later. Although no one wants to 
claim that decline in cognitive functioning when getting closer to death in old age is anything 
but inevitable, the research cited above hints to the fact that individuals can actively influence 
their own cognitive development. In the following, I will discuss two theories that provide a 
framework for cognitive development that explicitly consider the influence of individual 
differences variables and activities. 
1.2. Investment theories 
In what follows I will outline two theories of intellectual development, namely 
&DWWHOO¶V  LQYHVWPHQW WKHRU\ DQG $FNHUPDQ¶V LQWHOOLJHQFH-as-process, personality, 
interests, and intelligence-as-knowledge (PPIK; 1996), that both try to integrate biologically 
determined aspects of cognitive development with flexible, highly individual aspects of 
cognitive development. Both theories include non-ability aspects in cognitive development 
such as personality, motivation, and interest. Also, they advocate the idea of (deliberate) 
selection in which fields to invest intellectual capacities.  
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Based on the formulation of theories on the structure of intellectual abilities (Cattell, 
1967; Horn, 1968; Spearman, 1904; Thurstone, 1938), Cattell postulated his investment 
theory (1987) as an approach to understand the development of cognitive abilities. He 
proposed that although intelligence is constrained by biological components, in the course of 
development, motivational and personality aspects become more and more influential. 
&DWWHOO¶V LQYHVWPHQW WKHRU\ ZDV GHULYHG IURP his conceptualization of fluid (gf) and 
crystallized (gc) intelligence to provide a framework for cognitive development (Cattell, 
1967),QKLVQRWLRQIOXLGLQWHOOLJHQFHLVGHILQHGDV³an expression of the level of complexity 
of relationships which an individual can perceive and act upon when he does not have 
UHFRXUVHWRDQVZHUWRVXFKFRPSOH[LVVXHVDOUHDG\VWRUHGLQPHPRU\´&DWWHOOp. 115). 
Crystallized intelligence in turn is defineG DV ³expressions, though of a judgemental, 
discriminatory, and reasoning nature, [that] operate in areas where the judgements have been 
WDXJKWV\VWHPDWLFDOO\RUH[SHULHQFHGEHIRUH´&DWHOOp.115). In his investment theory 
Cattell stated that initially only a general ability, called fluid ability, exists ,WLV³FRQQHFWHG
with the total, associational, neuron development of the cortex´ (Cattell, 1987, p. 138). Fluid 
intelligence is content free and underlies all intellectual processes. In the course of 
development, fluid intelligence is formed and organized by the investment of motivation, the 
frequency of reward, and distal environmental influences. As a consequence of the so 
invested fluid abilities, crystallized intelligence emerges as WKH ³IL[ed IRUP´ in different 
areas. Thus fluid abilities are the foundation and represent context independent, basic 
cognitive processes such as speed of processing and reasoning. They determine the basic 
capacity an individual is able to handle intellectually. The form in which this basic capability 
manifests itself, depends on the amount of time invested into acquiring knowledge, 
motivation, interests, but also on the perceived success and positive reinforcement of 
investing intellectual abilities (Cattell, 1987). Two individuals with identical scores on 
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measures of fluid intelligence could hence end up with crystallized knowledge in completely 
different areas as well as different levels of expertise in one area. This would then necessarily 
be ascribed to different distal and proximal environmental factors (see Hess, 2005). However, 
fluid and crystallized abilities are mutually dependent. The ability to understand and to learn 
complex and abstract new contents depends on the level of fluid intelligence of an individual. 
The ease of learning will in turn reinforce motivation and interest in fields where success is 
likely. Motivational aspects as well as fluid intelligence, hence, are both indispensable for 
intellectual development. As a result, fluid and crystallized intelligence will remain correlated 
although they reflect different stages and processes in the course of intellectual development. 
Successful cognitive development proceeds only with the interaction of crystallized and fluid 
abilities as well as distal and proximal environmental factors in any area in any individual 
(Cattell & Horn, 1978). Cattell emphasized the influence of experience, education and 
personal characteristics on cognitive development (1987). The effect of environment on 
cognitive development has, for instance, been shown in studies that found expertise and 
education compensating normative age-related decline (e.g., Masunaga & Horn, 2000). 
Empirically, both gc and gf in different stages of the life as well as the hypothesis of 
investment have been investigated across the lifespan $OWKRXJK &DWWHOO¶V LQYHVWPHQW
hypothesis was developed to explain childhood development, parts of individual differences 
in changes in general knowledge are encouraged by differences in fluid abilities across the 
adult lifespan (McArdle, Hamagami, Meredith & Bradway, 2000). Additional empirical 
support for &DWWHOO¶Vconceptualization of gf and gc comes from studies on genetics: while 
age-related decline in gf was found to be largely genetic (70%) the opposite was true for gc 
for which 67% of change was attributable to environmental influences. These results serve as 
empirical evidence for the conceptualization of gf and gc across the life span (McArdle, 
Prescott, Hamagami & Horn, 1998).  
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In order to encompass the non-cognitive influences on adult knowledge, Ackerman 
(1996) IXUWKHU GHYHORSHG &DWWHOO¶V LQYHVWPHQW WKHRU\ LQWR his Intelligence-as-process, 
personality, interest, intelligence-as-knowledge theory. He, very similar to Cattell¶V IOXLG
intelligence, proposed one aspect of intelligence to be categorized as process. As tested in 
intelligence tests that assess maximal performance abilities, mainly the information-
processing components are assessed. Information-processing contains components such as 
speed, reasoning, and memory span. These are also the components for which age-related 
decline is continuously found in ageing research (Verhaeghen & Salthouse, 1997). It is 
supposed to be rather biologically determined. 
Ackerman stated that his definition of intelligence-as-knowledge ³PDWFKHV WKH ILUVW
GHILQLWLRQRI*FSURYLGHGE\&DWWHOOLQKLV,QYHVWPHQW7KHRU\´$FNHUPDQS. He 
postulated, however, that his notion of intelligence-as-knowledge was much broader and that 
³WKHUH DUH SUREDEO\ DVPDQ\ GRPDLQV RI NQRZOHGJH DV WKHUH DUH RFFXSDWLRQV´ $FNHUPDQ
1996, p. 241). This conceptualization of intelligence strongly emphasises the importance of 
environmental demands (e.g., Hess, 2005) and the considerable extent of idiosyncrasy in 
intelligence and intellectual development. Personality aspects, motivation, and interests then 
determine the orientation toward and the content of different knowledge domains an 
individual will engage in and try to gain knowledge and expertise (Ackerman, 1996, 2000; 
Rolfhus & Ackerman, 1999$FNHUPDQ¶VWKHRU\H[SOLFLWO\DLPed at providing a framework 
for understanding adult intellectual development and interindividual differences in 
intellectual development. He postulated that during childhood, institutionalization with 
accompanied common curricula would limit the amount of interindividual differences. Only 
with advancing diversity in academic and personal life, idiosyncrasies become more 
pronounced (Ackerman, 1996). 
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One assumption of the PPIK is that a more reliable way of assessing intellectual 
performance in order to infer the general intellectuality of an individual is to measure typical 
rather than maximal performance. Maximal performance describes the assessment of an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶V PD[LPDO FDSDELOLW\ LGHDOO\ LQGHSHQGHQW IURP FRQWH[W DQG FRQWHQW $FNHUPDQ
1994). Typical performance can be described analogous to stable personality traits. Hence, 
typical performance describes what an individual is most likely to do across different 
(intellectual) situations and across time (Ackerman, 1994). Maximal cognitive performance is 
an important research target in order to understand the basic mechanisms of intelligence (e.g., 
Lindenberger & Baltes, 1995). However, from a differential psychology perspective, typical 
SHUIRUPDQFHGHVFULEHGDV³ZKDWDSHUVRQLVPRVWOLNHO\WRGR´LVHTXDOO\LPSRUWDQW$VVHVVLQJ
intelligence from a typical-performance perspective makes the consideration of motivation, 
personality and interest mandatory (Ackerman, 1994; Kanfer, 1990). Also self-regulatory 
processes in the form of monitoring the necessities and demands of intellectual tasks and the 
knowledge of RQH¶VDYDLODEOHUHVRXUFHVDQGOHYHORIintellectual functioning are important in 
assessing the level and the mechanisms of long-term, everyday typical performance (cf., 
Ackerman, 1994). Hence, typical performance represents the level of functioning an 
individual is most likely to maintain and is eager to stabilize across time. In the course of 
development and changing environmental demands, an individual is likely to invest resources 
in order to preserve this stable level of functioning. Not the maximal capability of an 
individual in the presence of unusual challenges or tasks is of central interest, but the typical, 
reliable, and stable performance in environments and situations. The conceptualization of 
intelligence as typical performance calls for the description of an individual differences 
YDULDEOH WKDW H[SODLQV GLIIHUHQFHV LQ ³W\SLFDO´ WKDW DUH QRW DFFRXQWHG IRU E\ GLIIHUHQFHV LQ
maximal ability. To successfully manage the investment of engagement and the allocation of 
cognitive resources in order to maintain a stable level of typical functioning, metacognition 
INTRODUCTION  10  
FRPHV LQWR SOD\ DV DQ LPSRUWDQW PHFKDQLVP WR ³VXSHUYLVH WKH LQWHOOHFWLYH GHPDQGV´One 
construct at the interface between abilities and personality is Typical Intellectual Engagement 
(Ackerman, 1994; Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997). It will be addressed in the next section in 
discussing Typical Intellectual Engagement (Goff & Ackerman, 1992); metacognition will be 
addressed VXEVHTXHQWO\LQWKHSDUDJUDSKRQ³PHWDFRJQLWLRQ´ 
1.2.1. Typical Intellectual Engagement, Need for Cognition, and Openness to 
Experience 
Within the framework of Ackermans PPIK-theory (1996, 2000), Typical Intellectual 
Engagement (Goff & Ackerman, 1992) has been postulated as a construct to explain non-
ability individual characteristics that influence typical performance. Typical Intellectual 
Engagement is defined as ³DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V DYHUVLRQ RU DWWUDFWLRQ WR WDVNV WKDW DUH
LQWHOOHFWXDOO\ WD[LQJ´ $FNHUPDQ .DQIHU 	 *RII  S  Typical Intellectual 
Engagement KHQFH GHVFULEHV DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V VWDEOH DQG enduring inclination to engage in 
intellectual activities. Goff and Ackerman (1992) conceptualized Typical Intellectual 
Engagement as a dispositional construct associated with intelligence as typical performance. 
Hence, Typical Intellectual Engagement can be seen as a trait-like construct that describes an 
LQGLYLGXDO¶VW\SLFDOZD\RIHQJDJLQJLQLQWHOOHFWXDODFWLYLWLHVDFURVVVLWXDWLRQVWKHRULHQWDWLRQ
in terms of content being individually coloured by her own interests. Connecting Typical 
Intellectual Engagement to motivational aspects of learning, Typical Intellectual Engagement 
would be a trait-like aspect of individuals that generally rather adopt learning goal 
orientations over performance goal orientations. Learning goals describe cognitive activities 
that are OLQNHG WR LQFUHDVH RQH¶V competence via task mastery without the necessity of 
GHPRQVWUDWLQJRQH¶VDELOLW\WRRWKHUV3RVLWLYHDIIHFWLVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHHQJDJHPHQWLWVHOI
rather than the outcome (Kanfer, 1990). The alignment to learning goals might hence be 
UHJDUGHGDVDQ LPSRUWDQWXQGHUO\LQJPHFKDQLVP WKDW LQIOXHQFHV DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶VDYHUVLRQRU
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attraction towards the engagement in cognitively challenging activities in her leisure time 
(see also Matzler & Mueller, 2011; Vermetten, Lodewijks & Vermunt, 2001). Across the 
lifespan, Typical Intellectual Engagement should influence the amount of acquired 
knowledge and should be related to gc (e.g., Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008). Typical 
Intellectual Engagement could explicitly represent in part the motivational person 
characteristics that have already been addressed in Cattell´s investment theory. The extent to 
which an individual invests motivational resources in knowledge acquisition is hence 
dependent on the level of Typical Intellectual Engagement. Two individuals with the same 
level of fluid abilities but different levels of Typical Intellectual Engagement should 
consequently be different with respect to quality and quantity of possessed knowledge. The 
difference, however, is driven by differences in the motivational equipage rather than 
differences in true intellectual capacity. According to the so called fan spread phenomenon 
(e.g., Stanovich, 1986), interindividual knowledge differences should become stronger. Also, 
the influence of Typical Intellectual Engagement on gc should increase across the lifespan. 
While in childhood and early adolescence institutional effects predominantly influence 
knowledge acquisition, in later stages of the lifespan those formal, and for all individuals 
equal, influences are diminished. More and more, personal idiosyncrasies exert their 
influence on development. Hence, the relation between levels of Typical Intellectual 
Engagement and acquired knowledge should increase. 
Typical Intellectual Engagement has been found to be closely related to Openness to 
Experience (Costa & McCrae, 1995) and Need for Cognition (NFC; Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982). While Ackerman and Goff (1994; Goff & Ackerman, 1992) explicitly formulated the 
expected relation to the Big Five personality trait Openness to Experience, they did not 
mention the conceptual closeness to NFC. In what follows, Typical Intellectual Engagement 
will be juxtaposed to Openness to Experience and NFC. 
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Within the conceptualization of the Big Five personality traits, Openness to 
Experience describes individuals that are intellectually curious, aesthetically sensitive, high in 
need for variety, and liberal in their value systems (Costa & McCrae, 1992, p. 660). In the 
hierarchical structure of Openness to Experience, the following subordinate facets have been 
postulated: Fantasy, Aesthetics, Feelings, Actions, Ideas, and Values (Costa & McCrae, 
1992). While generally a relation between Openness to Experience and Typical Intellectual 
Engagement has been reported in many studies (Arteche, Chamorro-Premuzic, Ackerman & 
Furnham, 2009; Rolfhus & Ackerman, 1999; Rocklin, 1994; Zimprich, Allemand & 
Dellenbach, 2009) this relation especially holds true for the facet Openness to Ideas 
(Ackerman & Goff, 1994; Mussel, 2010). Conceptually, Typical Intellectual Engagement and 
Openness to Experience delineate constructs. However, while Openness to Experience 
describes a rather stable, outlasting disposition that impinges on a wide variety of situations 
and behaviours, Typical Intellectual Engagement is restricted to activities that are related to 
intellectual activities and knowledge acquisition. Studies have shown the incremental validity 
of Typical Intellectual Engagement after controlling for the influence of Openness to 
Experience on intellectual performance (Chamorro-Premuzic, Furnham & Ackerman, 
2006b). Hence, in order to gain insight into person characteristics that can explain 
interindividual differences in knowledge and intellectual functioning, the more specific 
construct of Typical Intellectual Engagement seems to be more precise and, hence, better 
suited than the broad, with regard to content, non-specific personality factor Openness to 
Experience. 7KHIDFHW2SHQQHVVWR,GHDVPRUHVSHFLILFDOO\GHVFULEHVDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VWHQGHQF\
to the active pursuit of intellectual interests and the engagement in new, unconventional 
ideas. The facet has been found to be related to gf (Moutafi, Furnham & Crump, 2006). 
Typical Intellectual Engagement has been proposed to mediate the relation between 
knowledge and personality. Containing intellectual motives the deliberate allocation of 
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resources to acquire new knowledge and engaging in intellectual activities might, thus, more 
strongly depend on Typical Intellectual Engagement (Ackerman et al., 1995; Moutafi et al., 
2006). Openness to new ideas would hence describe the scope within which an individual is 
curious and intellectually flexible. The motivational foundation to actual engage in 
intellectual activities, however, would be better described by the measured intensity of 
Typical Intellectual Engagement. 
In the same vein, Typical Intellectual Engagement and NFC (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) 
have been found to be conceptually and empirically related. NFC describes the motivation of 
an individual to make sense of the surrounding world by means of thinking and problem 
solving. Individuals, low in NFC, tend to rely on others to make sense for them (Cacioppo, 
Petty, Feinstein & Jarvis, 1996; Fleischhauer et al., 2010). Some researchers have argued that 
both constructs are basically the same, finding correlations as high as r = .78 (Mussel, 2010; 
Woo, Harms & Kuncel, 2007). On the contrary, ForsterLee (2007) found evidence that 
Typical Intellectual Engagement differentially predicted performance in men and women, 
whereas NFC has repeatedly found to be gender neutral (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Spotts, 
1994). Additionally, NFC is represented by one single dominant factor (e.g., Sadowski, 
1993). Some studies did find a multifactor solution; however, it has been questioned if the 
subscales provide any differential information (see Cacioppo et al., 1996). For Typical 
Intellectual Engagement, in turn, several reliable subscales have been found in different 
studies (Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008; Ferguson, 1999; Wilhelm, Schulze, Schmiedek & 
Süss, 2003). Hence, although sharing a large amount of variance, NFC and the different 
subfactors of Typical Intellectual Engagement apparently are different (see Wilhelm et al, 
2003).  
In the present thesis, the construct of Typical Intellectual Engagement is chosen over 
NFC for the reason of Typical Intellectual Engagement being implemented in a 
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comprehensive framework of cognitive development in adulthood (Ackerman, 2000, 1996). 
Because the main aim of the present thesis is to add some knowledge to the literature on 
cognitive development across the lifespan, a construct that can be directly linked to a theory 
on cognitive development in adulthood seems to be appropriate. However, one needs to bear 
in mind, that both constructs are conceptually as well as empirically similar (Mussel, 2010; 
Woo et al., 2007).  
1.3.Metacognition 
Having discussed the possible influence of Typical Intellectual Engagement as a 
proximal factor in the course of adult intellectual development, in what follows I will 
elaborate on a different aspect, namely the role of metacognition. High levels of cognitive 
functioning have been postulated to be an important aspect of subjective well-being (Lawton 
et al., 1999) as well as successful aging (e.g., Kahn, 2002; Rowe & Kahn, 1997). The 
definition of successful ageing DV³older individuals¶ lifestyle choices that would maximize 
WKHLURZQOLNHOLKRRGRIDJLQJZHOODQGPDLQWDLQLQJDKLJKTXDOLW\RIOLIHLQROGDJH´.DKQ
2002, p. 726), stresses the importance of cognitive functioning. In turn, impending cognitive 
decline poses a great risk of decreasing well-being on individuals (Price et al., 2011). 
Cognitive functioning can, to a certain extent, be influenced by an individual itself (Hultsch 
et al., 1999; Schaie, 1984). In terms of successful ageing, the influence of genetic factors was 
postulated to decrease and the influence of nongenetic factors such as lifestyle choices 
increase (Ackerman, 1996; Cattell, 1987; Kahn, 2002; Rowe & Kahn, 1997). This has not 
only been discussed in the field of successful ageing, but also at the other end of the 
continuum in the field of slowing down pathological cognitive decline (Hultsch et al, 1999; 
Scarmeas, Levy, Tag, Manly & Stern, 2001). However, to be able to choose to engage in 
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(cognitive) activities makes self-regulatory and metacognitive monitoring processes 
mandatory. 
0HWDFRJQLWLRQLVGHILQHGDV³cognition about cognition´+HUW]RJ& Hultsch, 2000, p. 
417). This broad concept subsumes different aspects. Hertzog and Hultsch (2000) subdivided 
metacognition into three categories: µThe knowledge about cognition and cognitive functions 
in general; the monitoring of the current state of the cognitive system; and the beliefs an 
individual holds about her own cognitive abilities and that of others ¶ (Hertzog & Hultsch, 
2000, p. 417). The beliefs individuals hold about cognition has been further subdivided into 
implicit theories about cognitive ageing and self-referent beliefs about cognition. While the 
former describes general beliefs an individual holds about general ageing processes, the latter 
explicitly refers to ageing processes an individual experiences herself (Hertzog & Hultsch, 
2000). The first category contains declarative knowledge about the general functioning of 
cognition and cognitive functions and, opposed to this, the processes that are categorized in 
the second group contain RSHUDWLRQVWKDWPRQLWRUDQGDQDO\]H³FXUUHQWVWDWHLQIRUPDWLRQ´RQ
current cognitive operations during learning. The third category contains implicit and explicit 
EHOLHIV DERXW RQH¶V RZQ FRJQLWLYH DELOLties and that of others. Stereotypes about memory 
functions DUH DV ZHOO LQKHUHQW LQ WKLV FDWHJRU\ DV WKH JURZQ H[SHULHQFH ZLWK RQH¶V RZQ
cognitive capabilities across time. 
Although all categories have been linked to cognitive functioning (e.g., Rabbitt & 
Abson, 1991; Rast & Zimprich, 2009) and deserve attention in the course of cognitive ageing, 
in the present thesis I will focus on beliefs about memory and especially on beliefs an 
individual holds about her own performance. Self-reported beliefs mirror the self-rated ability 
RI RQH¶V RZQ SHUIRUPDQFH In the course of discussing subjective aspects that influence 
FRJQLWLRQEHOLHIVDERXWRQH¶VRZQIXQFWLRQLQJVHHPWREHPRVWLQIRUPDWLYHZKHQFRQGXFWLQJ
research on interindividual differences in cognitive ageing. In order to obtain information 
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about how an individual evaluates her own cognitive abilities, the concentration on subjective 
EHOLHIVDERXWRQH¶VRZQPHPRU\VHHPV, hence, to be the most suited option. The use of self-
repRUWV KDV EHHQ GHVFULEHG DV ³D VRXUFH RI GDWD WKDW FDQ EH UHODWHG WR RWKHU HPSLULFDO
observations and thereby can help investigators draw inferences about the participants' 
SV\FKRORJLFDO SURFHVVLQJ´ 1HOVRQ  SThus, self-reported cognitive evaluations 
represent a valuable source of information when examining interindividual differences in 
cognitive development across the adult lifespan. Although rather in the context of monitoring 
current cognitive operations, Nelson (1996, 2002) has described metacognition as one way to 
empirically assess awareness and aspects of self-regulation. This idea does also apply to 
HYDOXDWLQJRQH¶VRZQFRJQLWLYHFDSDELOLWLHVLQWKHEURDGHUIUDPHZRUNRIW\SLFDOSHUIRUPDQFH
Implicit theories that picture cognitive abilities as malleable are related to learning goal 
orientations and self-efficacy (Kanfer, 1990; Matzler & Mueller, 2011; Vermetten et al., 
2001). Although only moderately accounting for variance, research has shown that self-
efficacy and cognitive performance are significantly related. In their study, Valentijn et al. 
(2006) found that memory self-efficacy explained approximately 3% of variance in a verbal 
learning task. Moreover, the authors report that low memory self-efficacy was related to less 
improvement in sequential trials of a verbal learning task (K2 = .57). Hence, beliefs an 
individual holds about her own cognitive functioning are not only an important aspect of self 
evaluation but are also related to actual cognitive performance (Caretti, Borella, Zavagnin & 
De Beni, 2011). Generally, research that examined the relation between reported and actual 
memory performance has repeatedly found correlations not exceeding r = .3 (cf., Cavanaugh 
& Poon, 1989; Jorm, Christensen, Korten, Jacomb & Henderson, 2001; Valentijn et al., 
2006). The question that, hence, arises is why those relations are repeatedly found to be as 
low as they are. Various explanatory approaches have been promoted. 
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It has been suggested that beliefs about memory functioning are a function of general 
beliefs, self-efficacy and control that act rather independently from cognitive performance 
(e.g., Bandura, 1989). Although subjective beliefs do influence performance (Caretti et al., 
2011) the accuracy with which performance is evaluated might not be most important. It 
seems possible that the mere conviction that one is able to fulfil a certain task influences the 
effort an individual invests and, hence, the outcome (e.g., Cavanaugh & Green, 1990). 
Hertzog and Hultsch (2000) stated that implicit theories may influence the recalling of a past 
cognitive personal status and that expectations that are derived from implicit theories may 
also influence future cognitive performance. However, these evaluations may be biased due 
to time passing and other personal characteristics that work on the accuracy of memory. 
In the same vein, another line of research has argued that memory ratings are rather a 
function of personality traits and affect (Jylhä, Melratin & Isometsä, 2009; Kliegel & 
Zimprich, 2005; Metternich, Schmidtke & Hüll, 2009). Depression as well as neuroticism in 
healthy adults may strongly influence the level of self-rated cognitive abilities (Mol, Ruiter, 
Verhey, Dijkstra & Jolles, 2008). This line of argument comprises that the relation between 
subjective and objective memory performance is important, however, it seems as if the 
perceived capability not necessarily depends on objective capability, but rather on 
HPRWLRQDOO\ WUDQVPLWWHG LPSUHVVLRQVRIKRZRQH¶VRZQSHUIRUPDQFH is believed to be. It is 
known from research on depression that cognitive biases can strongly influence behaviour 
and well-being even if the cognitive representations of situations or abilities are not grounded 
on actual events, but rather on individual interpretations of those (e.g., Lester, Mathews, 
Davison, Burgess & Yiend, 2011). 
A third line of research that has dealt with explaining the small relation between 
memory performance and self-evaluated memory performance often found has focused on 
psychometric aspects (Herrmann, 1982). Measurement instruments differ in content and 
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rating formats as much as individuals differ in their way of evaluating their own performance 
(e.g., Albert, 1977; Arnkelsson & Smith, 2000; Brown & Middendorf, 1996). This line of 
reasoning advocates that even if subjective and objective cognitive performance were reliably 
related, the inaccuracies in measurement instruments and individual differences would 
prevent a reliable assessment of both constructs. Although the reliability of the instruments 
has proven acceptable (e.g., Hertzog, Dixon & Hultsch, 1990; Hertzog, Park, Morrell & 
Martin, 2000), the question of interindividual differences in rating behaviour endures. Related 
to this, Martin and Zimprich (2003) and Zimprich, Martin and Kliegel (2003) proposed that 
the relation between subjective and objective cognitive measures should be assessed 
longitudinally, because then those interindividual differences in rating behaviour could be 
controlled for.  
To summarize, metacognition has been recognized as an important factor of cognitive 
development. However, different explanatory approaches in combination with a manifold of 
inconsistent results exist concerning the relation between objective and subjective cognitive 
performance. Further research is needed to clarify the relation between objective and 
subjective cognitive performance ratings and the function of subjective ratings with respect to 
objective performance. Future research could engage in investigating the relation between the 
two constructs from different perspectives. This could include different methodological 
approaches or examining the relation between subjective and objective cognitive performance 
in different groups of individuals with different cognitive statuses. Both approaches would 
further investigate the relation between the constructs within the framework of assuming that 
a reliable relation between the constructs exists. Yet a different approach for future research 
could lie in further examining the purpose of subjective cognitive evaluations in the course of 
PDQDJLQJRQH¶VRZQFRJQLWLYHGHYHORSPHQW 
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1.4.Examining change in lifespan developmental research  
Before embarking on discussing the research questions of the present thesis, in this 
chapter I will briefly discuss the examination of change in developmental research and will 
briefly address the concept of measurement invariance (MI; Meredith, 1993; Meredith & 
Horn, 2001; Meredith & Teresi, 2006). According to Meredith (1993), testing MI is an 
explicit method to ensure that characteristics of the applied instrument remain stable across 
groups or time. Only with MI established on the level of manifest indicators, inferences can 
be drawn from the results on the latent level that are not biased by the instrument (Meredith 
& Horn, 2001). A possible problem if not testing for measurement invariance is that items 
could be comprehended differently across groups or at different measurement occasions 
(Meredith, 1993). By explicitly testiQJ 0, RQH FDQ DVVXUH WKDW ³WKH OLQHDU FRPSRVLWHV
assumed to measure a given set of concepts in different groups, or at different times, are 
LQGHHGPHDVXULQJWKRVHFRQFHSWVLQWKHVDPHZD\LQWKHGLIIHUHQWFLUFXPVWDQFHV´0HUHGLWK
& Horn, 2001, p. 206). For developmental research this implies that with MI the foundations 
are laid to study true development whilst keeping the psychometric characteristics of an 
instrument constant. Hence, MI reflects whether the measurement characteristics remain 
unaffected by time or in different groups and change or differences can be reduced to true 
changes or differences in the underlying theoretical concept (but see Nesselroade, Gerstorf, 
Hardy & Ram, 2007, on dynamic factor analysis). 
One way to examine the different degrees of measurement invariance lies in applying 
confirmatory factor analyses (Lubke, Dolan, Kelderman & Mellenbergh, 2003; Meredith, 
1993; Meredith & Horn, 2001; Meredith & Teresi, 2006). Another approach is originated in 
item response theory (IRT; Reise, Widaman & Pugh, 1993). Generally, in item response 
WKHRU\ IXQFWLRQV DUH GHULYHG WKDW WU\ WR DFFRXQW IRU ³WKH UHODWLRQ EHWZHHQ [the] examinee 
OHYHORQDODWHQWYDULDEOHDQGWKHSUREDELOLW\RIDSDUWLFXODULWHPUHVSRQVH´5HLVHHWDO
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p.557). In IRT, statistical models that specify the conditional probability of an individual to 
response in a particular response category of one item are derived. Measurement invariance 
in IRT is even stricter than within the framework of confirmatory factor analyses, because 
equality constraints are imposed on the probability of responding to the particular categories. 
Establishing measurement invariance hence implies that the item functions unbiased, that is 
LQGLYLGXDOV DW WKH ³VDPH ODWHQW OHYHO KDYH WKH same expected probability of response 
UHJDUGOHVV RI JURXS PHPEHUVKLS´ 5HLVH HW DO  S  9LRODWLRQV WR PHDVXUHPHQW 
invariance, in turn, are reflected in differential item functioning (DIF) and indicate that, 
dependent on group membership, individuals have systematically different probabilities to 
respond to specific item categories. However, in this thesis, the confirmatory factor analyses 
approach is chosen and, hence, will be described in more detail in what follows (see Lord, 
1980, for an extensive introduction to IRT). 
The factor analytic model with non-zero means of manifest and latent variables is 
specified as follows in a multigroup factor model: 
 
yg = Ĳg + ȁg Șg + įg                                                           (1) 
 
where y denotes observed scores, g   «G indicate groups, Ĳ represents a vector of 
intercepts, ȁ is the factor loading matrix, Ș is the vector of scores on the latent variables, and 
į is the vector of residual terms.  
Hence, the variance-covariance matrix can be derived: 
 
¦g = ȁ Ȍg ȁ'g + Ĭg                                                           (2) 
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where ¦ denotes the covariance matrix of the items, Ȍdenotes the covariance matrix of the 
factors, and Ĭdenotes the variances and covariances of the residuals. The mean structure that 
is also needed to test for measurement invariance can be expressed in the following equation:  
 
ȝg = Ĳg + ȁg Įg                                                                  (3) 
 
where Įdenotes the mean vector of a factor in group g. 
Measurement invariance is a matter of degree and different levels can be described as 
will be shown below. According to Meredith (1993), the highest degree of measurement 
invariance can be expressed in: 
 
 (yi _ Și, g) =  (y _ Ș)                                                      (4) 
 
where y and Șdenote observed scores and factor scores, respectively and g denotes group 
membership. Equation (4) states that if measurement invariance holds then y as a function of 
Ș is equal across groups. In other words, measurement invariance implies that given a 
subjects factor scores Ș, the subjects observed scores y do not depend on group membership, 
that is no bias of group membership exists. 
The most basic level of MI is configural invariance, which implies that the same 
items indicate the same factor in each group or across time (Meredith & Horn, 2001). 
Without configural invariance to hold, items may be subscribed to different factors, 
indicating that the conceptualization of the items is ambiguous. The next level is weak 
invariance, which implies that the factor loadings of the items can be constrained to be equal 
across groups or time. In other words, ȁ in (2) and (3) is constrained to be equal across 
groups or time (Meredith & Horn, 2001). If weak invariance holds, this indicates that the 
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proportion of how items contribute information to the assessment of the latent factor remains 
unchanged. Factor (co-)variances can be compared. On the next level, strong invariance is 
usually tested, implying that the intercepts are invariant across time or groups, that is Ĳg  (in 
(3)) are constrained to be equal (Meredith & Horn, 2001). Conceptually this describes that no 
significant level differences exist between groups that are not attributable to the underlying 
latent construct (Bollen, 1989). Factor means can be compared with strong measurement 
invariance. Eventually, strict invariance implies equal residual variances across groups or 
time, that is, Ĭ, are constrained to be equal across groups or time (Meredith & Teresi, 2006). 
With strict measurement invariance to hold, all changes in variances on the latent level are 
attributable to changes in the latent construct since error variances are equal across groups or 
time (Chen, Sousa & West, 2005). 
Because change is ubiquitous in development, not one but several different aspects of 
change are of interest in developmental research, namely changes on the group level as well 
as changes of individuals (Martin & Zimprich, 2005; Nesselroade, 2001; Zimprich & 
Mascherek, 2010). To meet this criterion it is necessary to analyze data sets from different 
perspectives and to include different dimensions along which changes can occur. In what 
follows I will briefly address structural change, absolute change, change of divergence, 
differential change, and specific versus general change (Allemand, Zimprich & Hertzog, 
2007; Martin & Zimprich, 2005).  
Structural change refers to the persistence of the covariance pattern between factors 
across groups or time (Martin & Zimprich, 2005). It describes whether the relation of 
variables of a given construct remains the same. In research on cognition, structural change is 
referred to as differentiation and dedifferentiation, where differentiation implies lower and 
dedifferentiation higher interfactor correlations (Zimprich & Martin, 2010). Although 
structural change mainly refers to the relation between established factors, it still is a matter 
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of degree and contains the different degrees of measurement invariance (Allemand et al., 
2007; Meredith & Horn, 2001). 
Absolute change refers to the mean change of a construct across time or groups. It 
conceptually describes how a construct changes on average (Allemand et al, 2007; Martin & 
Zimprich, 2005). A second aspect describing the trajectory or differences on group level is 
change of divergence. Change of divergence refers to the question whether interindividual 
differences change across time. Is the average range becoming wider, smaller or does it 
remain the same across time or groups (Zimprich & Mascherek, 2010)? Change of 
divergence hence describes the homogeneity or heterogeneity of a construct within a group. 
An increase in variances implies individuals drifting apart. Hence, change of divergence hints 
at interindividual differences in development; however, it not necessarily implies differential 
change (see below). Although mean level changes and changes in divergence are informative 
in terms of an average (maybe normative) progression, note that individual trajectories might 
deviate from those predicted by absolute change and change of divergence.  
Differential change refers to possible changes in rank-order between individuals. 
Differential change is a measure to assess individual changes across time. It can only be 
assessed longitudinally (Allemand, Zimprich & Martin, 2008; Martin & Zimprich, 2005). 
Changes in rank-order conceptually imply that some individuals change to a smaller (or 
larger) amount than others. Differential change indicates that the trajectory of the construct 
under study is different for different individuals. 
A last aspect of change refers to general versus specific change (Allemand, Zimprich 
& Martin, 2008). This aspect describes the generality of change in a given construct, hence 
addresses the question whether an underlying mechanism can be ascribed to the change in 
different (sub)-factors (Martin & Zimprich, 2005). Empirically, general versus specific 
change is assessed in correlating longitudinal change scores in the constructs. If changes are 
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highly related, this would suggest that one underlying mechanism could be responsible for 
the observed change in the different factors. General change denotes a necessary, however, 
not sufficient condition to infer that one underlying mechanism might drive change in two or 
more related constructs.  
Only if all five aspects of change are considered in an analysis of development, a 
detailed picture concerning changes on group and individual level can be drawn. For 
developmental research, investigating change from different perspectives allows for gaining 
insight in different mechanisms underlying development. For instance, normative and 
nonnormative changes in individuals could be disentangled. While strong mean-level changes 
(i.e., absolute change) are rather linked to normative changes, rank-order changes hint at 
stronger nonnormative, individual changes. Because both types of change can occur 
independently, it is mandatory to investigate both in order to shed light on the different 
mechanisms that underlie possibly observed change. If rank-order changes would be 
observed in Typical Intellectual Engagement, it is plausible to assume that changes observed 
are caused by nonnormative influences. If, however, only mean-level change would occur, 
the conclusion that Typical Intellectual Engagement was strongly dependent on biological 
mechanisms and could not easily be influenced would be more adequate. Hence, 
investigating change from different angles enables inferences about the basic developmental 
characteristics of a construct. In the next chapter I know turn to the description of the 
questions addressed in the current work. 
1.5. The current work 
Research examining the influence of non-cognitive influences on cognitive-
development has yielded varying results and leaves a number of questions unanswered. Thus, 
we aim at further investigating the development of person characteristics that influence 
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cognitive development such as Typical Intellectual Engagement (1.2.; Study 1 and Study 2) 
and the relation between subjective and objective cognitive performance (1.3; Study 3 and 
Study 4) across the adult lifespan. The present thesis is thus divided into two parts. Both parts 
are concerned with non-cognitive aspects of cognitive development in adulthood; however, 
two slightly different approaches are taken. In this chapter, the two broad research questions 
will be formulated and presented. 
First, above and beyond the influence of changes in cognitive variables on cognitive 
development, several proximal and distal personal factors also need to be taken into account 
in order to establish a comprehensive lifespan theory on cognitive development (cf., 
Ackerman, 1996; Cattell, 1987; Scarmeas & Stern, 2003; Schooler, 1984). Environments 
surrounding an individual (Hess, 2005; Schooler, 1984) and aspects within an individual such 
as personality, interests, and motivation, contribute to and influence the developmental 
trajectory of cognitive functions. Within the limit of biological boundaries, cognitive ageing 
seems to be open to the deliberate control of an individual. Inferring from these theoretical 
considerations, Goff and Ackerman (1992) proposed Typical Intellectual Engagement as one 
important person characteristic that contributes to the development of knowledge and that 
might explain interindividual differences in cognitive ageing over and above differences in 
cognitive ability. Typical Intellectual Engagement is conceptually located among personality 
and intelligence and is significantly related to knowledge acquisition and academic 
achievement as a proxy for knowledge (Goff & Ackerman, 1992; Rolfhus & Ackerman, 
1999). As outlined above, Typical Intellectual Engagement is thought to influence the 
direction and the extent of knowledge acquisition and, hence, cognitive development in 
general (e.g., Chamorro-Premuzic, Furnham, & Ackerman, 2006a). It has also been outlined 
that, although postulated as a rather stable person characteristic (Goff & Ackerman, 1992), 
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Typical Intellectual Engagement is prone to experiences and motivational influences (e.g., 
Ackerman et al., 1995; Kanfer, 1990).  
Having discussed the relation between Typical Intellectual Engagement and cognitive 
development, the question arises: How does Typical Intellectual Engagement itself develop 
across the adult lifespan? No research has been conducted yet to address this question. Before 
the mutual development of both constructs can be investigated, Typical Intellectual 
Engagement itself needs to be studied further in a developmental context itself. Also, 
knowledge of the developmental trajectory of Typical Intellectual Engagement may provide 
additional information that could facilitate the positioning of the construct at the intersection 
of motivation, intelligence, interest, and personality. This is what Study 1 (2.1.) and Study 2 
(2.2.) of the present thesis aim at. Study 1 investigates age-related differences in Typical 
Intellectual Engagement cross-sectionally in young and old adults to gain large scale 
information about Typical Intellectual Engagement. While this helps to draw a picture of 
Typical Intellectual Engagement in a lifespan scope, no inferences can be drawn about the 
individual from cross-sectional research. Age differences between young and old individuals 
should not be interpreted as reflecting ageing effects within an individual (e.g., Hofer & 
Sliwinski, 2001). Additionally, in cross-sectional data, cohort effects and many years of 
systematic environmental influences cannot be controlled for, leading to possibly biased 
results. Still, cross-sectional data sets are a useful tool in developmental research, because 
large age differences can be covered and, thus, assumptions about the possible development 
of a construct can be made, provided that measurement invariance is established. 
In order to complement the cross-sectional results of Study 1, in Study 2 the 
development of Typical Intellectual Engagement is investigated longitudinally across five 
years. Therefore, inferences can be made about the development of Typical Intellectual 
Engagement within an individual. Additionally, idiosyncrasies that might act as confounding 
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variables in cross-sectional data can be controlled for. Taken together, covering both, the 
large age difference in Study 1 in order to learn more about Typical Intellectual Engagement 
in young and old adults and the longitudinal findings in Study 2 to be able to make inferences 
about developmental trajectories and individual differences, represents a sound approach for 
understanding the development of Typical Intellectual Engagement across the adult lifespan.  
Investigating the development of Typical Intellectual Engagement across the adult 
lifespan will allow gaining an understanding of the trajectory of the construct. This allows for 
reliably relating Typical Intellectual Engagement to trajectories of cognitive abilities and 
further investigation of the influence of Typical Intellectual Engagement on knowledge 
acquisition. So far, the relation has only been studied in cross-sectional studies (Dellenbach 
& Zimprich, 2009) but, to the best of our knowledge, no one has investigated the mutual 
influence. However, in order to do so and to draw reliable conclusion, the development of 
Typical Intellectual Engagement itself needs to be understood. Study 1 and 2 will contribute 
to this understanding and will provide a developmental framework within which the 
developmental dependency of cognitive abilities and Typical Intellectual Engagement could 
further be investigated. Additionally, the studies allow disentangling different components of 
Typical Intellectual Engagement. Depending on the trajectory, inferences can be made 
whether Typical Intellectual Engagement is stronger grounded in personality or motivation. 
Hence, Study 1 and 2 will provide empirical evidence for the theoretical conceptualization 
outlined in 1.2.1.  
Second, if cognitive development is partly influenced by the LQGLYLGXDO¶V amount of 
engagement in (cognitively) challenging activities, then one central prerequisite is the ability 
WR UHOLDEO\HYDOXDWHRQH¶VRZQIXQFWLRQLQJDeliberate attempts to expediently engage more 
or less in (cognitive) activities to maintain a desired level of functioning depend on the ability 
WRPRQLWRURQH¶VRZQSHUIRUPDQFH(QJDJHPHQWDVVXFKLVQRWQHFHVVDULO\OLQNHGWRSUHFLVH
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self-evaluation. However, in order to expediently manage the investment of cognitive 
activities in order to maintain a satisfactory level of functioning, efficient self-evaluation 
seems to be an important aspect. 
In Study 3 (3.1.) ZHDGGUHVVWKHTXHVWLRQRI³What do cognitive reports reflect?´ in a 
group of either healthy, mildly cognitive impaired or demented clinical outpatients. Are 
cognitive complaints closely related to affect or do they reliably reflect cognitive losses? We 
hypothesize that investigating this question in a group of memory clinic outpatients should be 
especially informative. In an experimental setting the accuracy of judgements has been found 
to increase in older adults with increasing meaningfulness of the task (cf., Hess, Rosenberg & 
Waters, 2001). Also, in older individuals, concerns with age-related losses in abilities are 
more salient and hence easier accessible (e.g., Weiss & Lang, in press). Both aspects should 
apply to a group of individuals seeking help due to perceived problems in memory 
functioning. $V D JURXS RI LQGLYLGXDOV SURQH WR FRJQLWLYH FKDQJH VHOI HYDOXDWLRQ RI RQH¶V
own cognitive performance should be highly relevant and, hence, salient and easily 
accessible. Additionally, in a group of individuals that are in part objectively impaired in 
cognitive performance, cognitive complaints can be addressed concerning their potential 
differentiating role at different stages of levels of functioning. The results of Study 3 will, 
hence, allow inferences about the relation between subjective and objective cognitive 
performance in differently cognitively impaired groups. This will help understanding whether 
for different cognitive levels self-evaluations of cognitive functioning serve different 
purposes or are differentially accurate or important for different functional levels.  
Study 4 (3.2.) also addresses WKHTXHVWLRQRI³:KDWGRFRJQLWLYHFRPSODLQWVUHIOHFW"´
however, a rather methodological approach to the topic is taken. It is argued that and 
investigated whether the relation between self reported and objectively measured memory 
performance is better assessed in looking at commonalities in change across time (see also 
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Zimprich et al., 2003). We hypothesize that assessing the commonality in change results in a 
stronger correlation between the constructs. This would indicate that the purpose of 
subjective ratings might rather be that of detecting deviations than to assess absolute 
performance levels. In order to understand the relation between objective and self-rated 
cognitive performance, it might be helpful to focus on the commonality in change rather than 
on the performance and the rating at a static, given time point. Having data that cover a time 
span of 12 years, enough change variance in both variables should emerge to enable reliable 
modelling of parallel change trajectories. From the results of Study 4 we will learn whether 
the repeatedly found small relation between subjective and objective cognitive evaluations is 
due to confounding individual differences that cannot be controlled for in cross-section. If 
this was the case, the change correlation should be significantly larger than the level 
correlation. If the change correlation would remain low this would indicate that either 
variables that have not yet been taken into account influence the relation or that the purpose 
of the relation between subjective and objective cognitive performance is to manage 
cognitive functioning through the monitoring or allocation of cognitive resources that are not 
precisely linked to the reliable self-evaluation of measurable objective functioning. It seems 
possible that intentionally allocating and monitoring resources would be restricted to domains 
that are of special importance to the maintenance of subjective well-being. Because the 
importance of different domains could be different between individuals, the relation between 
subjective and objective performance would not show to be large if subjective importance 
ratings would not be controlled for. 
Altogether, in the present thesis a variety of approaches are taken to investigate 
different aspects of non-cognitive influences on cognitive development across the adult 
lifespan. The four studies will be introduced in more detail now. 
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2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TYPICAL INTELLECTUAL ENGAGEMENT ACROSS THE ADULT 
LIFESPAN 
In this chapter, two studies will be presented that investigate the development of 
Typical Intellectual Engagement across the adult lifespan in detail. While in Study 1 Typical 
Intellectual Engagement is examined in a cross-sectional design, in Study 2 Typical 
Intellectual Engagement is investigated longitudinally across 5 years. 
 
2.1. Age related differences in Typical Intellectual Engagement between young and old 
adults1 
2.1.1. Introduction 
A construct filling the gap between personality and intelligence was put forth by Goff 
DQG $FNHUPDQ  7KH\ SRVWXODWHG ³Typical Intellectual Engagement´ WR GHVFULEH
specific aspects of personality that are closely related to intelligence. Typical Intellectual 
Engagement KDV EHHQ GHILQHG DV ³D SHUVRQDOLW\ FRQVWUXFW WKDW represents an individual's 
DYHUVLRQRUDWWUDFWLRQWRWDVNVWKDWDUHLQWHOOHFWXDOO\WD[LQJ´$FNHUPDQ et al., 1995, p. 276) 
Thus, it is believed to be related to acculturative and purposeful development and expression 
of certain intellectual abilities. Typical Intellectual Engagement illustrates that people differ 
with respect to their breadth of interests and their need for deeper understanding of complex 
issues. For example, one person may spend several hours a day reading and thinking, whereas 
another person may prefer sports or socializing. Typical Intellectual Engagement exemplifies 
these differences with respect to the degree of engagement in intellectual activities in leisure 
time or in job performance and academic achievement (Chamorro-Premuzic, Furnham & 
Ackerman, 2006b; Wilhelm et al., 2003).  
                                                                                                                    
1  $VLPLODUYHUVLRQRIWKLVFKDSWHUKDVEHHQDFFHSWHGIRUSXEOLFDWLRQLQ³([SHULPHQWDO$JLQJ5HVHDUFK´ 
(Mascherek & Zimprich, in press)  
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Measurement of Typical Intellectual Engagement 
Based on the theoretical construct of Typical Intellectual Engagement, Ackerman and 
Goff (1994) developed a selfrating scale to measure Typical Intellectual Engagement. The 
original questionnaire entails 59 Items. A number of studies have applied an abridged version 
with item selection being unique to each study (e.g., Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008; Wilhelm 
et. al, 2003). The Typical Intellectual Engagement scale measures differences in individual 
interests and engagement in intellectual activities. The Typical Intellectual Engagement scale 
as a whole can be divided into several different subfactors. Depending on the study, items 
have been assigned to different subfactors, for example, Reading, Abstract Thinking, 
Problem Solving, Intellectual Curiosity, Intellectual Avoidance, or Contemplation (Ackerman 
& Goff, 1994; Ferguson, 1999; Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008; Wilhelm et. al, 2003). 
Referring to the structure found by Dellenbach and Zimprich (2008), the present study 
postulates a four factor structure with the factors Reading, Abstract Thinking, Problem 
Solving, and Intellectual Curiosity. All four factors describe different aspects of Typical 
Intellectual Engagement. Reading aims at the quantity and quality of books a person reads, 
FRQWDLQLQJ LWHPV VXFK DV ³, UHDG DW OHDVW WHQ ERRNV D \HDU´ $EVWUDFW Thinking captures 
LQWHUHVW LQSKLORVRSKLFDO LVVXHVDQGFRQWDLQV LWHPVVXFKDV³<RXDUHSKLORVRSKLFDO LQFOLQHG
WKDW LV LQFOLQHG WR SKLORVRSKL]H DERXW WKLQJV´ 3UREOHP Solving aims at the aspect of 
engaging in thinNLQJDERXWHODERUDWH WKHRUHWLFDO LVVXHVDQGFRQWDLQV LWHPVVXFKDV³, UHDOO\
HQMR\ D WDVN WKDW LQYROYHV FRPLQJ XSZLWK QHZ VROXWLRQV WR SUREOHPV´ 7KH IRXUWK IDFWRU
Intellectual Curiosity, covers the more motivationally driven aspects of Typical Intellectual 
Engagement DQGFRQWDLQVLWHPVVXFKDV³,UHDOO\HQMR\DWDVNWKDWLQYROYHVFRPLQJXSZLWK
QHZVROXWLRQVWRSUREOHPV´ 
 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF TYPICAL INTELLECTUAL ENGAGEMENT   32  
Typical Intellectual Engagement and personality 
To place Typical Intellectual Engagement within the field of personality-intelligence 
research, the question of empirical relations to personality has to be addressed. Generally, 
Typical Intellectual Engagement is described as a highly stable trait-like a facet of personality 
(cf., Ackerman & Goff, 1994; Goff & Ackerman, 1992; Gow, Whiteman, Pattie & Deary, 
2005) and is conceptually linked to the BIG Five personality trait Openness to Experience. In 
validation studies, examining different samples, significant correlations (r = .65, p <  .05) 
between Typical Intellectual Engagement and Openness to Experience emerged repeatedly 
(Ackerman & Goff, 1994). More specifically, Ackerman and Goff (1994) showed that the 
correlations between Typical Intellectual Engagement and Openness to Experience are 
mainly based on an overlap with the facet Openness to Ideas. Ferguson (1999) found that the 
strongest associations among single Typical Intellectual Engagement subfactors and 
Openness to Experience emerged for abstract reasoning, a subdimension of Typical 
Intellectual Engagement (r = .54, p <  .001). Additionally, he found that Typical Intellectual 
Engagement and Openness to Experience put different stress on personal agencies. He 
correlated Typical Intellectual Engagement with measures of internal control beliefs and 
found a statistically significant relation (r = .37, p <  .001) whereas Openness to Experience 
remained statistically unrelated (r = .20, p >  .05) to internal control beliefs. Additionally, 
Paunonen and Ashton (2001) showed that measuring narrow personality traits is a better 
predictor for academic achievement than taking the broad factor as an indicator and here, 
again, Typical Intellectual Engagement is more precise. Taken together, the construct of 
Typical Intellectual Engagement reveals aspects of personality that are not encompassed by 
other well established personality traits but rather contributes specific information that is 
helpful for the process of understanding the personality - intelligence interplay. 
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Typical Intellectual Engagement and Intelligence 
In the following we will address the empirical relations between Typical Intellectual 
Engagement and intelligence. Correlations with crystallized intelligence measures were 
repeatedly found to be substantially higher than with fluid intelligence measures (Verbal 
Ability r = .49, p <  .05, Math r = .12, n.s.; Ackerman et al, 1995; see also Furnham & 
Chamorro-Premuzic, 2006; Zimprich et al., 2009). In a study conducted by Ackerman (2000), 
a significant positive correlation (r = .29, p <  .05) between Typical Intellectual Engagement 
and crystallized intelligence emerged. In a meta-analysis of personality - intelligence 
relations, Ackerman and Heggestad (1997) identified Typical Intellectual Engagement and 
Openness to Experience as the two personality traits being correlated with knowledge and 
achievement. The relations between Typical Intellectual Engagement and intelligence are 
thus mostly accounted for by measures of knowledge and crystallized intelligence. 
A possible explanation for the relations between Typical Intellectual Engagement and 
crystallized intelligence is provided by Cattell's investment hypothesis. According to this 
hypothesis, knowledge accumulation has to be considered in a larger context of non-ability 
traits such as personality, motivation and interests (Cattell, 1987). The amount of time and 
effort an individual invests in knowledge acquisition is more driven by motivation and 
personality than fluid ability. Ackerman (1996) further developed Cattell's investment 
hypothesis into his PPIK. He postulated that interindividual differences in interests and 
motivation account for interindividual differences in knowledge. Ackerman proposes that 
abilities determine the probability of success, and personality and motivation determine the 
amount of effort an individual puts into attempting a special task. Hence, personality and 
motivation may explain differences in adult intellectual competence where ability cannot 
account for those differences (Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2006b).  
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Both theories aim at providing a substantial framework in which the development of 
individual differences in knowledge can be understood. However, although Typical 
Intellectual Engagement has been recognized as an important influence on the development 
of knowledge (e.g., Furnham, Swami, Arteche & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2008; Gow et al., 
2005; Rolfhus & Ackerman, 1999; Wilhelm et al., 2003), the development of Typical 
Intellectual Engagement itself has not been addressed so far. Additionally, most existing 
research has been done on samples of undergraduates (e.g., Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2006b; 
2006a), whereas Typical Intellectual Engagement in old has not been addressed yet (for an 
exception see Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008). Hence, the aim of the present study was to 
study the structure of Typical Intellectual Engagement in young and old adults.  
Types of change and differences in personality development 
In research on development, different types of change can be examined, namely, 
absolute differences, differences in variances, structural differences, differential change, and 
general versus specific change (see Allemand et al., 2007; Martin & Zimprich, 2005). 
Differential or rank order and general versus specific change can only be examined 
longitudinally. As the present study deals with cross-sectional data, we concentrate on 
absolute differences, differences in variances and structural differences. In the following, we 
briefly outline the concept of each type of change and present relevant literature. Generally, 
research on the different types of change is sparse. Concerning Typical Intellectual 
Engagement, to the best of our knowledge, no comprehensive studies exist; hence, we present 
research on personality concerning the different types of change. 
Absolute differences. Research concerning the mean-level structure refers to the 
stability of an absolute quantity of an attribute across groups or over time. Although it is the 
most commonly used measure to investigate change or differences across time or age groups 
it mainly is the least informative as it masks individual changes over time because changes 
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are only assessed on average (Martin & Zimprich, 2005). Mean-level changes in Openness to 
Experience most often have been found in terms of a decline into old age (Caprara, Caprara 
& Steca, 2003; Helson, Kwan, John & Jones, 2002; McCrae et al., 1999; Roberts, Walton & 
Viechtbauer, 2006). In their comprehensive meta-analysis, Roberts et al. (2006) found 
significant decline in Openness to Experience in the age range from 60-70. No change was 
found for the age range from 22-60. Allemand et al. (2007) found results indicating into the 
same direction. Examining the Big Five Personality traits in a middle aged (42-46 years) and 
an old aged (60-64 years) sample in a 4-year interval each, they found significantly lower 
values for Openness to Experiences in the old, both cross-sectionally and longitudinally. 
Hence, we expect mean-level differences pointing towards less Typical Intellectual 
Engagement in the old for the following reasons. First, literature on mean-level decline in 
personality is quite consistent. Second, as Typical Intellectual Engagement exhibits a close 
relation to cognition as well, and here mean-level changes are also found, we assume, that the 
part accounting for the relation, might drive decline in Typical Intellectual Engagement in old 
age (e.g., Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Rolfhus & Ackerman, 1999; Salthouse, 1991).  
Differences in divergence. Research on differences in divergence among groups aims 
at interindividual differences within a given construct. Empirically, change of divergence is 
assessed by examining the variances across groups or time (Martin & Zimprich, 2005). 
Conceptually, greater variance implies greater heterogeneity; small variance implies 
homogeneity with respect to interindividual differences of personality traits. The only studies 
that examine differences in variance reveal inconsistent results. Small, Hertzog, Hultsch and 
Dixon (2003) report no change in variances in the BIG Five personality traits across a 6 year 
period in older adults. In contrast, Allemand, Zimprich and Martin (2008) report an increase 
in variance with respect to Openness to Experience over a 12-year period in older adults. 
Taken those results together, one may conclude that differences in variance do occur across 
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lifespan, but in order to assess change of divergence in personality traits one needs to observe 
a substantial time interval. Hence, inferring from the studies presented above we expect to 
find an increase in interindividual variability as, although cross-sectionally, our data cover an 
age range of almost 50 years. 
Structural differences. Research on structural differences in personality traits refers to 
the positioning of the different traits relative to each other across groups. Empirically, 
structural continuity is assessed by examining the covariation patterns across age groups 
(Caspi & Roberts, 2001). Most studies examining the covariance structure among personality 
traits, either longitudinally or cross-sectionally, report substantial stability (e.g., Robins, 
Fraley, Roberts & Treszniewski, 2001). Using the NEO-PI, Small et al. (2003) found 
structural stability in a sample of 474 adults (ranging from 55 to 85 years) across a 6-year 
period. Examining cross-sectional data, Allemand, Zimprich and Hendriks (2008) found 
structural stability in all age groups (N = 2.494, six groups, ranging from 16-91 years). One 
contradictory finding is reported by Allemand, Zimprich and Martin (2008). They found 
structural change in the personality traits of the NEO-FFI across a 12 year period in an old-
aged sample (N = 300, 60-64 years at first measurement occasion). Covariances between 
Extraversion and Conscientiousness, between Openness and Conscientiousness and between 
Agreeableness and Conscientiousness increased significantly across the 12-year period. Due 
to the fact that mainly structural stability of personality is reported we expect to find 
structural stability, that is no differences in the covariance structure of Typical Intellectual 
Engagement between young and old adults. 
To summarize, in the present study we concentrate on differences between young and 
old adults concerning absolute differences, differences in divergence and structural 
differences in Typical Intellectual Engagement. Relying on the results of studies on Openness 
to Experience, we expect to find substantial differences in the mean-level structure for all 
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four subfactors, namely less Typical Intellectual Engagement in the old, and differences in 
divergence, namely an increase in interindividual variability in the old, whereas we expect to 
find substantial structural stability across groups. 
2.1.2. Method 
Participants 
The total sample of the present study comprised 832 participants, divided into two age 
groups. The subsample of older adults entailed individuals from the Zurich Longitudinal 
Study on Cognitive Aging (ZULU; Zimprich et al., 2008), an ongoing study on normative 
cognitive aging in Switzerland. The subsample comprised 364 participants in the age range of 
65-80 years (for details of sample recruitment and sample composition see Zimprich et al., 
2008). Participants were on average 72.99 years old (SD = 4.4 years), 46% of the participants 
were female. On average, participants had 12.8 years (SD = 3.0 years) of formal education. 
The young participants of the present study were undergraduate students from the University 
of Zurich. The subsample comprised 468 participants in the age range of 18-25 years. 
Participants were on average 21.12 years old (SD = 1.8 years), 69% of the participants were 
female. In terms of representativeness, both, the old and the young subsample, were more 
educated in comparison to the general population of persons of the same age. The comparison 
between the groups in the present sample still seems warranted, because the young sample 
was at the very beginning of their university training (i.e., 12.9 years of education on 
average), which matches the average 12.8 years of education in the old group.  
Measures.  
All analyses refer to an abridged version of the Typical Intellectual Engagement scale 
investigated by Dellenbach and Zimprich (2008). It contains 16 out of the 59 original items. 
Item selection was based on factor analyses of previous studies dealing with the structure of 
Typical Intellectual Engagement. By tendency all studies involved young, well educated 
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student samples, although the age range did include some older adults and some less educated 
persons, respectively. Across the different studies items with the highest factor loadings were 
selected (for details see Dellenbach & Zimprich 2008). The scale entails four related 
subfactors with four items each: Reading (e.g., I read a great deal), Problem Solving (e.g., I 
enjoy thinking out complicated problems), Abstract Thinking (e.g., Sometimes I like to 
consider concepts even if they may be of no practical con sequence), and Intellectual 
Curiosity (e.g., There are very few topics that bore me). Except for the factor Intellectual 
CXULRVLW\ IRXU LWHPV HDFKZHUH DVVLJQHG WR HDFK VXEIDFWRU ,WHP & ³,PDLQWDLQ , OLYHO\
interesWLQUHDGLQJERRNVRQDYDULHW\RIWRSLFV´ZDVDOORZHGWRORDGRQLQWHOOHFWXDOFXULRVLW\
as well as reading. Cross-loading was allowed as the item's phrasing comprised aspects that 
fit both for reading and intellectual curiosity. Subjects were asked to answer the items on a 5-
point-Likert-scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). High scores then 
indicate a high interest in engaging in intellectual demanding activities. Two items had to be 
reversed for data analyses. The factorial structure consists of four intercorrelated first order 
factors. The subfactors with their four related items each and their corresponding means and 
standard deviations for each group are presented in Table 1.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Typical Intellectual Engagement Items for Young and Old 
 Mean Young SD Young Mean Old SD Old 
Reading 
TIE1A* 3.60 1.05 3.16 1.31 
TIE1B* 3.74 .99 3.93 1.07 
TIE1C 3.29 .95 3.35 1.15 
TIE1D* 3.53 1.32 3.10 1.56 
Problem solving 
TIE2A (R)* 3.53 1.06 3.74 .98 
TIE2B* 3.15 .84 2.90 1.02 
TIE2C* 3.48 .90 3.26 1.17 
TIE2D 3.20 .98 3.22 1.1 
Abstract thinking 
TIE3A* 3.74 1.18 3.15 1.35 
TIE3B (R)* 3.35 1.18 2.95 1.28 
TIE3C 3.47 .96 3.38 1.11 
TIE3D* 3.84 1.08 4.08 .77 
Intellectual curiosity 
TIE4A* 3.52 .85 3.91 .95 
TIE4B* 2.65 1.0 3.72 1.25 
TIE4C* 3.17 1.05 3.75 .95 
TIE4D* 3.59 .84 3.79 1.08 
Note: * = group differences p < .01; N for Young = 468, N for Old = 364; all items were answered on a 5-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree); TIE = Typical Intellectual 
Engagement; (R) = reversed Items 
 
Statistical Analyses 
Four degrees of measurement invariance were examined by constraining different 
parameters to be equal across the two groups. According to Meredith and Horn (2001) the 
following different forms of measurement invariance were imposed on the dataset: configural 
invariance, weak factorial invariance, strong factorial invariance, and strict factorial 
invariance. Analysis of measurement invariance was conducted as a prerequisite to provide a 
valid basis for examining absolute differences, differences in divergence, and structural 
differences on the latent level. Without establishing measurement invariance, emerging 
differences could also be due to differences on manifest level as well, hence, causing 
difficulties in interpretation. Analyses on the latent level were conducted using confirmatory 
factor analysis. Means and variances were also included into the analyses to model 
interindividual differences.  
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As criteria for model fit, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and the Root Mean Square 
Error of Approximation (RMSEA) are reported. Values of the CFI above 0.90 denote a well 
fitting model, whereas for the RMSEA values less than 0.06 may be interpreted as indicating 
good model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). In addition, we report Ȥð-values, degrees of freedom 
(df), and corresponding p-values for all models examined. Model parameterization and factor 
scaling of the configural invariance model were achieved by fixing the factor variances to one 
and the factor means to zero. These constraints were relaxed, depending on the model 
specified and its identification status. Specifically, after having established partial strong 
factorial invariance (see below) across age groups, those constraints were only retained for 
the young age group, the reference group, whereas for the old age group, factor means and 
factor variances were freely estimated. The estimated factor means and variances then 
represent relative values or differences that have to be interpreted in comparison with the 
reference group. Note that due to the unbalanced sex ratio in our young and old sample, we 
statistically controlled for sex throughout the analyses. Throughout the analyses we use SPSS 
17 and Mplus version 3.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 2004). 
2.1.3. Results 
Measurement Invariance 
We started model building with a Configural Invariance Model of the four correlated 
Typical Intellectual Engagement-factors Reading, Problem Solving, Abstract Thinking and 
Intellectual Curiosity where for both groups the same four manifest variables served as an 
indicator of each latent factor. By constraining which item loads on which factor to be equal 
across groups, one can test whether the general composition of the specified factor is equal 
across the two tested groups. As Table 2 shows, the model achieved an acceptable fit 
concerning the CFI and RMSEA (CFI = 0.93, RMSEA = 0.051). Although the Ȥð-value 
indicated a significant departure of the model from the data, we accepted the model as an 
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adequate description. We did so because the residuals for the covariance matrices exhibited 
small departures on every item but no pronounced departures on specific items. So the 
conclusion seems warranted that the overall fit of the model was acceptable and the degree of 
PLVILWUHSUHVHQWHGJHQHUDO³EDFNJURXQGQRLVH´ 
Table 2. Estimated Models 
Model Ȥð df ǻȤð ǻdf CFI RMSEA 90% CI 
Model without 
grouping 
320.128 92   0.92 0.055 0.048 - 0.061 
Configural 
Invariance 
395.064* 189   0.93 0.051 0.044 - 0.058 
Weak MI 
 
439.897* 202 44.833* 13 0.92 0.053 0.046 - 0.060 
Strong MI 
 
600.346* 214 160.449* 12 0.87 0.066 0.060 - 0.072 
Partial Strong 
MIb  
480.122* 211 40.225* 9 0.91 0.056 0.049 - 0.062 
Strict MI 
 
590.268* 226 110.146* 16 0.88 0.062 0.056 - 0.068 
Absolute 
stabilityb 
619.141* 
 
214 139.019*a 4a 0.87 0.067 0.061 - 0.074 
Stability of 
Divergenceb 
525.710* 214 45.588*a 4a 0.89 0.059 0.053 - 0.066 
Structural 
stabilityb 
525.338* 216 45.216*a 6a 0.89 0.059 0.052 - 0.065 
*p < .01, a represents the difference to Model Partial Strong MI; b intercepts of TIE1B, TIE2A, TIE3D were 
freely estimated for both groups; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square of 
Approximation; CI = Confidence Interval of RMSEA;  
 
We then tested for weak factorial invariance (Model weak MI), implying that the 
factor loadings of the items on the latent variables remained stable across groups. In 
constraining factor loadings to be equal across groups, one can test if the relative relation of 
the items remains the same. As can be seen from Table 2, this led to a significant reduction in 
model fit in terms of Ȥð differences compared to the model of configural invariance. 
According to Cheung and Rensvold (2002) the CFI and RMSEA still indicate an acceptable 
fit (CFI = 0.92, RMSEA = 0.053) and therefore we accepted weak measurement invariance, 
as sample size was large and Ȥð-values become more sensitive for any deviation with 
increasing sample size. Inspection revealed as a source of the loss of fit a general 
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rather that the model as a whole represented the data relatively worse. This seems reasonable 
as the model implies stronger constraints on the data set. Table 3 shows the unstandardized 
and standardized factor loadings for the measurement model. Note that parameter constraints 
act on covariance level. Standardized factor loadings can be different in numbers although 
equality constraints do hold, because of the standardization. 
In a third step, we imposed strong factorial invariance (Model strong MI) by requiring 
the intercepts of the manifest variables to be equal across groups. By constraining intercepts 
to be equal across groups, one can test for if systematic differences on the intercept level exist 
between the groups. As can be seen from Table 2, again, model fit was reduced significantly 
in terms of Ȥð-differences compared to model weak MI. This time, CFI and RMSEA changed 
as well, implying a significant decrease in fit (CFI = 0.87, RMSEA = 0.053). Upon 
inspection, we estimated three intercepts freely (namely, item TIE1B, TIE2A, TIE3D) as 
those items were closely related to activities our young sample carried out on a daily base and 
therefore confound the requirements of their study activities and true intellectual engagement. 
After allowing the critical items to be freely estimated we accepted partial strong factorial 
invariance across groups as, albeit, the differences in Ȥð indicated a significant decrease in 
model fit, CFI and RMSEA were within an acceptable range (CFI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.056). 
According to Byrne, Shavelson and Muthén (1989) testing for differences on factor level is 
reasonable with partial strong measurement invariance as long as model specification 
includes multiple indicators and at least one measure is invariant. As we had four indicators 
for each factor with only one free item intercept in three factors, the criteria for interpreting 
differences on latent level are met in our model. 
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Table 3. Unstandardized and standardized factor loadings for the measurement model  
 Unstandardized Factor loadings Standardized Young Standardized Old 
 
Reading    
TIE1A 0.68 0.67 0.67 
TIE1B 0.61 0.63 0.72 
TIE1C 0.55 0.56 0.61 
TIE1D 0.83 0.63 0.75 
Problem solving    
TIE2A (R) 0.32 0.31 0.49 
TIE2B 0.33 0.40 0.52 
TIE2C 0.57 0.61 0.76 
TIE2D 0.51 0.54 0.74 
Abstract thinking 
TIE3A 0.56 0.50 0.62 
TIE3B (R) 0.46 0.40 0.53 
TIE3C 0.54 0.59 0.72 
TIE3D 0.29 0.29 0.54 
Intellectual curiosity 
TIE4A 0.41 0.49 0.53 
TIE4B 0.42 0.43 0.45 
TIE4C 0.35 0.34 0.43 
TIE4D 0.46 0.54 0.57 
TIE1C 0.28 0.29 0.28 
Note: Factor loadings refer to the Model weak factorial invariance. Standardized factor loadings can be different 
in numbers although equality constraints do hold, because of the standardization; (R) = reversed Items 
 
In a last step concerning measurement invariance, we tested for strict factorial 
invariance, that is constraining the residuals of the manifest variables to be equal across 
groups. As can be seen from Table 2, this model did not achieve an acceptable fit, implying 
that strict factorial invariance does not hold across groups. Differences in Ȥðand the CFI and 
RMSEA imply a substantial decrease in model fit in model strict MI (CFI = 0.88, RMSEA = 
0.062). Hence, we used the partial strong factorial invariance model as a reference model 
throughout our further analyses.  
Absolute differences 
To test for absolute differences, that is factor-mean differences across groups on the 
latent level, factor means were constrained to be equal across groups. As can be seen from 
Table 2, this led to a profound reduction in model fit (ǻȤð= 139.019ǻGI= 4, p < .01, CFI = 
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0.87, RMSEA = 0.067). Note that as factor means in the young group were set to zero as a 
reference, these estimates already reflect mean-level differences between young and old. 
Hence, at least one factor mean in the old group was significantly different from zero. When 
factor means were freely estimated based on the Model Partial strong MI, values were -.451 
for Reading, -.705 for Problem Solving, -.837 for Abstract Thinking, and 1.495 for 
Intellectual Curiosity. Mean differences were all statistically significant (p < .01). As can be 
seen from Figure 1, the differences, expressed in Cohen's d, were of medium to large effect 
size. Old showed less Typical Intellectual Engagement in Reading (d = -.38), in Problem 
Solving (d = -.54), and Abstract Thinking (d = -.64), whereas in Intellectual Curiosity they 
exhibited substantially more Typical Intellectual Engagement (d = 1.04) than the young 
participants.  
 
 
Figure 1. Mean-level differences expressed in Cohen's d  
                   Note: all differences are significant on p < .01 
Differences in divergence 
To test for differences in divergence, that is differences in variance across groups, 
variances of Reading, Problem Solving, Abstract Thinking, and Intellectual Curiosity were 
constrained to be equal across groups. Stability of divergence would indicate that the young 
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and the old differ not substantially in terms of interindividual differences. As can be seen 
from Table 2 constraining variances to be equal across groups led to a significant reduction of 
model fit (ǻȤð= 45.588ǻGI= 4, p < .01, CFI = 0.89, RMSEA = 0.059). Hence, at least one 
factor variance differed between the young and old. When factor variances were freely 
estimated based on model Partial strong MI, variances were 1.579 for Reading, 2.299 for 
Problem Solving, 1.846 for Abstract Thinking, and 1.424 for intellectual curiosity, 
respectively. As can be seen in Figure 2, variances in Reading (ǻȤð = 11.805 ǻGI = 1), 
Problem Solving (ǻȤð= 29.279ǻGI= 1), and Abstract Thinking (ǻȤð= 13.385ǻGI= 1) were 
significantly different (p < .01), whereas the difference in Intellectual Curiosity (ǻȤð= 3.532; 
ǻGI = 1) failed to reach statistical significance. These results reflect that, apart from 
Intellectual Curiosity, old participants were more heterogeneous than the young participants, 
thus exhibiting more profound interindividual differences in the old.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
Figure 2. Differences in variances between young and old      
      Note: *p < .01 
 
 
Structural differences 
To test for structural differences, that is differences in covariances across groups, 
covariances among the factors on latent level were constrained to be equal across groups. We 
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report correlations because they can be interpreted in terms of effect sizes (see Table 4). 
However, models are estimated using covariances, because correlations depend on the 
variances of the factors. As the variances are significantly different between the groups, 
covariances are used to avoid a bias in the estimation process. As can be seen from Table 2, 
this model did not reach an adequate fit (ǻȤð= 45.216ǻGI= 6, p < .01, CFI = 0.89, RMSEA 
= 0.059). Hence, at least one covariance had to be different across the two groups. As can be 
seen in Figure 3, the difference in reading/intellectual curiosity failed to reach significance, 
whereas all other five covariances among the four factors differed statistically significant 
between young and old participants (p < .01). Inspection revealed larger correlations in the 
old group. As can be seen from Table 4, correlations in the young group were only in the 
small to medium range (r = .18 to r = .48), except for abstract thinking/ problem solving (r = 
.71).  
Table 4. Factor correlations in young and old  
 Reading Abstract 
Thinking 
Problem 
Solving 
Intellectual 
Curiosity 
Reading  0.18 0.23 0.31 
Abstract Thinking 0.44  0.71 0.48 
Problem Solving 0.33 0.85  0.48 
Intellectual Curiosity 0.37 0.72 0.68  
Note: Correlations in the lower triangle indicate old, Correlations in the upper triangle indicate young 
In the old group, correlations ranged from medium to high level (r = .33 to r = .85), 
indicating stronger relationships among the four factors. Figure 3 shows that the effect of 
differences in correlations between young and old was medium in Problem Solving/Reading, 
Abstract Thinking/Problem Solving, Intellectual Curiosity/Problem Solving, and Intellectual 
Curiosity/Abstract Thinking. The difference in the correlation of Abstract Thinking/Reading 
revealed a large effect between young and old. The effect in Intellectual Curiosity/Reading 
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between young and old was very small, which is not surprising keeping in mind that the 
difference was nonsignificant.  
 
Figure 3. Differences in R2 between young and old 
    Note: *p < .01  
 
2.1.4. Discussion  
The goal of the present paper was to analyze age-related differences between young 
and old adults in the means, the variability, and the structure of Typical Intellectual 
Engagement. We expected a significant mean-level difference in the four subfactors of 
Typical Intellectual Engagement indicating less Typical Intellectual Engagement in the old 
sample. Additionally, we expected greater heterogeneity within the old sample, which would 
manifest itself in significant differences in factor variances. A third aspect to address was the 
covariance structure of the four factors. Inferring from results on covariance structure in the 
big five personality trait, we expected structural stability, that is no differences in covariance 
structure to emerge between young and old adults. Note that in general, although we 
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statistically controlled for sex throughout our analyses, interactions between group and sex 
can be possible.  
We began our analyses of the latent factor structure of the Typical Intellectual 
Engagement scale in testing different levels of measurement invariance. Configural and weak 
factorial invariance were established, implying that the four factor structure and the factor 
loadings of the corresponding items to each factor were equal across the two age groups. As a 
last step concerning measurement invariance, we established strong factorial invariance as a 
prerequisite for examining absolute differences, differences in divergence, and structural 
differences among groups. Only partial factorial invariance held. For an explanation note that 
with respect to the variance-covariance structure, the model is fitted to the data within groups, 
whereas, concerning the means, only between-group comparisons are possible. Hence, albeit 
the variance-covariance structure of the critical items reveals that within each of the two 
groups the model fits to a comparable degree, the mean structure of the four items reveals a 
reversed trend which needs further consideration for meaningful interpretation. The estimated 
intercepts for items TIE1B, TIE2A, TIE3D were higher for the old than for the young. 
Although from a methodological point of view analyses of differences on the latent level are 
allowed with partial factorial invariance established (Byrne et al., 1989; Reise et al., 1993) 
the exceptions are interesting from a conceptual point of view. We conclude that the wording 
of the items triggered an answering behaviour which referred to more motivationally driven 
aspects. This led to a different understanding of the items in contrast to the other items 
belonging to the respective factor. Considering the more motivationally driven aspects, the 
old sample exhibits more engagement than the young sample. This is not only reflected in the 
factor Intellectual Curiosity (see below) but is also present in the wording of some items.  
We then addressed age-related differences on the latent level. First, to assess absolute 
stability (mean-level differences), the means of the latent factors were constrained to be equal 
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across groups. Statistically significant mean differences emerged for all four factors, ranging 
from medium to strong effect sizes. Reading, Problem Solving, and Abstract Thinking 
showed significant decline in the old, whereas in Intellectual Curiosity an increase in the old 
emerged. This findings hint towards a multidirectionality of the development of Typical 
Intellectual Engagement across the lifespan. The differences in Reading, Problem Solving 
and Abstract Thinking can be explained when arguing with cognitive resources that are 
involved. Reading in general requires a large amount of cognitive capacity for processing, 
hence becomes more exhausting in old age. Problem Solving and Abstract Thinking are more 
strongly related to fluid aspects of cognition such as processing speed for example. Although 
Typical Intellectual Engagement represents an aspect of personality rather than cognition, we 
assume that experiencing substantial decline in those cognitive domains leads to less 
engagement in intellectually taxing activities as they become more exhausting. Another 
possible explanation is related to the construct in social psychology of implicit theories that 
individuals hold about aging and memory influencing responses on self ratings (cf., Hertzog 
& Hultsch, 2000). Implicit theories are informal constructs held by individuals about specific 
psychological phenomena. In general, young and old adults tend to believe in cognitive 
decline in old age (Kite, Stockdale, Whitley & Johnson, 2005; McDonald-Miszczak, Hertzog 
& Hultsch, 1995). Hence, as Typical Intellectual Engagement is a self-reported measurement 
the results could be biased by the belief in decline in old age. The biggest factor-mean 
difference was shown in more Intellectual Curiosity in the old. Leaning on results concerning 
Openness to Experience, we expected a decline in all four factors. Hence, the results support 
Typical Intellectual Engagement as contributing detailed information concerning the 
personality/intelligence interplay. Conceptually, a higher level of Intellectual Curiosity is not 
to be explained as straightforward. According to Cattell (1987) and Ackerman (1996), 
motivational aspects account for intelligence performance and academic achievement as well 
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which are represented by intellectual curiosity in the Typical Intellectual Engagement scale. 
We conclude that the increase in Intellectual Curiosity reflects a lifelong interest in academic 
and/or intellectually taxing topics which may remain unaffected by age.  
Certainly, when addressing developmental issues in a cross-sectional design one has 
to be aware that cohort effects or other systematic differences between the samples cannot be 
entirely controlled for. Hence, future research should also address Typical Intellectual 
Engagement in longitudinal designs, although this would make it difficult to obtain results 
that enable analyses with age differences of more than 50 years on average. 
Second, stability of divergence was assessed. Factor variances were constrained to be 
equal across groups. Conceptually, decreasing variance implies increasing homogeneity, 
whereas an increase in variances implies a more heterogeneous sample with respect to the 
aspect under study. Variances in Reading, Problem Solving, and Abstract Thinking were 
significantly greater in the old, whereas the difference in variances of Intellectual Curiosity 
failed to reach significance. The results show that the group of old people was more 
heterogeneous in terms of intellectual engagement than the young subsample. Change of 
characteristics depends on lifelong experiences. People are attracted to environments that 
match their interests and meet their needs (e.g., Scarr & McCartney, 1983; Stanovich, 1986). 
Our results show that bigger differences between people, that is greater variances, occur in 
samples in which persons share less of the same environment. In a sample of undergraduates 
the proportion of shared environment is greater than it is in a sample of older people who had 
unique experiences across the lifespan. This assumption is met in the increase of factor 
variances in Typical Intellectual Engagement in the old. One limitation of the present study 
that is to be addressed here is that we have tested a rather homogeneous sample of young 
students in terms of education. Hence, the distinctiveness of the differences in variance could 
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be a sample artefact and differences could turn out smaller using a more representative young 
sample in terms of education. 
Third, structural stability was assessed by constraining the factor covariances of the 
four factors to be equal across age groups. Except for Reading/Intellectual Curiosity, all 
covariances differed significantly between the two groups. Correlations among the four 
factors were higher in the old than in the young. Although in both groups all correlations are 
significantly different from zero, in the old they were more pronounced. We present two 
possible explanations. To our knowledge, no explicit theory concerning ³GHGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQ´LQ
personality exists; therefore we borrow from cognitive theories. Dedifferentiation refers to 
the question whether a rather general factor underlies cognitive change in the old, that is to 
what degree changes in a single cognitive ability are associated with changes in other 
cognitive abilities. Dedifferentiation is shown in an increase of correlation as a function of 
age (e.g., de Frias, Lövdén, Lindenberger & Nilsson, 2007; Ghisletta & Lindenberger, 2003; 
Zelinski & Lewis, 2003). Despite existing controversial data concerning this theory (e.g., de 
Frias et al., 2007, for dedifferentiation; e.g., Tucker-Drob & Salthouse, 2008, for 
differentiation), we transfer this idea to the results of the present study. While the young are 
more specific, that is factor correlations are small, in development of the different aspects of 
Typical Intellectual Engagement, development of Typical Intellectual Engagement in the old 
appears to be more general, that is factor correlations are higher. Studies on the Five Factor 
Model of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1992; 1995) also exhibited increasing correlations 
among the factors across time (Allemand, Zimprich & Martin, 2008). We conclude that 
underlying processes may cause effects of dedifferentiation of personality characteristics. 
Note, that in the old, a second-RUGHUPRGHOZLWKD³JHQHUDOTypical Intellectual Engagement´
factor fitted the data well (see Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008).We tried to fit a second-order 
model on the young subsample as well, but this did not achieve an acceptable fit.  
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Other than the limitations concerning the sample selection, one additional limitation 
pertains to the assessment of Typical Intellectual Engagement with only four items for each 
latent factor. Although the abridged version has been applied in previous studies, one has to 
bear in mind that four items provide limited information. Future studies may apply the 
original Typical Intellectual Engagement scale for replication. 
Taken together, what do these results say about age differences in Typical Intellectual 
Engagement and about its structure? First, the results support the Typical Intellectual 
Engagement scale as being a valid contributor to the understanding of intellectual 
engagement, revealing more specific information than Openness to Ideas. Second, we found 
substantial mean-level differences between young and old. As the differences exhibit both 
increases and decreases in old age, the results give evidence to multidirectionality in terms of 
gains and losses in lifespan development. Third, we found evidence for increasing variance, 
that is greater heterogeneity within the old sample. This supports earlier work by Scarr and 
McCartney (1983) who postulate a close developmental relationship between choosing 
environmental settings that enhance one's own developmental potential concerning specific 
characteristics. As potentials are different in people, heterogeneity in the old is the stringent 
outcome. Fourth, borrowing from cognitive research and from results of the Five Factor 
Model, higher factor correlations are interpreted as dedifferentiation in Typical Intellectual 
Engagement in old adulthood. In future research the relation between Typical Intellectual 
Engagement and objective memory performance measures needs to be addressed to gain 
further understanding of how aspects of personality contribute to cognitive aging. For applied 
aging research this findings leave room for interventions training memory performance that 
take aspects of personality into account.  
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2.2. Stability and change in Typical Intellectual Engagement in old age across five 
years2  
2.2.1. Introduction 
7KHTXHVWLRQRIKRZRQH¶VRZQZD\RIOLIHDQGbehaviour influence cognitive development 
and how non-cognitive aspects or environmental influences contribute to the development of 
cognitive performance has received increasing interest (e.g., Hertzog, 2009). A body of 
research, where mainly small to moderate effects are reported, exists on how intellectually 
demanding leisure activities, level of education, or complexity of occupation influence 
cognitive functioning (e.g., Schooler et al., 1999; Schooler & Mulatu, 2001; Schumacher & 
Martin, 2009). However, research on within-person variables that foster an intellectually 
engaged lifestyle is not as prominent yet. 
Typical Intellectual Engagement 
A construct that may help explain why some persons lead an intellectually engaged 
lifestyle was put forth by Goff and AckHUPDQ 7KH\ LGHQWLILHG³Typical Intellectual 
Engagement´ DV D FRQVWUXFW WKDW LV FORVHO\ UHODWHG WR SHUVRQDOLW\ DQG WR NQRZOHGJH
acquisition. Typical Intellectual Engagement LV GHILQHG DV ³DQ LQGLYLGXDO¶V DYHUVLRQ RU
attraction to tasks that are inteOOHFWXDOO\WD[LQJ´Ackerman et al., 1995, p. 276). Intellectually 
taxing activities may for example be reading or learning a new language. Research on 
cognitive aging has repeatedly found that engaging in intellectual activities can buffer 
cognitive decline in old age (Hertzog, 2009). Hence, Typical Intellectual Engagement could 
serve as one variable in explaining interindividual differences in cognitive development in 
old age.  
A self-rating questionnaire is commonly used to assess Typical Intellectual 
Engagement. The scale can be divided into several different subfactors (Ackerman & Goff, 
                                                                                                                    
2  $VLPLODUYHUVLRQRIWKLVFKDSWHULVFXUUHQWO\LQUHYLVLRQDWWKH³-RXUQDORI*HURQWRORJ\3V\FKRORJLFDO
6FLHQFHV´ (Mascherek & Zimprich)  
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1994; Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008; Ferguson, 1999; Wilhelm et al., 2003). According to 
Dellenbach and Zimprich (2008), Typical Intellectual Engagement can be subdivided into the 
four factors Reading, Abstract Thinking, Problem Solving, and Intellectual Curiosity. The 
different subfactors were found to be correlated with correlations ranging from r = .85 
between Abstract Thinking and Problem Solving to r = .18 between Reading an Abstract 
Thinking (e.g., Mascherek & Zimprich, in press). Similar results have been found by 
Wilhelm et al. (2003).  
To class Typical Intellectual Engagement with related concepts, Openness to 
Experience and Need for Cognition are closest. For the facet Openness for ideas correlations 
ranged from r = .44 to r = .70 for different subfactors of Typical Intellectual Engagement 
(Ackerman & Goff, 1994). However, Typical Intellectual Engagement still appears to add 
incremental validity: while cognitive abilities and the Big Five personality traits explained 
15% of variance in academic performance, Typical Intellectual Engagement added a unique 
9% of explained variance (Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2006b). In the same vein, Typical 
Intellectual Engagement and need for cognition (NFC) (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) have been 
found to be related with correlations as high as r = .78 (Mussel, 2010; Woo et al., 2007). 
However, ForsterLee (2007) found evidence, that NFC and Typical Intellectual Engagement 
differentially predict performance in men and women. Hence, although sharing a large 
amount of variance, NFC and the different subfactors of Typical Intellectual Engagement tap 
into different directions (see Wilhelm et al., 2003). 
Concerning the relation between Typical Intellectual Engagement and cognitive 
variables, Typical Intellectual Engagement has been found to be differentially related to 
crystallized and fluid intelligence. While for fluid intelligence the relation was negligible 
(about 1% of shared variance), it was much stronger for Typical Intellectual Engagement and 
crystallized intelligence (about 11% of shared variance; Goff & Ackerman, 1992). These 
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findings were in line with the conceptualization of Typical Intellectual Engagement 
indicating that Typical Intellectual Engagement is related to volitional knowledge acquisition 
and study rather than to reasoning and speed. Using Typical Intellectual Engagement as a 
predictor variable for cognitive performance, Gow et al. (2005) found a small relation (r = 
.21; r = .13) between Typical Intellectual Engagement and IQ at age 11 and age 79. In a 
different study, Furnham et al. (2008) found a significant correlation between Typical 
Intellectual Engagement and general knowledge (r = .22) in a sample of 100 undergraduate 
students. ForsterLee (2007) showed that while Typical Intellectual Engagement was a 
significant predictor for cognitive performance in women, it was not in men. The relation 
between Typical Intellectual Engagement and education indicated that the higher the 
educational level of an individual the higher they score on Typical Intellectual Engagement 
(e.g., Wilhelm et al., 2003). Summarizing the existing literature, Typical Intellectual 
Engagement is one non cognitive variable for explaining interindividual differences in 
cognitive performance. Relations have repeatedly been found between Typical Intellectual 
Engagement and academic achievement on graduate level. However, besides the importance 
of Typical Intellectual Engagement for healthy aging, research on the development of Typical 
Intellectual Engagement and its relation to cognition in older age is sparse.  
To the best of our knowledge, only one study investigated age-related differences in 
Typical Intellectual Engagement (see Mascherek & Zimprich, in press). But because Typical 
Intellectual Engagement was investigated cross-sectionally, no inferences can be made in 
terms of development and interindividual differences in intraindividual change. Therefore, 
the objective of the present study was to examine different types of longitudinal change in 
Typical Intellectual Engagement across five years in an old aged sample. In what follows, we 
elaborate on five different types of change (cf., Zimprich & Mascherek, 2010), namely 
structural change, absolute change, change in divergence, differential change, and general 
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versus specific change. Because research on the development on Typical Intellectual 
Engagement is sparse we report results concerning Openness to Experience. 
Structural change refers to the constancy of the VXEIDFWRUV¶UHODWLRQWRHDFKRWKHU ,W
GHVFULEHVWRZKLFKH[WHQWWKH³VNHOHWRQ´RIWKHVXEIDFWRUVUHPDLQVVWDEOHDFURVVWLPH2YHUDOO
results concerning structural change are mixed. Allemand, Zimprich and Martin (2008) found 
structural change in the Big Five personality traits across 12-years in old age. Contradictory 
to this finding, Small et al. (2003) found structural stability across six years. For Typical 
Intellectual Engagement, to the best of our knowledge only one study investigated structural 
stability cross-sectionally (Mascherek & Zimprich, in press). In their study they found 
structural differences between young and old adults with larger correlations between the 
subfactors for the older. Larger correlations between the Typical Intellectual Engagement 
subfactors would imply that differences between subfactors are diminished. 
Absolute change, that is, change on the mean-level, refers to changes of a group of 
individuals. Mean-level changes in Openness to Experience most often have been found in 
terms of a decline in old age (Allemand, Zimprich & Martin, 2008; Allemand et al., 2007; 
Roberts et al., 2006). In their cross-sectional investigation of Typical Intellectual Engagement 
in young and old adults, Mascherek and Zimprich (in press) found both, higher and lower 
levels in the Typical Intellectual Engagement subfactors in old age. Results implied that 
while the manner in which intellectual activities are displayed was lower in old age, a general 
interest in academic and intellectually taxing topics was higher.  
Change of divergence describes the change of interindividual differences with respect 
to a specific construct (e.g., Zimprich & Mascherek, 2010). It is expressed in increasing or 
GHFUHDVLQJYDULDQFHVDQGKDVEHHQUHIHUUHG WRDV³IDQ-spread pheQRPHQRQ´ LQ WKH OLWHUDWXUH
(Stanovich, 1986). Studies on change in divergence in personality development are sparse 
and with conflicting results. For Openness to Experience, Allemand et al. (2007) found larger 
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variances in younger adults compared to older adults. By contrast, Small et al. (2003) found 
stability of divergence for all Big Five personality aspects across six years. Yet another result 
has been found by Mascherek and Zimprich (in press) with respect to Typical Intellectual 
Engagement. They found significantly larger variances in the older sample compared to 
young adults for the subfactors Reading, Problem Solving, and Abstract Thinking. For 
Intellectual Curiosity, no difference was found.  
Differential change reflects the consistency of individual differences across time 
(Martin & Zimprich, 2005). It describes to what extent individuals remain stable relative to 
each other. Over a 12-year period, Allemand, Zimprich and Martin (2008) found profound 
differential change, indicating individual differences in the change of personality traits. 
Across six years, Small et al. (2003) found high longitudinal differential stability for 
Openness to Experience. The results indicate that with elapsing time, individuals are more 
likely to change their relative placement within a reference group.  
Specific versus general change refers to the question of the generality in change of the 
different Typical Intellectual Engagement factors (Martin & Zimprich, 2005). General change 
would indicate that changes in different factors can be ascribed to one underlying common 
mechanism. If the same underlying mechanisms drive the development of different aspects of 
Typical Intellectual Engagement, factors which appear different on behavioural level, must 
share structural commonalities. The opposite is true for specific change. Allemand, Zimprich 
and Martin (2008) found large commonalities in change between Openness to Experience, 
Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and Extraversion, indicating general change. 
Overall, because the results reported mainly apply to Openness to Experiences, a 
related yet different construct, it is difficult formulate exact hypotheses. However, the 
following hypotheses were derived: First, mean-level stability as well as, second, structural 
stability were expected. Third, an increase in divergence was expected. Fourth, rank-order 
DEVELOPMENT OF TYPICAL INTELLECTUAL ENGAGEMENT   58  
coefficients were expected to resemble the relationship found in the study by Small et al. 
(2003), and, fifth, rather general than specific change was expected. 
2.2.2. Method 
Sample 
The data for the present study come from the Zurich Longitudinal Study on Cognitive 
Aging (ZULU; Zimprich et al., 2008), an ongoing study on normative cognitive aging in 
Switzerland. At first measurement occasion (T1: 2005) the sample comprised 364 
participants, whereas at the third measurement occasion (T3: 2010) 233 individuals 
participated in the study (for further details of sample recruitment and sample composition 
see Zimprich et al., 2008).The second wave was not included, because it was assessed 1.5 
years after T1. A personality related construct such as Typical Intellectual Engagement would 
be expected to remain stable. To be able to capture change, we used data covering a time 
span of five years. Mean age at T1 was 72.99 years (SD = 4.4 years, 65-80 years) and at T3 
was 77.90 years (SD = 4.42 years, 72-86 years) with 46% of the sample being female. In 
terms of representativeness, the sample of the present study was slightly overeducated (12.8 
years of education on average). To examine whether sample attrition was selective, 
individuals leaving after T1 (26 individuals) and after T2 (104 individuals) were merged 
together into one group. There were no significant mean-level differences between the 
dropout and the non-dropout group. However, in the group of individuals that participated at 
all three measurement occasions, Typical Intellectual Engagement variances were 
significantly larger at T1. In addition, the covariances among the four subfactors were 
significantly higher in the non-dropout group. Although excluding individuals from the 
analyses limits the generalizability of the results, we only included the 233 complete cases, 
because change of divergence and structural change were of specific interest in the present 
study.  
DEVELOPMENT OF TYPICAL INTELLECTUAL ENGAGEMENT   59  
Measures 
Typical Intellectual Engagement was assessed using a 16-items self-rating scale that 
was embedded in the ZULU-test battery. The 16 items represent an abridged version of the 
original 59-item Typical Intellectual Engagement scale (Ackerman & Goff, 1994). Item 
selection for the abridged version of the present study was based on previous factor analytic 
studies that examined the structure of Typical Intellectual Engagement (Ferguson, 1999; Goff 
& Ackerman, 1992; Wilhelm et al., 2003). Items with the highest factor loadings across the 
three studies were selected (for details see Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008). The scale entails 
four related subfactors: Reading, Problem Solving, Abstract Thinking, and Intellectual 
Curiosity. Four items were assigned to each subfactor, except for the factor intellectual 
FXULRVLW\ZLWKILYHLWHPV2QH,WHP³,PDLQWDLQ,OLYHO\LQWHUHVWLQUHDGLQJERRNVRQDYDULHW\
RIWRSLFV´ZDVDOORZHGWRORDGRQ,QWHOOHFWXDO&XULRVLW\DVZHOODVRQ5HDGLQJEHFDXVHWKH 
item's phrasing comprised aspects that fit Reading and Intellectual Curiosity. Subjects were 
asked to answer the items on a 5-point-Likert-scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). High scores indicate a high manifestation of Typical Intellectual 
Engagement.  
Statistical Analyses 
Measurement invariance was examined as a prerequisite for the analyses of different 
types of change on the latent level. Measurement invariance describes the degree of stability 
of the psychometric characteristics of a questionnaire. Changes on latent level can then be 
interpreted without cofounding measurement errors. Three degrees of measurement 
invariance were tested in the present analyses. We examined configural invariance, weak 
invariance and strong invariance. According to Meredith and Horn (2001), configural 
invariance implies constraining the items to load on the same factor across time indicating 
that the same items can be assigned to the same theoretical construct across time. Weak 
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invariance requires the factor loadings to be equal across time. This indicates that the 
information that every item contributes to the assessment of a construct, remains the same 
across time. Strong measurement invariance requires the item intercepts to be equal across 
time. Strong measurement invariance indicates that differences in latent factor means are not 
confounded by differences in item-specific intercepts (Meredith & Teresi, 2006). As criterion 
to evaluate changes in model fit we rely on changes in CFI. According to Cheung and 
Rensvold (2002), a drop of no more than .01 in CFI indicates invariance.  
For the analyses of change in Typical Intellectual Engagement, first, structural 
stability was assessed by examining the invariance of factor covariances across time. 
Structural stability indicates that a construct and the relations between the subfactors remain 
stable across time. Next, differential stability was tested by assessing the test-retest 
correlation (Martin & Zimprich, 2005). Thirdly, mean level changes were assessed in 
constraining latent factor means to be equal across time. No significant decrement in model 
fit would indicate that on average, no change emerged. Change of divergence was then 
measured by constraining the factor variances to be equal across time. A significant decrease 
in model fit would imply that the sample became substantially more or less homogeneous. 
Hence, variances indicate the homogeneity of a sample. Finally, specific versus general 
change was assessed by correlating longitudinal change scores. For the analyses of change on 
the latent level, latent difference score models were applied (McArdle & Hamagami, 2001). 
As criteria for model fit, the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) with its 90% 
confidence interval, the comparative fit index (CFI) and the Root Deterioration per 
Restriction (RDR) are reported as fit indices. RMSEA values below .06 denote a good model 
fit and values up to .08 denote an acceptable fit, whereas for the CFI, values above .90 
indicate a well fitting model (Hu & Bentler, 1999). RDR values below .08 can be interpreted 
as indicating no change in model fit (Raykov & Penev, 1998). Additionally, we report Ȥð-
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values, degrees of freedom, and corresponding p - values for all models. To scale the latent 
factors, factor means and variances were set to zero and one, respectively, to identify the 
model. The estimated means and variances for the change parameters should be interpreted in 
comparison to the estimates at T1. We used maximum likelihood estimation for our analyses. 
Analyses were conducted using SPSS 18 and SAS. 
2.2.3. Results 
Analyses started with specifying a four factor model separately for each time point. The 
model with the four factors Reading, Abstract Thinking, Problem Solving and Intellectual 
Curiosity, fitted almost equally well at both measurement occasions (see Table 5). This leads 
to the conclusion that longitudinal analyses of stability and change were warranted. Note that 
the errors of the manifest variables were allowed to be correlated across-time to improve 
model fit, and because in a longitudinal design, the same individuals are repeatedly measured, 
which implies that specific factors of the items can also be correlated across time. Then 
different degrees of measurement invariance were analyzed. The configural invariance 
model, evinced a good fit (Table 5). Second, we imposed weak measurement invariance. As 
can be seen from Table 5, this, in terms of fit indices (CFI = 0.99; RDR = .066; RMSEA = 
.049), did not lead to a decrement in fit. Hence, we accepted this model. Next, strong 
measurement invariance was tested for. This, again, did not lead to a significant decrease in 
model fit (CFI = 0.99; RDR = .056; RMSEA = .049); hence, we accepted the strong 
measurement invariance model. With measurement invariance to hold, changes on the latent 
level can be ascribed to changes in the underlying theoretical construct. They are not 
confounded by systematic changes in the responding behaviour. 
Next, structural stability was analyzed. Constraining the covariances between the 
subfactors to be equal at T1 and T3 did not lead to a VLJQLILFDQWGHFUHDVHLQPRGHOILWǻȤð = 
ǻdf = 6, ns; CFI = 0.99; RDR = .000; RMSEA = .048). Structural stability was also 
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tested with constraining the interfactor correlations to be equal. In doing so, possible 
differences in factor variances are also taken into account. However, this did not alter the 
result (see Table 5, structural), indicating that the structure between the four factors was 
stable across a 5-year interval. The factors most strongly related were Abstract Thinking and 
Problem Solving (T1: r = .83; T3: r = .80), whereas the weakest relationship emerged 
between Reading and Problem Solving (T1: r = .25; T3: r = .24; see Table 6).  
Table 5. Estimated Models 
Model Ȥð df ǻȤð ǻGI RDR CFI RMSEA 90% CI 
4 factor T1 236.12 112   - 0.99 .069 .057-.081 
4 factor T3 205.77 112   - 0.99 .060 .047-.073 
Configural MI 735.71 480   - 0.99 .048 .041-.055 
Weak MI 764.25 494 28.54*a 14a 0.066 0.99 .049 .042-.055 
Strong MI 787.05 507 22.8*b 13a 0.056 0.99 .049 .042-.055 
Structural 790.56 513 3.51c 6 0.000 0.99 .048 .042-.055 
Differential 887.37 511 100.32*b 4 0.321 0.82 .060 .054-.066 
LCS 787.05 507   - 0.99 .049 .042-.055 
Absolute 795.87 511 8.83c 4 0.071 0.99 .049 .042-.056 
Divergence 791.49 511 4.45 c 4 0.021 0.99 .049 .042-.055 
*p <  .05; T1 = first measurement occasion; T3 = third measurement occasion; MI = measurement invariance; 
LCS = Latent change score model; a = represents the difference to the configural invariance model; b represents 
the difference to the weak MI model; c = represents difference to LCS; RDR = Root Deterioration per 
Restriction; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; 90% CI = 
90% Confidence Interval of RMSEA  
 
To assess differential change across time, test-retest correlations were estimated for 
the factors. Perfect differential stability is indicated by a test-retest correlation of r = 1. To 
test this, a model with across time factor correlations being constrained to 1 was estimated. 
As Table 1 shows, this led to significanWGHFUHDVHLQPRGHOILWǻ Ȥð  ǻdf = 4, p < 
.05; RDR = .321; RMSEA = .060). The CFI dropped down to 0.82, implying that there were 
significant interindividual differences in the amount of change. At least for one subfactor the 
across-time correlation had to be less than r = 1. As can be seen from Table 6, although all 
subfactors showed rather strong differential stability, in sum, shifts in rank order emerged. 
DEVELOPMENT OF TYPICAL INTELLECTUAL ENGAGEMENT   63  
This result indicates that individuals differ in the amount of change in Typical Intellectual 
Engagement across five years. The individual developmental trajectories do not run parallel 
but are specific for different individuals. Mean-level change is independent from this 
construct. 
Table 6. Factor correlations  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(1)Reading .88* .43* .25* .26* 
(2)Abstract Thinking .37* .84* .83* .58* 
(3)Problem Solving .24* .80* .83* .65* 
(4) Intellectual Curiosity .26* .67* .66* .81*  
Note: Correlations in bold indicate across time correlations; Correlations in the upper triangle indicate factor 
correlations at T1, correlations in the lower triangle indicate factor correlations at T3; * indicates correlations 
significantly different from zero on p<.05. 
 
For the analyses of mean level changes, changes in variances and general vs specific 
changes, we reparameterized the strong measurement invariance model and estimated a latent 
change score model (LCS) (McArdle & Hamagami, 2001). Means and variances were fixed 
to 0 and 1, respectively in the level factor in order to identify the model. Hence, means and 
variances in the change factor can be directly interpreted as differences from the level 
estimates.  
To test changes on the mean level, all factor means were constrained to be equal 
DFURVVWLPH7KLVGLGQRWOHDGWRDVLJQLILFDQWRYHUDOOGHFUHDVHLQPRGHOILWǻȤð  ǻdf = 
4, p > .05; RDR = .071; RMSEA = .049). However, when examining each mean individually, 
a small but significant decrease for Intellectual Curiosity and an increase for Problem Solving 
emerged. The change scores indicate, that, on average, individuals engage significantly more 
in Problem Solving but significantly less in Intellectual Curiosity. The non-significant 
changes in Reading and Abstract Thinking indicate that on group level, both subfactors 
remain stable across five years. When latent change means were freely estimated, values 
DEVELOPMENT OF TYPICAL INTELLECTUAL ENGAGEMENT   64  
were .108 (Standard Error (SE): .055; p < .05) for Problem Solving and -.155 (SE: .075; p < 
.05) for Intellectual Curiosity. The changes in Reading -.002 (SE: .044) and in Abstract 
Thinking -.028 (SE: .058) were not significant.  
To analyze change of divergence that is the extent to which the sample homogeneity 
changes, variances were constrained to be equal across time. This did not lead to a significant 
GHFUHDVH LQPRGHO ILW HLWKHU ǻȤð  ǻdf = 4, p > .05; RDR = .021; RMSEA = .049), 
indicating that the amount of interindividual differences remained stable. Stability of 
divergence implies that across five years overall differences between individuals do not 
become larger. 
In a last step, general versus specific changes were investigated. This aimed at 
examining whether change in Typical Intellectual Engagement could be subscribed to one 
underlying mechanisms or if the subfactors change rather independently. First, correlations 
between the change factors were estimated. Results are shown in Table 7. Positive 
correlations indicate that change in one factor goes along with change in the other factor. The 
actual direction of change is indicated by the means. For two of the four factors non 
significant mean changes emerged, hence, the direction cannot be reliably inferred for 
Abstract Thinking and Reading. The positive change correlation (r = .48) between 
Intellectual Curiosity and Problem Solving shows that change above average in one factor is 
accompanied by change above average in the other factor. This means that individuals, who 
increase in Problem Solving, are less likely to decrease in Intellectual Curiosity. Overall, 
medium to large change correlations emerged, with the correlation between Abstract 
Thinking and Reading being the weakest (r = .31) and with Problem Solving being the 
strongest (r = .73). Hence, the amount of shared variance ranged from 9% between changes 
in Reading and Abstract Thinking up to 50% between changes in Abstract Thinking and 
Problem Solving. The results indicate that although changes in all factors were significantly 
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related, a substantial amount of variance in change for each factor remains independent from 
changes in the other factors. Note that fitting a model with a general change factor did not 
exhibit an acceptable fit. This underlines that different mechanisms underlie the changes in 
the Typical Intellectual Engagement-factors. Although Typical Intellectual Engagement is 
one coherent construct, change in the subfactors is, to a substantial amount, driven by 
different mechanisms. Correlations between level and change are also shown in Table 7. 
Negative correlations here indicate that higher levels of Typical Intellectual Engagement at 
T1 are associated with less change. As the largest effect, a medium negative correlation 
emerged between the level of Abstract Thinking and the change in Problem Solving (r = -.35) 
and vice versa (r = -.33). No significant relationships emerged between the level factor of 
Reading and the change factors of the other factors. All other interfactor level-change 
correlations did not exhibit a systematic pattern and were either small or non-significant 
(Table 7). Finally, correlations between level and change within a factor were estimated. 
Negative relationships in the medium to large range emerged (see Table 7). This indicates 
that, overall, higher levels of the respective factor at T1, were associated with less change. 
That is, the higher on Typical Intellectual Engagement an individual rated herself, the smaller 
the change in Typical Intellectual Engagement for this person. We also tested age and gender 
as covariates to examine whether they accounted for unexplained variance. However, the 
covariates did not explain additional variance. 
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Table 7. Level and change correlations 
 Reading Abstract 
Thinking 
Problem 
Solving 
Intellectual 
Curiosity 
(5) (6) (7) 
(5)D_Reading -.34* -.23* -.24* -.24*    
(6)D_Abstract Thinking -.19 -.50* -.33* -.22 .31*   
(7)D_Problem Solving -.06 -.35* -.35*  -.16 .44* .73*  
(8)D_Intellectual Curiosity -.22 -.18 -.19. -.36* .50* .65* .48* 
1RWH³'B´LQGLFDWHVWKHFKDQJHSDUDPHWHU&RUUHODWLRQVLQEROGLQGLFDWHOHYHODQGFKDQJHFRUUHODWLRQZLWKLQD
factor; Correlations in the right indicate correlations between the change factors: general vs specific change; all 
other correlations indicate correlations between level and change parameter between different factors; * 
indicates correlations significantly different from zero on p<.05. 
 
2.2.4. Discussion 
In the present study we, first, examined the factorial structure of the Typical 
Intellectual Engagement scale by testing configural, weak, and strong measurement 
invariance (Meredith & Horn, 2001) and, second, we analyzed the change of Typical 
Intellectual Engagement across five years.  
Strong measurement invariance was found to hold as well as structural stability across 
five years. Hence, the findings can serve as a replication of the structure of the Typical 
Intellectual Engagement questionnaire (Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008). Finding measurement 
invariance as well as structural stability underlines that Typical Intellectual Engagement as a 
construct can be reliably measured across time. 
We then addressed differential stability. Profound differential change emerged for all 
the Typical Intellectual Engagement factors, that is, Reading, Abstract Thinking, Problem 
Solving, and Intellectual Curiosity. Because stability was modelled on the latent level it is, 
less affected by measurement error. Correlations less than one suggest that individuals 
change differently. Allemand, Zimprich and Martin (2008) found r = .69 for Openness to 
Experience across 12 years. Hence, the tendency of less than perfect differential stability is 
known from the literature on personality development. Note that the higher correlations in 
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Typical Intellectual Engagement still fit into the literature as the study cited above covers 12 
years whereas Typical Intellectual Engagement was measured across a 5-year period. 
Generally, research on critical life events, where nonnormative events impact some 
individuals, has shown to lead to different developmental trajectories (e.g., Roberts, Helson 
& Klohnen, 2002). Hence, it might be that changes in rank-order can be partly explained by 
individual changes in the living conditions. A limitation of the present study is that life events 
were not included into the analyses. Even within the boundaries that are provided by 
biological constraints in personality development, motivational influences are possible as 
well. Research on motivational selectivity (e.g., Riediger & Freund, 2006) has shown that 
individuals tend to restrict oneself to few personal goals that are regarded as highly important 
for life satisfaction. In the course of cognitive resources becoming more restricted, 
differences between individuals concerning the importance of intellectual activity become 
more pronounced. One individual might enjoy engaging in intellectual activities but still 
value social interaction higher when she is forced to decide in the presence of declining 
resources. Hence, we conclude that profound changes in rank-order could reflect motivational 
selectivity and focusing on different priority goals.  
Parameters that describe a construct on the group-level are means and variances. In 
the present study, small significant mean-level changes only emerged for Intellectual 
Curiosity and Problem Solving. No changes in variances emerged. We propose the following 
explanation for the results of the present study. Participating in a longitudinal study on 
cognitive aging might have a unique effect on interests and intellectual activities itself. Not 
only are people who are highly interested in cognitive activity more likely to participate in 
psychological studies (e.g., Cooney, Schaie & Willis, 1988); participating in a study that 
assesses age-dependent developmental changes in intellectual activities and interests, could 
itself influence the development. Hence, the slight increase in Problem Solving could reflect 
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peculiarities of the study. In ZULU, different kinds of cognitive tests are administered. Tests 
such as the digit symbol test, number series or the standard progressive matrices could have 
URXVHGWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶LQWHUHVWWRVROYHIRUH[DPSOH6XGRNX¶V in their free time. This could 
have resulted in a perceived increase in Problem Solving across the time period of five years. 
The decrease in Intellectual Curiosity is in line with research on Openness to Experience 
(Roberts et al., 2006; Small et al., 2003). Although Intellectual Curiosity in Typical 
Intellectual Engagement has been found to be higher in old age (see Mascherek & Zimprich, 
in press), it is possible the increase found in the cross-sectional study may reflect a cohort 
effect. Also, Intellectual Curiosity was assessed comparatively unspecific. Hence, individuals 
might rate their global interest in engaging in new topics as decreased. Attending a talk on a 
new topic outside the home could be complicated by physical deficiencies. This self 
evaluation could then be confounded by perceived health issues.  
We have two explanations for the stability of divergence. First, it seems possible that 
for significant changes in variances to occur, five years were too short. This explanation is in 
line with recent research on personality development. Small et al. (2003) found stability of 
divergence across six years. Hence, the 5-year interval in the present study might have been 
too short to exhibit changes in variances. Another explanation aims at sample selectivity. All 
participants were highly educated (see Zimprich et al., 2008) ending up in a comparatively 
homogeneous group with respect to intellectual interests and activities, which may lead to 
rather homogeneous developmental trajectories across a five year interval. This idea is 
supported by the significant negative level-change correlations that emerged for the factors, 
indicating that individuals scoring high on Typical Intellectual Engagement at T1 experience 
the least change across a five year period. With most of the participants being intellectually 
engaged, one may conclude that this imposed a restriction on the level variance in the first 
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place, and, in combination with the negative level-change correlations led to a non-significant 
development of variances across five years in the Typical Intellectual Engagement factors. 
In a last step we analyzed change correlations between the four subfactors. The 
highest change correlation emerged between Problem Solving and Abstract Thinking. Both 
factors describe more abstract aspects of intellectual engagement, which may help explain a 
large amount of coupled development. Among all change correlations, change in Reading 
was the change least correlated with all other three factors. The factor Reading aims at a 
highly trained, overlearned, specific activity that is conceptually different from Abstract 
Thinking, Problem Solving, and Intellectual Curiosity. Because the Typical Intellectual 
Engagement questionnaire does not assess what kind of books a person reads, reading does 
not necessarily imply much cognitive activity besides the activity itself. Hence, even if 
intellectual engagement decreases, reading as highly trained activity could remain unaffected. 
Likewise, if the frequency of reading decreases, the general interest in intellectual activity 
may remain unaffected. The positive change correlation between Problem Solving and 
Intellectual Curiosity implies that the increase in Problem Solving provides protection against 
decline in Intellectual Curiosity. Individuals who manage to maintain their level of Problem 
Solving also benefit from less decrease in Intellectual Curiosity. Because correlations do not 
imply causality, it is also possible to interpret the results the other way around: Individuals 
who manage to remain intellectually curious could also benefit in a way that Problem Solving 
even increases in older age. 
To summarize, what do the results of the present study tell us about Typical 
Intellectual Engagement in old age? First, the structure of Typical Intellectual Engagement as 
a construct remained stable across five years. Second, differential but no mean-level change 
emerged for all subfactors of Typical Intellectual Engagement across five years. This 
demonstrates that in order to understand the development of a given construct, it is necessary 
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to investigate different aspects of development because individual differences may be masked 
by change or stability on the group level. Third, the change correlations between the four 
subfactors vary in magnitude, indicating different underlying mechanisms that drive change 
in Typical Intellectual Engagement. While the present study added important information to 
the literature on Typical Intellectual Engagement concerning its development in older age, 
open questions remain to be addressed in future research. The relation between Typical 
Intellectual Engagement and cognition needs to be further examined. Also, the question of a 
causal relationship between the constructs remains unanswered. This question could be 
addressed only longitudinally, including more than two measurement occasions to enable 
cross-lagged latent analyses. Another yet equally important aspect would concern the 
development of Typical Intellectual Engagement in middle adulthood, or, generally, across 
the lifespan. Also, the specific mechanisms that cause interindividual changes in Typical 
Intellectual Engagement need to be the objective of future studies. Because Typical 
Intellectual Engagement is conceptualized as influencing typical intellectual performance, 
another area of research could engage in the question if Typical Intellectual Engagement 
could be trained in different settings or different stages across the lifespan. 
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3.  SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE MEMORY PERFORMANCE 
In chapter 3, the relation between subjective memory self-evaluations and objective 
memory performance is further investigated from two different angles. While in Study 3, the 
relation between subjective and objective memory performance is addressed in a group of 
clinical outpatients; in Study 4 the question of the relation between the two constructs is 
approached from a methodological point of view. 
3.1. What do cognitive complaints in a sample of memory clinic outpatients reflect?3 
3.1.1. Introduction 
In cognitive aging, subjective cognitive or memory complaints, that is, negative 
MXGJPHQWV DERXW RQH¶V FRJQLWLYH SHUIRUPDQFH DUH LPSRUWDQW DV D FULWHULRQ IRU GLDJQRVLQJ
mild cognitive impairment (MCI; Dilling, Mombour, Schmidt, 2000; Petersen et al, 1999). 
However, research on the relation between subjective cognitive or memory performance 
ratings and objective cognitive or memory performance as measured by standardized 
instruments has repeatedly found only small to moderate relations between both constructs 
(cf., Cavanaugh & Poon, 1989; McDonald-Miszczak et al., 1995). Notably, the relation 
between subjective and objective performance has mainly been studied in healthy samples 
(Jorm et al., 2001; Valentijn et al., 2006). There is a body of research, though, on the 
predictive value of subjective cognitive complaints in clinical samples, which has led to 
controversial results (Geerlings, Jonker, Bouter, Adèr & Schmand, 1999; Kliegel, Zimprich 
& Eschen, 2005; Levy-Cushman & Abeles, 1998; Schofield et al., 1997;). While in some 
studies no relation between cognitive complaints and pathological cognitive decline was 
found, in others subjective cognitive complaints emerged as a valid predictor for higher risk 
                                                                                                                    
3 A similar version of this chapter has been submitted for publication at ³The Journal of Gerontopsychology 
and Geriatric Psychiatry´ (Mascherek & Zimprich) 
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of developing MCI or dementia even when no signs of objective cognitive impairment were 
present at time of assessment. Dufouil, Fuhrer and Alpérovitch (2005), for example, reported 
that even after controlling for depression, drug intake and baseline cognitive performance, 
cognitive complaints were a valid predictor for developing cognitive impairment. In their 
comprehensive review, Jonker, Geerlings and Schmand (2000) came to the conclusion that 
subjective memory complaints could be seen as early signs of beginning dementia. On the 
contrary, Flicker, Ferris and ReLVEHUJDVZHOODV2¶%ULHQHWDOGLGQRWILQGDQ\
reliable relation between clinically relevant memory impairment and subjective cognitive 
complaints. Given this conflicting evidence for the predictive value of cognitive complaints 
for the evaluation of clinically relevant cognitive decline, the function of cognitive 
complaints needs to be further evaluated. Several hypotheses of what subjective cognitive 
ratings reflect have been put forward. 
First, cognitive complaints may not only be determined by actual memory 
performance, but could also be linked to affect or to stable personality traits such as 
neuroticism (Kliegel & Zimprich, 2005; Mowla et al., 2007; Wilhelm, Witthöft & 
Schipolowski, 2010). Neuroticism, which is defined as a tendency to enduring or frequent 
states of anxiety and nervousness (e.g., John & Gross, 2004), may negatively color self-
judgments in general and cognitive performance in particular. In line with this assumption, 
Pearman and Storandt (2005) found that the facets anxiety and self-consciousness of the 
personality trait neuroticism explained almost one third of the variance in subjective memory 
complaints. Cognitive complaints may be an expression of permanent worry or self-
monitoring. In a study on the relation between neuroticism and negative physical outcomes, 
Charles, Gatz, Kato and Pedersen (2008) proposed as the explanatory mechanism that 
stronger neuroticism could be associated with greater internal self-focus. This could result in 
a heightened awareness of and a permanent preoccupation with even small negative 
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GHYLDWLRQVIURPDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VQRUP7KHVHGHYLDWLRQVDUHHDVLO\SHUFHLYHGDVVWUHVVIXODQG
threatening. A similar explanatory approach could be applied to self-judgments of cognitive 
functioning. This seems especially true for old age where cognitive functioning and age-
related decline are a salient and more or less permanent topic and threat for individuals 
(Weiss & Lang, in press). As a consequence, cognitive complaints could be interpreted as an 
expression of neuroticism rather than a reliable monitoring of actual cognitive performance.  
Another line of research has investigated the possible influence of affective states on 
cognitive complaints. Depressive affect, for example, is linked to the tendency to report and 
recall negative events or thoughts repeatedly (e.g., Hautzinger, 1998). Hence, in judging 
RQH¶V SHUIRUPDQFH VRPH LQGLYLGXDOV PD\ GUDZ WKHLU DWWHQWLRQ WR HSLVRGHV RI FRJQLWLYH
malperformance rather than carefully monitoring different episodes of cognitive performance 
DQG WKHQ HYDOXDWH RQH¶V SHUIRUPDQFH 7KLV FRXOG H[SODLQ ZK\ FRJQLWLYH FRPSODLQWV DUH
reliably related to depressive affect (e.g., Jylhä et al., 2009). Similar to neuroticism, 
GHSUHVVLYHDIIHFWPD\FORXGRQH¶VHYDOXDWLRQRIFRJQLWLYHperformance. To summarize, there 
is a body of both theory and research which shows that cognitive complaints are affected by 
personality traits and affective states. Importantly, from this perspective, one could argue that 
cognitive complaints do not or at EHVWLQSDUWUHIOHFWUHDOLVWLFLQIHUHQFHVDERXWRQH¶VFRJQLWLYH
performance, but rather a general way of judging oneself that is affectively colored.  
A different line of argumentation has pointed to the fact that although cognitive 
complaints may not be suitable to assess actual memory performance, a change in complaints 
could serve as an indicator for change in cognitive performance (e.g., Martin & Zimprich, 
2003; Mascherek & Zimprich, 2011; Zimprich et al., 2003). The reason for this is that, 
longitudinally, individuals serve as their own controls. Hence, individual differences at cross-
section are accounted for, while the variables of interest are individual differences in changes 
of both cognitive complaints and cognitive performance. As Hertzog and Hultsch (2000) 
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KDYHGLVFXVVHGFRJQLWLYHVHOIHYDOXDWLRQV LQYROYHVPRQLWRULQJRIGLIIHUHQWDVSHFWVRIRQH¶V
RZQ SHUIRUPDQFH 7KH\ DUJXHG WKDW NQRZOHGJH RI RQH¶V RZQ SHUIRUPDQFH FRPSULVHV WKH
accuracy and the awareness with which different stages of learning and memory are 
supervised. Studies have repeatedly shown that judgment accuracies vary in dependence of 
different stages of learning and memory (Rast & Zimprich, 2009). Brown and Middendorf 
(1996; also, Albert, 1977) showed that in old age, individuals predominantly use temporal 
comparisons to evaluate their cognitive performance. Inferring from that one could argue that 
if increasing cognitive complaints are reported from one measurement occasion to the next, 
this could indicate a reliable change in cognitive performance. This idea is supported by 
studies that investigated cognitive complaints and cognitive performance longitudinally. 
Jessen et al. (2010) identified cognitive complaints as a significant predictor of developing 
dementia in the future. They investigated cognitive complaints in more than 2400 non-
demented individuals and found cognitive complaints to predict developing dementia over a 
time period of 3 years even after controlling for known confounding variables such as 
depression, education and baseline cognition. Supporting evidence also comes from a study 
by Jorm et al. (2004) who found that in healthy older men, subjective cognitive complaints 
were associated with Alzheimer´s disease-related neuropathology in autopsies after death. 
Hence, cognitive complaints can be seen as indicators for cognitive decline in comparison to 
earlier performance. This appears especially important for early stages of cognitive decline, 
because medical treatment that operates on preserving cognitive functioning on a high 
functioning-level as long as possible could be most effectively if taken early in the progress 
of decline. In another study, Reisberg, Shulman, Torossian, Leng and Zhu (2010) found in 
213 healthy older adults that cognitive complaints indicate a risk of accelerated cognitive 
decline across 14 years. Hence, cognitive complaints serve as an important indicator for 
cognitive decline even if objective memory performance remained within normal limits 
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(MMSE > 29). However, they also found that the magnitude of cognitive complaints 
decreased with progressing dementia, indicating that cognitive complaints may serve as an 
indicator of cognitive decline only in very early stages of pathological cognitive changes. 
This finding fits into the assumption of making temporal comparisons, because in order to 
make temporal comparisons, previous episodes of performance have to be recalled and the 
ability to do so is impaired in dementia.  
Importantly, it is not only memory or memory changes that are associated with 
cognitive complaints, but also other cognitive abilities that typically decline in conjunction 
with pathological processes. In a large population based cohort, Benito-León, Mitchell, Vega 
and Bermejo-Pareja (2010) found that while cognitive complaints were not related to global 
memory performance, they were associated with poor verbal fluency. Taken together, the 
findings referenced imply that both in normal aging and in later stages of dementia, cognitive 
complaints do not necessarily serve as a valid predictor. But they are an important point of 
reference for early, subtle onsets of clinical cognitive changes. 
The objective of the present study was to investigate whether, while controlling for 
confounding variables such as depression, age, education and gender, variance in cognitive 
complaints could be reliably explained by specific cognitive performance tasks as well as 
different levels of cognitive functioning. A third variable, which is closely related to the 
question of whether or not cognitive complaints are of value in progressed dementia, was the 
means of contact. On the one hand, individuals who come by themselves were hypothesized 
to report higher cognitive complaints yet to show fewer deficits in cognitive performance, 
that is, are less likely to be diagnosed with MCI or dementia. On the other hand, individuals 
who were sent by their relatives were hypothesized to report fewer cognitive complaints 
however are more likely to receive a diagnosis indicating clinical cognitive decline. Research 
on the importance of informant ratings has shown that in progressed dementia, evaluations 
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made by informants are of high diagnostic value. MacKinnon et al. (2003) reported that in 
order to reduce the frequency of false positive or negative ratings in a screening for dementia, 
informants ratings added significantly to the accuracy of the assessment. Similar results were 
found by Gonçalves, Arnold, Appadurai and Byrne (2011). They reported that a brief 
questionnaire for informants on the cognitive functioning level of the patients was as efficient 
as the MMSE. Hence they concluded that especially in older adults with already progressed 
dementia, informants¶ ratings were a valid measure for the clinical status of the patient. 
For the analyses of the present study the following hypotheses were formulated: First, 
we expected that the severity of already present clinical cognitive impairment indicated by 
diagnosis was negatively associated with cognitive complaints. Also, individuals sent in by 
their relatives would report fewer cognitive complaints. Second, we expected to find no 
influence of the global cognitive performance level on cognitive complaints, however, verbal 
fluency as a specific measure of cognitive functioning was expected to be negatively related, 
indicating more complaints for those with bad performance in verbal fluency. 
3.1.2. Method 
Sample 
The sample of the present study comprises N = 169 older outpatients from the 
Erlangen memory clinic at the Institute of Psychogerontology. Mean age of the sample was 
76.24 years (SD 7.55 years, 60-89 years), 101 (60%) persons were female.  
Selectivity Analyses 
The data for the present study stem from 748 outpatients who came to the Erlangen 
memory clinic at the Institute of Psychogerontology during the period of 2006 to 2010 
seeking for an assessment of their cognitive abilities. Of these, 657 (88%) were 60 years of 
age or older during their visit at the memory clinic. Outpatients with severe psychiatric 
disorders (e.g., manifest depression) or a history of drug or alcohol addiction were excluded. 
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Also, persons with a visual or hearing impairment making them unable to complete paper-
pencil tests were excluded. Finally, for diagnosis purposes outpatients were required to have 
complete data records on a standard neuropsychological test battery. In total, there were 477 
(73%) persons who fulfilled these criteria. Of these persons, 354 (74%) were administered a 
questionnaire on subjective cognitive complaints (see below). The group of those who 
answered the cognitive complaints questionnaire did not differ significantly from the group of 
those who did not with respect to age (76.2 versus 75.2 years, t = 1.19, p !&RKHQ¶Vd = 
0.09), Mini Mental State Examination (24.3 versus 23.9 points, t = 0.92, p !&RKHQ¶Vd = 
0.07), or Verbal Fluency (6.75 versus 6.72, t = 0.06, p !  &RKHQ¶V d = 0.01), or the 
percentage of women (62.1% versus 62.2%, F2 = 0.01, p > .90). Hence, regarding these 
variables, the subsample of 354 persons adequately represented the sample of 477 older 
adults.  
Finally, 169 (48%) persons of the 354 older adults who answered the cognitive 
complaints questionnaire also had complete data for all predictor variables of interest. These 
169 persons did not differ from the 185 persons who had missing data in at least one of the 
predictor variables with respect to age (76.13 versus 75.34 years, t = 0.25, p !&RKHQ¶Vd 
= 0.02), Mini Mental State Examination (23.95 versus 24.65 points, t = 1.21, p !&RKHQ¶V
d = 0.13), or the percentage of women (60% versus 64%, F2 = 0.31, p > .50). There was, 
however, a statistically significant difference in Verbal Fluency (6.45 versus 7.08, t = 1.96, p 
  &RKHQ¶Vd = 0.21). Note that those with incomplete data, on average, had a better 
fluency than those with complete data, implying that in terms of Verbal Fluency those with 
complete data records represent a slightly negative selection, although the effect size was 
small. Taken together, this analysis suggests that the subsample with complete data on the 
variables of interest represents a slight negative selection of those persons who, in principle, 
could have participated in the study. 
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The 169 outpatients were diagnosed based on general medical, neurological, and 
neuropsychological examinations by a multidisciplinary team. Using ICD 10 criteria (Dilling 
et al., 2000), the outpatients were assigned to one of the following groups: Subjective 
cognitive complainers (SCC, n = 63), mild cognitive impairment (MCI, n = 40), and persons 
with dementia (PWD, n = 66). Table 8 shows some descriptive statistics of the analyses 
variables separately for the three diagnosis groups. 
Measures 
Cognitive Complaints. Cognitive complaints were assessed using 14 items (e.g., 
³&RPSDUHGWREHIRUHGR\RXKDYHJUHDWHUGLIILFXOWLHVLQUHPHPEHULQJQDPHV"´RU³&RPSD-
red to before, do you have greater difficulties in finding your personal belongings, for 
example, glDVVHVNH\VRUZDOOHW"´3DUWLFLSDQWVZHUHDVNHGWRDQVZHUWKHLWHPVLQD\HV-
no-format. The answers to the 14 items were summed up in order to form an indicator of 
cognitive complaints. Note that a higher score implies more cognitive complaints. 
CronEDFK¶VDOSKDRIWKHFRJQLWLYHFRPSODLQWVLQGLFDWRUZDV 
Demographic variables. Sex was dummy-coded with 0 = male and 1 = female. Age 
was measured as years since birth. Education was coded ordered-categorical with 0 = no 
graduation, 1 = elementary school, 2 = secondary school, and 3 = grammar school.  
Cognitive Status. Cognitive status was measures using the Mini-Mental-State 
Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein & McHugh, 1975). 
Fluency)OXHQF\ZDVDVVHVVHGXVLQJWKH&(5$'6XEWHVW³DQLPDOQDPLQJ´0RUUis, 
Mohs, Rogers, Fillenbaum, & Heyman, 1988). Briefly, participants were asked to name as 
many animals as possible within one minute time. Scored was the number of unique animals 
named. 
Depressive Affect. The presence of depressive affect was diagnosed based on the 
general medical, neurological, and neuropsychological examination. A multidisciplinary team 
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assigned the outpatients to one of the following groups: 0 = no signs of depressive affect, 1 = 
some signs of depressive affect, 2 = depressive mood at least once a day affect, and 3 = 
pronounced depressive affect (depressive mood most of the day). 
Table 8. Sample Characteristics 
 SCC 
(n = 63) 
MCI 
(n = 40) 
PWD 
(n = 66) 
 
M 
 
M 
 
M 
Age (in years) 70.74 72.48 73.70 
Sex (% female) 59 53 64 
Education 2.14 1.69 1.25 
MMSE 29.36 28.18 22.21* 
Verbal Fluency 9.01 8.77 5.08* 
Depression 1.45 1.41 1.11 
Referred by Physicist (%) 10 28 22 
Referred by Relatives (%) 23 26 66* 
Cognitive Complaints 4.77 4.95 3.75* 
Note: * indicates mean differences between PWD and SCC and MCI on p < .05; SCC = Individuals with 
subjective cognitive complaints; MCI = Individuals with Mild Cognitive Impairments; PWD = Individuals with 
dementia; M = means  
 
3.1.3. Results 
Table 8 shows the means of the analysis variables separately for the three diagnosis 
groups (SCC, MCI, PWD). Those diagnosed with dementia (PWD) differed significantly 
from the other two groups (SCC, MCI) with respect to the MMSE, verbal fluency, the 
proportion of those referred to the memory clinic by relatives, and the number of cognitive 
complaints. First, the PWD group had a much lower average MMSE score, which 
demonstrates the amount of cognitive impairment in those diagnosed with dementia. About 
41% of variance in the MMSE score was accounted for by diagnosis group alone. Similarly, 
the average verbal fluency was lower in the PWD group than in the other two groups (SCC, 
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MCI), implying that those diagnosed with dementia had much more difficulties to retrieve 
animal names from memory. In verbal fluency, the amount of explained variance by 
diagnosis groups was about 40%. Also, the average number of cognitive complaints, the 
dependent variable, was lower in the PWD group than in the SCC and MCI groups. Thus, it 
appears as if those diagnosed with dementia are no longer aware of their cognitive problems. 
About 4% of variance were explained in the number of cognitive complaints by diagnosis 
group. Finally, in the PWD group, much more persons were referred to the memory clinic by 
their relatives than in the other two groups. This may also indicate those diagnosed with 
GHPHQWLDDUHQRWIXOO\DZDUHRIWKHLUFRJQLWLYHLPSDLUPHQW,QWHUPVRIHIIHFWVL]H&RKHQ¶Vw 
= 0.43), this effect was in the medium to large range. 
Regression Analyses 
In a first model (Model I), only demographic variables were included as predictors. 
As Table 9 shows, only the effect of education became statistically significant, implying that 
persons with a stronger educational background, on average, reported less cognitive 
complaints. By contrast, cognitive complaints were not significantly related to age or sex. 
That is, in memory clinic outpatients educational differences can account for cognitive 
complaints, but effect size was small.  
In a second model (Model II), Model I was complemented by cognitive variables 
(MMSE, verbal fluency) and depressive affect. As can be seen from Table 9, there were 
statistically significant effects of verbal fluency and depressive affect. Those with higher 
verbal fluency reported less cognitive complaints, while those with a more pronounced 
depressive affect, on average, showed more complaints. At the same time, the effect of 
education decreased slightly compared to Model I, implying that part of the education effect 
was captured by depression and fluency. Note that the MMSE did not reach statistical 
significance. One reason for this is that, compared to the MMSE, the verbal fluency measure 
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appeared to tap those aspects of cognitive functioning that are most relevant in forming 
cognitive complaints. After including the three predictors, the amount of explained variance 
increased. Note that opposed to many previous studies, there was an effect of cognition 
(verbal fluency) on cognitive complaints, implying that cognitive complaints do, at least in 
part, reflect actual cognitive performance. 
Table 9. Results of Regression Analyses  
 
 
Predictor 
Model 
 
I 
 
II 
 
III 
 
IV 
Sex -0.61 -0.29 -0.49 -0.39 
Age -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
Education -0.79* -0.54* -0.72* -0.74* 
MMSE  -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 
Fluency  -0.27* -0.34* -0.03 
Depression  -1.18* -0.89* -0.95* 
MCI   -0.03 -0.05 
Dementia   -2.06* -2.03* 
Referred by Physicist   -0.10 -0.16 
Referred by Relatives   -1.31* -1.23* 
MCI x Fluency    -0.40* 
Dementia x Fluency    -0.43* 
R2 0.03 0.08 0.16 0.18 
Note: * p < .05; MMSE = Mini Mental State Examination; MCI = Mild Cognitive Impairment 
 
Subsequently, in Model III, two dummy variables reflecting an MCI diagnosis (0 = 
no, 1 = yes) and a dementia diagnosis (0 = no, 1 = yes) were included. In addition, the type of 
referral was added to the model in form of two dummy variables (see Table 9). Of these new 
predictor variables, the diagnosis of dementia had a statistically significant effect in the 
reverse direction: those with a dementia diagnosis reported, on average, two complaints less 
than persons with other diagnoses. This findings either imply that those with dementia are not 
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or no longer aware of their cognitive impairment. Also, a significant effect emerged for those 
referred to the memory clinic by their relatives. These persons, on average, reported about 1.3 
complaints less. Similar to those with dementia diagnosis, those person sent to the memory 
clinic by their relatives were not fully aware of their cognitive problems. After including 
diagnosis and type of referral, the effect of depression decreased somewhat. By contrast, the 
effects of verbal fluency and education became stronger, implying that after controlling for 
diagnosis and type of referral, the impact of verbal fluency and education was even more 
pronounced. In total, 16% of variance were accounted for in cognitive complaints. 
In a final model (Model IV), an interaction term was included. Specifically, the 
interaction between verbal fluency and diagnosis was added to the model. Because diagnosis 
was coded into two dummy variables, two interaction variables were specified. As Table 9 
shows, both interactions became statistically significant. How can this finding be interpreted? 
The findings must be seen in relation to the effect of verbal fluency alone, which was reduced 
to non-significance. Hence, in persons classified as subjective cognitive complainers (SCC), 
there is no association between verbal fluency and cognitive complaints. By contrast, in both 
the MCI and the PWD groups, there is a negative association between verbal fluency and 
subjective complaints, implying that those with higher verbal fluency report less cognitive 
complaints. The other effects remained virtually unchanged. Overall, model IV explained 
18% of variance in cognitive complaints.  
3.1.4. Discussion 
In the present study we examined whether cognitive complaints are associated with 
cognitive performance in a group of memory clinic outpatients differentially diagnosed as 
persons with subjective cognitive complaints (SCC) only, persons with mild cognitive 
impairment (MCI), and persons with dementia (PWD). Concerning sample selectivity, the 
subsample of 169 persons with complete data records represented a somewhat negative 
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selection with respect to verbal fluency. Because this subsample did not differ with respect to 
all other variables, we assume that the large dropout is a result of the assessment conditions 
found in practice in a memory clinic. Patients were primarily assessed in preparation for 
possible clinical treatment. Hence, mental status of patients had priority, which only if 
considered necessary resulted in administering all tests in an individual ± without being 
highly systematic. Notwithstanding, one has to keep in mind that attrition diminishes the 
generalizability of the results of our study. 
A number of mean comparisons showed that the PWD group had a significantly lower 
MMSE score, showed less verbal fluency, and reported less cognitive complaints. Also, a 
higher proportion of persons with PWD was referred to the memory clinic by their relatives. 
These analyses showed that persons diagnosed with dementia are not fully aware of their 
cognitive impairment and, hence, do not see the necessity to visit a memory clinic based on 
their own initiative. Rather, to a large part they are advised by their relatives to seek help in a 
memory clinic. 
Subsequently, regression analyses were conducted. In line with recent findings, no 
significant effects of age and sex on cognitive complaints emerged (e.g., Slavin et al., 2010). 
Concerning education, we found that less educated individuals reported more cognitive 
complaints. In the literature, generally controversial findings exist with respect to the effect 
of education (Jonker et al, 2000; Slavin et al, 2010). In many community-based studies, low 
levels of education have been found to be associated with more cognitive complaints 
(Schofield et al., 1997). Ramakers et al. (2009), in contrary, found higher levels of education 
to be associated with more complaints in a sample of individuals seeking help for subjective 
memory complaints. Elsewhere (Kliegel & Zimprich, 2005), we have demonstrated that the 
assumption of one homogenous sample with regard to cognitive complaints may not be 
tenable. That is, there may be a group of persons where less education is related to more 
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complaints. At the same time, in a subgroup of people, higher education may elicit more 
cognitive complaints, because these persons may be more afraid of losing their cognitive 
abilities.  
Depressive affect was included as an additional control variable. As expected, 
depression had a positive effect on the number of cognitive complaints, indicating that higher 
levels of depressive affect are associated with more complaints. Note, that individuals that 
were clinically depressed were excluded from the analyses. Still, the effect of depressive 
affect was also present in subclinical ranges. It is known from the literature that depression 
influences the report of cognitive complaints (e.g., Mowla et al., 2007; Zimprich et al., 2003). 
Our findings provide additional evidence that the current emotional state is an influential 
YDULDEOHZKHQDVNHGWRMXGJHRQH¶VFRJQLWLYHSHUIRUPDQFH7KHRUHWLFDOO\WKLVUHODWLRQVHHPV
plausible. One central characteristic of depressive affect is rumination combined with high 
levels of self-consciousness. This may increase the tendency to focus on negative rather than 
on positive aspects (Hautzinger, 1998). Hence, depressed individuals may, for example, be 
liable to over-interpret a transient state of forgetfulness as a permanent cognitive impairment 
and may, worried as they are, also be more likely to report it. 
The diagnosis of dementia had the strongest effect on cognitive complaints. While 
individuals with dementia reported significantly less cognitive complaints, patients with MCI 
were not significantly different from healthy individuals in terms of the reported complaints. 
We suggest that the diagnosis of dementia as an influential effect on cognitive complaints 
mirrors the fact that being diagnosed with dementia implies severe impairment of cognitive 
functions and awareness. Impaired awareness is common in demented patients as well as the 
report of fewer complaints (e.g., Stewart, McGeown, Shanks, & Venneri 2010; Reisberg et 
al., 2010). That is why fewer reported cognitive complaints ± despite obvious cognitive 
problems ± could be interpreted as an additional, relevant aspect in the course of diagnosing 
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dementia. However, it could also be that the PWD group underreported complaints in order to 
IDNH³JRRG´.HHSLQJ LQPLQG WKDWD ODUJHSURSRUWLRQRI WKHVHSHUVRQVZHUHUHIHUUHG Wo the 
memory clinic by their relatives, it could be that they tried to dissimulate. But this would 
require an intention to do so, which appears unlikely in demented persons. Concerning the 
group of individuals diagnosed with MCI, the results of our study suggest that the amount of 
reported cognitive complaints does not differentiate between healthy or mild cognitively 
impaired individuals. Although this has also been reported in the literature (Slavin et al., 
2010), cognitive complaints are one criterion for diagnosing MCI (Dilling et al., 2000; 
Petersen et al., 1999). 
For demented patients, there appears to be an indirect statement of cognitive 
impairment that is given by relatives sending them to a memory clinic could. This fact alone 
could serve as an indicator for cognitive impairment, which could function as a useful hint for 
clinicians being confronted with individuals who were referred to the clinic by relatives, but 
who do not report complaints. Because relatives are likely to include earlier levels of 
functioning into the evaluation, this could be used as an important source of information for 
clinicians in the course of diagnosing. By contrast, the group that was sent in by a physicist 
did not differ from the group that came on their own initiative. The reasons why a physicist 
might send in a patient for an assessment are diverse, however. He or she could, for example, 
just follow the request of a patient or, alternatively, may base his or her decision on the 
clinical impression. Hence, the group of individuals referred to the clinic by a physicist was 
probably too diverse as to exhibit a concurrent pattern of complaints. 
Including the MMSE into the analyses did not significantly add information to the 
analyses. In line with recent literature (Benito-León et al., 2010), we conclude that the 
MMSE as a screening instrument assesses cognitive functioning too broadly. It is not well 
suited to detect subtle, beginning cognitive impairments. In other words, when the MMSE 
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classifies as a useful instrument, cognitive complaints might not be of any relevance for 
performance evaluation anymore. In contrast to the general MMSE measure, verbal fluency 
was an influential parameter. A negative relation between verbal fluency and cognitive 
complaints emerged. This indicated that the better the performance in verbal fluency the 
fewer cognitive complaints were reported (see also Benito-León et al., 2010). While global 
cognitive measures are not sensitive enough to detect very early onsets of cognitive decline, 
executive functions as operationalised in verbal fluency, could serve as an indicator. 
Considering the relation between cognitive complaints and verbal fluency performance, both 
measures could serve as valuable sources of information in a screening procedure to assess 
early onsets of cognitive malfunctioning. 
Importantly, however, the relation between verbal fluency and cognitive complaints 
was different in the different diagnostic groups. While for the SCC group, no significant 
relation emerged, MCI and PWD groups reported more complaints in the presence of poorer 
verbal fluency performance. A possible explanation is that SCC persons have such a high 
level of cognitive functioning that verbal fluency does hardly differentiate between persons 
with more or less cognitive complaints. This interpretation has two different implications. 
First, in the SCC group a much more fine-graded assessment of cognitive abilities could lead 
to a relation between cognition and complaints. Second, it might well be that in the range of 
normal cognitive functioning, complaints are due to other reasons than cognition, for 
example, depressive affect or personality (Kliegel & Zimprich, 2005). 
By contrast, in the dementia and the MCI group, better verbal fluency performance 
was related to fewer cognitive complaints. While the overall level of complaints was lower in 
the PWD group compared to the SSC and MCI groups, verbal fluency differentiated in both 
the PWD and MCI groups between individuals within those groups. Specifically, although 
the diagnosis as such does not differentiate between SCC and MCI individuals, within the 
SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE MEMORY PERFORMANCE   87  
MCI group those performing better on the verbal fluency task report fewer complaints. 
Hence, verbal fluency may have to fall below a certain threshold in order to become relevant 
for forming cognitive complaints. Note that changes or emerging difficulties in executive 
functions might be a phenomenon very noticeable in the everyday life of lay persons. Hart 
and Bean (2011), for example, found that only after falling below a critical threshold in terms 
of general intellectual abilities, executive functioning was associated with daily living skills.  
Taking together, what do the results of the present study reveal about cognitive 
complaints in a group of outpatients? First, while sex and age had no effect, lower education 
was associated with more complaints. Depression was found to strongly influence the 
expression of cognitive complaints. Second, with respect to cognitive measures, global 
measures had no significant effect. However, verbal fluency as a more specific measure had a 
significant effect on cognitive complaints, indicating that lower verbal fluency performance 
was associated with more complaints. This was true, however, only for the groups of MCI 
and dementia patients. No significant effect emerged for the SCC group.  
When interpreting the results of the present study, one has to keep in mind that overall 
only 18% of variance were explained by the predictors. This means that other important 
factors that influence the report of cognitive complaints were not included in the present 
study. Also, the results of the present study are based on cross-sectional data. Hence, no 
inferences on developmental trajectories can be made. Assumptions to what extent cognitive 
complaints might foreshadow dementia are not warranted from the data of the present study. 
As a last point to mention, our study is limited by a lack of exact experimental control. This, 
however, is a result of what represents a strength of the present data set as well: Because data 
stem from outpatients of a memory clinic that came seeking for an assessment of their 
cognitive abilities, our data represent a population that otherwise would not have been very 
likely to participate in the course of data collection in a scientific context.   
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3.2. Correlated change in memory complaints and memory performance across 12 
years4  
3.2.1. Introduction 
The nature of the relationship between memory complaints and actual memory 
performance poses an important issue in applied science. Several studies have demonstrated 
that memory performance decreases with age (e.g., Verhaeghen & Salthouse, 1997; Hess, 
2005) whereas memory complaints increase with age (Commissaris, Ponds & Jolles, 1998; 
Mol, van Boxtel, Willems & Jolles, 2006). However, the relationships found between 
subjective and objective measures of memory are of moderate size (cf., Cavanaugh & Poon, 
1989; Jorm et al., 2001; Valentijn et al., 2006). Several different ideas have been presented to 
explain this moderate association. 
First, subjective judgments on memory performance might not be solely determined 
by actual memory performance but might also be strongly related to other variables. The 
extent of complaints has been found to be strongly related to affective state (e.g., depression) 
(e.g., Mowla et al., 2007). Depression has also been found to be a major influence on self-
reports of cognition (e.g., Metternich et al., 2009). Just as high levels in neuroticism have 
proven to be related to the prevalence of major depression (Jylhä et al., 2009), memory 
complaints might be influenced by the level of neuroticism in nondepressed aging samples 
(Mol et al., 2008; Wilhelm et al., 2010). Lane and Zelinski (2003) investigated the relations 
between memory-functioning questionnaires and various personality variables and found 
levels of neuroticism to be related to evaluations of the seriousness and frequency of 
forgetting.  
Second, while questionnaires and tests of memory performance are defined and 
validated by experts in the field, they are answered by lay people. Differences in the 
                                                                                                                    
4  $VLPLODUYHUVLRQRIWKLVFKDSWHUKDVEHHQSXEOLVKHGDV³0DVFKHUHN$	=LPSULFK'&RUUHODWHG
change in memory complaints and memory performance across 12 years. Psychology and Aging. doi: 
D´  
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definitions of constructs intended by the creators and those understood by the participant 
might lead to different conclusions about memory performance. For example, differences 
between lay and expert definitions have been found in research on intelligence (Furnham, 
2000). Similarly, different perceptions of memory performance might account for the small 
relationship between subjective and objective memory performance. Related to this 
argument, current theories in social psychology state that implicit theories that individuals 
hold about aging and memory influence responses on self-ratings (cf., Hertzog & Hultsch, 
2000). Implicit theories are informal constructs held by individuals about specific 
psychological phenomena. According to Ross (1989), the manner in which individuals 
construe their own history is greatly influenced by socio-cultural conceptions of aging. In 
general, young and old adults tend to believe in cognitive decline in old age (Hertzog & 
Hultsch, 2000; Kite et al., 2005; McDonald-Miszczak et al., 1995). Although rather drawing 
the attention to short-term evaluation of performance in an upcoming memory test, Rabbitt 
and Abson (1990; 1991) found the levels of prediction to be associated with levels of self-
confidence. Hence, self-reported cognitive decline might be amplified by people being 
primed to expect cognitive decline in old age.  
7KLUG D SRLQW RI UHIHUHQFH LV QHFHVVDU\ WR MXGJH D SHUVRQ¶V SHUIRUPDQFH ,Q D
comprehensive review on the use of questionnaires for the assessment of memory 
performance, Herrmann (1982) pointed out the fact that content and format of ratings differ 
between questionnaires as well as individuals. Questionnaires might differ in the way that 
they assess forgetting, remembering or memory change across a time span of days, weeks or 
occasions. Additionally, individuals differ in what they use as a baseline for their ratings. 
Concerning cognitive functioning, people can either use social comparisons (e.g., Arnkelsson 
& Smith, 2000) or temporal comparisons (cf., Albert, 1977). Although temporal comparisons 
seem to be the most common in old age (e.g., Brown & Middendorf, 1996), this confounding 
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aspect cannot be controlled for in cross-sectional research designs. Martin and Zimprich 
(2003; Zimprich et al., 2003) accounted for this problem applying longitudinal data analyses 
and latent change models. The relationship between the subjective and objective 
measurements of memory performance was then assessed via the degree of correlation 
between the changes in memory and complaints. In their study, Zimprich et al. (2003) 
assessed memory complaints and memory performance in 202 older adults (mean age = 63 
years) at two measurement occasions across 4 years. They found a nonsignificant relationship 
between memory complaints and cognitive performance at the initial measurement occasion. 
However, they found a correlation of r = -.64 between changes in memory complaints and 
changes in actual memory performance. Somewhat contradictory evidence comes from a 
longitudinal study by Taylor, Miller and Tinklenberg (1992). In 30 older adults measured on 
three occasions over 4 years they found no relationship between subjective and objective 
memory change. However, this may be due to the small sample size. In a sample of 97 
individuals aged between 30 and 81 Lane and Zelinski (2003) found inconsistent 
relationships between memory performance and different factors of memory functioning 
questionnaire across 19 years. Again, this might be due to the comparatively small sample 
size or to the broad age range studied. The concept of correlated change addresses the 
question of whether there is a commonality in change across variables (Hertzog & 
Nesselroade, 2003). If points of reference are assumed to be different between persons but to 
remain stable within a person across time, each person may serve as his own control group. In 
that case, one can infer that the degree of correlated change represents the relationship 
between the variables in a way that is more precise and uncontaminated by initial differences. 
Commonalities in change scores can only be assessed longitudinally (Hofer & Sliwinski, 
2001; Nesselroade, 2001; Willett & Sayer, 1994).  
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This paper addresses the question of whether the relationship between subjective and 
objective memory performance can be assessed by analyzing the commonality in change 
between the two constructs. 
3.2.2. Method 
Sample 
The data for the present study come from the Interdisciplinary Study on Adult 
Development (ILSE; e.g., Allemand, Zimprich, Martin, 2008), an ongoing longitudinal study 
on the psychological, physical, and social antecedents and consequences of aging in 
Germany. Of originally 1001 participants from two cohorts (500 individuals born between 
1930 and 1932, 501 individuals born between 1950 and 1952), all 500 participants from 
cohort one were included in the present study. Mean age at first measurement occasion (T1: 
1994) was 62.9 years (SD = .91 years, 61-65 years) and at third measurement occasion (T3: 
2006) was 74.4 years (SD = .88 years, 72-76 years) with 47.9% of the sample being female. 
While there were complete data records of the variables of interest for all 500 participants at 
T1, only 297 individuals provided full data records at T3. 
Measures 
Memory and memory complaints were assessed using measures from the ILSE testing 
battery. Memory was assessed applying three subtests from the Nuremberg Inventory of Old 
Age (Oswald & Fleischmann, 1995), namely a picture recall task (PR), a delayed picture 
recall task (DP), and a wordlist recall task (WR). These three items served as indicators for 
memory. 
Memory complaints were assessed using six items from the Nuremberg Self-
Assessment List (Oswald & Fleischmann, 1995). The questionnaire measures self-reported 
problems of different domains in everyday life. Six items depicting memory complaints were 
selected for the present study: (1) "Lately, I find it difficult to follow the train of thought of 
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occasionally forget names and numbers", (4) "Lately, I find it difficult to concentrate on a 
task.", (5) "Lately, I have more difficulties in planning a journey or other undertakings.", and 
(6) "Lately, I now and then forget the birth dates of relatives or close acquaintances." 
Memory complaints items were scored on a four-point Likert scale from 4 = "completely 
false" to 1 = "completely true". Hence for memory complaints, lower scores indicate stronger 
memory complaints. The six items served as manifest indicators for memory complaints.  
Statistical analyses 
To test the extent to which the chosen measures depict the same construct across time 
or groups, we first test for measurement invariance (MI) (Meredith & Horn, 2001). In 
practice, MI can be tested by fitting confirmatory factor models that impose different degrees 
of restrictions to a data set (cf., Lubke et al., 2003; Meredith, 1993; Meredith & Horn, 2001; 
Meredith & Teresi, 2006). For the basic configural invariance model, items are constrained to 
load on the same factor across time. For weak factorial invariance, factor loadings are 
constrained to be equal across time and for strong factorial invariance to hold, item-intercepts 
are constrained to be equal across time. After measurement invariance is established, we then 
analyze the commonality in change by correlating the change scores of the two constructs 
across time using second-order latent growth curve models (e.g., Sayer & Cumsille, 2001).  
As criteria for model fit, we report the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and the Root 
Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA. Values of the CFI above 0.90 denote a well-
fitting model, whereas for the RMSEA values less than 0.08 may be interpreted as acceptable 
model fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). In addition, we report adjusted Ȥð-values, degrees of freedom 
(df), and corresponding p-values for all models examined as well as the Satorra-Bentler 
scaled Ȥð-difference-test for comparing nested models (Satorra & Bentler, 2001). Throughout 
the analyses we used SPSS 18 and Mplus version 3.0 (Muthén & Muthén, 2004). 
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Modeling description 
We begin analysis of the data with a first-order model for memory and memory 
complaints across three measurement occasions each. Because data for memory complaints 
were measured on an ordinal scale, we estimated thresholds between categories (Millsap & 
Yun-Tein, 2004). The number of thresholds is equal to the number of categories minus 1, 
resulting in 3 thresholds to be estimated. We used the theta parameterization and WLSM 
estimator for our analyses (Muthén & Asparouhov, 2002; Muthén & Muthén, 2004). Model 
parameterization and factor scaling of the configural invariance model were achieved by 
fixing the factor means to zero. Additional constraints were then imposed to test specific 
models. To scale the latent variables, factor loadings for Item 1 for memory complaints and 
the picture recall task were set to 1. For all six first-order factors, the means were set to 0 
across the three time points. For the second-order models, one level factor and one slope 
factor were specified for each of memory and memory complaints. Because time intervals 
were 4 and 8 years respectively, slope factor loadings were set to 0, 1 and 3, corresponding to 
linear growth. 
3.2.3. Results  
Different degrees of measurement invariance (MI) were tested. The configural 
invariance model achieved an acceptable fit (adjusted Ȥð 1040.7, df = 302, p < .01, CFI = 
0.96, RMSEA = 0.070), indicating that the same manifest indicators underlie the latent 
constructs across time. Weak MI, that is, constraining the factor loadings to be equal across 
time, did not change the model fit significantly (adjusted Ȥð  1029.93, df = 316, p < .01, CFI 
= 0.96, RMSEA = 0.067; Satorra-Bentler scaled (S-B) ǻȤð 17.74, ǻGI 14, ns), indicating 
that the manifest indicators assessed the latent factors in the same way at each time point. 
Strong MI did not hold (adjusted Ȥð  1652.57, df = 351, p < .01, CFI = 0.93, RMSEA = 
0.085; S-B ǻȤð   905.01, ǻGI   35, p < .01). We then tested for partial measurement 
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invariance (Byrne et al., 1989). Inspection revealed that the intercept for memory that caused 
the largest decrease was for delayed picture recall. The items representing immediate recall 
could be constrained to be equal across time, indicating that delayed recall behaves 
differently than immediate recall. For the memory complaints items a comparable picture 
emerged. Items 2, 3, and 6 could be constrained to be equal across time where Items 1, 4, and 
5 could not. The former items target specific episodic memory problems whereas the latter 
depict rather general difficulties in concentration. Although compared to the weak 
measurement invariance model, the partial strong measurement invariance model fit the data 
statistically significantly worse according to the chi-square difference test (S-B ǻȤð 65.25, 
ǻGI 14, p < .01), we accepted this model for conceptual reasons (discussion below).5 
Analyses continued using a second-order latent growth curve model. In this model, 
memory and memory complaints each were provided factors for level and slope across the 12 
years. The factor loadings of the second-order level factors were set to 1, their means set to 
zero, and their variances freely estimated. Covariances between the memory level factor and 
the complaints level factor as well as between the memory slope factor and the complaints 
slope factor were freely estimated. According to model fit criteria this model fitted the data of 
the present study well (adjusted Ȥð  1133, df = 343, p < .01, CFI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.068), 
hence we accepted it as our final model (see Figure 4). Standardized factor loadings and 
unique variances can be seen in Table 10.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
5  We also tested strong measurement invariance using continuous item factor analysis and parcels. 
However, both ways of structuring the data lead to similar results.  
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Table 10. Standardized factor loadings of the manifest variables and unique variances 
Manifest indicators  T1 T2 T3 
Picture recall .51 .56 .67 
Delayed picture recall .58 .58 .64 
Wordlist recall .46 .41 .49 
Compl 1 .78 .78 .82 
Compl 2 .50 .50 .55 
Compl 3 .77 .77 .81 
Compl 4 .75 .75 .79 
Compl 5 .66 .68 .71 
Compl 6 .76 .77 .80 
Variance memory  .03 .1 .07 
Variance complaints .2 .2 .1 
Note: T1 = First measurement occasion (1994), T2 = second measurement occasion (1998), T3 = third 
measurement occasion (2006); Compl1 - 6: Subjective memory complaints items; Picture recall = 
unstandardized loading fixed to 1 to scale the latent variable; Compl 1 = unstandardized loading fixed to 1 to 
scale the latent variable; Factor loadings refer to the final model. Standardized factor loadings can be different in 
numbers although equality constraints do hold, because of the standardization 
 
The skew of the distribution of memory complaints data did not change substantially 
over time. Taken together, for all items the general distribution remained the same with the 
highest weight on the first threshold and decreasing weight on threshold two and three. 
Variances for the level factors were 1.197 (SE: 0.19) for memory complaints and 0.209 (SE: 
0.036) for memory performance. Variances for the slope factors were 0.066 (SE 0.36) for 
memory complaints and 0.029 (SE: 0.01) for memory performance. Unstandardized means 
for the slope factors were -.158 (p < .05) for memory complaints and -.169 (p < .05) for 
memory performance. According to Byrne et al. (1989) means on latent level are 
interpretable even without full strong measurement invariance. Note, however, that if 
constraining intercepts of the memory complaints items that aim at difficulties in 
concentration, the mean-level change in memory complaints is non-significant anymore (see 
discussion below).  
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The covariance between the level factors was 0.116, p < .05, whereas the covariance 
between the slope factors was 0.015, p < .05. We also tested the covariance between the slope 
factors against a zero slope-slope covariance using a LR test (Hertzog, von Oertzen, Ghisletta 
& Lindenberger, 2008). This led to a significant decrease in model fit (S-B ǻȤð  8.16, ǻdf = 
1, p < .01). To test whether the covariances between levels and slopes differed significantly, 
we constrained them to be equal and refitted the model. This also led to a significant decrease 
in model fit (S-B ǻȤð  6.93, ǻdf = 1, p < .01). We conclude that the relationship between 
the slope factors was significantly different from zero and larger than the relationship 
between the level factors. In terms of effect-sizes, the relationship between memory and 
memory complaints at T1, was r = .23, p < .05. The correlation between the slopes of the two 
constructs was r = .39, p < .05. Correlations between the level and slope factors within the 
constructs were not significant (r = - .16, ns for memory complaints and r = - .03, ns for 
memory performance). The correlations remained unaffected by the different degrees of 
partial measurement invariance. 
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Figure 4. Final second-order latent growth curve model  
Note: adjusted Ȥð  1133, df = 343, p < .01, CFI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.068 
WR = Word recall, PR = Picture recall, DP = Delayed picture recall, 1 - 6 = Memory complaints Items 1 to 6, 
T1 = first measurement occasion, T2 = second measurement occasion, T3 = third measurement occasion, 
Numbers denote fixed parameters for model specification, Numbers in bold indicate correlations between levels 
and slopes, Means of complaints and memory first-order factors are set to zero. 
 
3.2.4. Discussion 
In the present study we examined whether the relationship between memory 
complaints and memory performance could be assessed more precisely by analyzing the 
commonality in change between the two constructs.  
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First, we examined different degrees of measurement invariance. Strong factorial 
invariance did not hold. The pattern that emerged for partial strong factorial invariance 
indicated invariance for those memory items measuring immediate recall but not for those 
measuring delayed recall. For the memory complaints items, invariance was shown to be 
tenable for those items measuring memory complaints in specific episodic memory tasks (i.e., 
remembering names and numbers) but not for the items measuring global memory changes 
(e.g., difficulties in concentration). The results indicate that changes in immediate recall can 
be accounted for by the latent memory factor, whereas changes in delayed recall remain 
partly unexplained by the memory factor. The same is true for the memory complaints items: 
while changes in the specific episodic memory complaints can be accounted for by the latent 
factor, changes in the items assessing complaints about more global concentration cannot. We 
have the following explanation for this: concentration is a less specific measure for memory. 
It seems plausible that these less-specific aspects of self-assessment are more difficult to 
evaluate, and therefore more strongly influenced by mediating variables such as affect or 
stereotypes about age. Just as affect has been shown to influence memory self-evaluation 
(e.g., Metternich et al., 2009), the different invariance characteristics of the items can be 
interpreted as representing the specific influence of affective variables on aspects of self-
evaluation of memory complaints. A related explanation seems plausible for the memory 
performance items. From the literature it is known that memory performance is influenced by 
perceived self-efficacy (e.g., Bandura, 1989). Although these effects are small, it seems 
plausible that the delayed recall is more prone to affective influences than is the immediate 
recall. In the deliberate process of recalling information after a delay, it seems reasonable that 
affective influences are more distinct. However, more detailed future research is needed to 
provide support for this explanation.  
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On the latent level we find a decrease in memory performance and an increase in 
memory complaints. This result is expected from the literature (e.g., Commissaris et al., 
1998; Hess, 2005). Note, however, that in the present study the significance of the mean-level 
changes in memory complaints depended on the choice of items that were constrained to 
equality across time. Constraining the specific memory complaints items (Item 2, 3, 6) led to 
significant mean-level changes, whereas constraining the less specific items (Items 1, 4, 5) to 
be equal led to a non-significant mean-level change. A reasonable interpretation of this result 
is that items that are possibly influenced more strongly by affective variables could mask the 
change in mean-level. Hence, differences on intercept level that are not completely mediated 
by the common factor but are rather confounded with specific additive influences result in the 
possibility that changes are masked (for extensive discussion see Gregorich, 2006; Meredith 
& Teresi, 2006).  
Analyses then focused on examining correlated change in memory performance and 
memory complaints. In terms of r2 we found the relationship to be three times stronger 
between the slopes than the levels. Although the effect size is only moderate for the change 
correlation, the results imply that development is dynamic rather than static, and that in order 
to assess the relationship between the development of two constructs, the dynamic nature of 
development must be represented methodologically as well. The relationship between 
memory and memory complaints is therefore described more precisely in the analysis of 
mutual development than in the analysis of static structure. From a conceptual point of view, 
the results of the present study indicate that individuals are sensitive to their own memory 
performance in the way that they notice changes. One limitation of the present study is that 
the overall correlation between the change parameters is only moderate. This resembles 
results from previous studies mentioned in the introduction (e.g., Jorm et al., 2001). Two 
possible explanations seem plausible. First, prior research has suggested that perceived age 
SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE MEMORY PERFORMANCE   100  
differences are ability specific (Lachman & Jelalian, 1984). In the present study, memory 
performance was assessed using word list and picture memory tasks whereas the items for 
memory complaints additionally aimed at concentration and everyday performance. Second, 
although points of reference were assumed to be stable across time; this might not be true for 
a time span as long as 12 years. It is possible that individuals periodically adjust their 
UHIHUHQFHSRLQWDQGFRPSDUHWKHPVHOYHVWR³WKHSHUVRQ,ZDVDIHZ\HDUVDJR´'HVSLWHWKHVH
limitations, the significant difference between the level correlation and the slope correlation 
supports the conclusion that analyzing the commonality in change is highly informative. 
What do the results of the present study tell us about the relationship between memory 
complaints and memory performance? First, across 12 years memory performance decreases 
while memory complaints increase. Second, items that measure memory performance in a 
less specific way seem to be more prone to outside influences. Possible mediating variables 
are affective variables; however, future research is needed to clarify this point. Third, 
assessing the commonalities in change is more informative than examining static values at a 
given time point. 
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4. GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Within the overarching framework of how and by which means individuals manage 
their own cognitive development two specific aspects were addressed in detail in the present 
thesis: the development of Typical Intellectual Engagement (Goff & Ackerman, 1992) as an 
individual differences variable that influences the extent of cognitive activities (Study 1 and 
Study 2) and the relation between objective and subjective memory performance (Study 3 and 
Study 4). In the following I will summarize and discuss the main findings of the studies and 
will relate them to the research questions formulated in the introduction. Afterwards, I will 
integrate the findings of all four studies and will then turn to the discussion of possible future 
research directions. I will close with drawing some final conclusions. 
4.1. Development of Typical Intellectual Engagement across the adult lifespan 
The first aim of the present thesis was to investigate the development of Typical 
Intellectual Engagement across the adult lifespan (Ackerman, 2000; Goff & Ackerman, 
1992). This question was addressed in Study 1 in a cross-sectional research design in order to 
describe differences in young and old adults. In Study 2 the question was addressed in a 
longitudinal study covering a 5-year interval in order to allow for inferences on 
developmental trajectories and interindividual differences concerning these trajectories. In 
taking the results of both studies together, a coherent picture emerges about how Typical 
Intellectual Engagement might develop across the adult lifespan ± generally and individually. 
Measurement Invariance 
As discussed in chapter 1.4., in both studies measurement invariance (MI) was tested. 
According to Meredith (1993), testing MI is an explicit method of ensuring that 
characteristics of the instrument applied remain stable across groups or time. In both of our 
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studies on Typical Intellectual Engagement, strong measurement invariance was established 
across groups (Study 1) and across time (Study 2). However, with the restriction that in Study 
1 only partial strong MI was found to hold. This indicates that for the respective items (here 
TIE1B, 2A, & 3D), intercepts could not be constrained to be equal across groups. Although 
from a statistical perspective, partial MI does not result in significant inaccuracies of the 
analyses (e.g., Byrne et al., 1989; Reise et al., 1993), conceptually this indicates that the items 
in question are comprehended differently across groups. Importantly, those differences 
cannot be accounted for by differences in the latent construct (here Typical Intellectual 
Engagement), but must be due to other influences that were not accounted for in Study 1. The 
conclusion that can be drawn for the measurement characteristics of the Typical Intellectual 
Engagement-scale hence is that although group differences or across time changes can be 
meaningfully and unambiguously interpreted as changes in the underlying latent construct 
(cf., Byrne et al., 1989; Lubke, et al., 2003; Rast, Zimprich, van Boxtel & Jolles, 2009), one 
has to bear in mind that some items of the scale are not as invariant as others. This seems to 
be especially true for large age differences or for group comparisons. Whether it is the age 
difference (almost 50 years) or the different groups cannot be disentangled from Study 1. 
Both seem reasonable: either the respective items could mean something rather different to 
young and old adults or the samples in Study 1 were, despite the great effort to control for 
that, systematically different with respect to an uncontrolled variable. Consequently, in future 
research on Typical Intellectual Engagement and its measurement properties, the items 1B, 
2A, and 3D of the present scale should be applied with special attention paid to their 
invariance characteristics. The analyses of MI revealed that the respective items function 
differently in both groups with regard to the means.  
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Change across the lifespan 
After discussing the implications of MI for the cross-sectional evidence, I now turn to 
the discussion of the findings of Study 1 and Study 2 concerning the development of Typical 
Intellectual Engagement across the adult lifespan. According to the different aspects of 
change mentioned in chapter 1.4., I will successively discuss the findings and will end with a 
depiction of how Typical Intellectual Engagement can be seen from a lifespan developmental 
perspective. 
Mean level changes 
In line with current research on the development of Openness to Experience we, 
cross-sectionally, found lower levels of Problem Solving, Reading and Abstract Thinking in 
the old. High stability for Reading and Abstract Thinking emerged longitudinally (e.g., 
Allemand et al., 2007; Allemand, Zimprich & Martin, 2008; Roberts et al., 2006). A variety 
of studies on personality (Allemand et al., 2007; Roberts et al., 2006; Small et al., 2003) has 
found that while personality traits are comparatively stable across the lifespan they still 
change. Openness, for instance, has been found to decrease in old age (Caprara et al., 2003; 
Helson et al., 2002; McCrae et al., 1999). This has been interpreted as reflecting proceeding 
limitations of resources and the tendency to focus on important existing relationships and 
aspects and maintaining current levels of functionality rather than engaging in new things 
(Baltes & Carstensen, 1996; Carstensen, Isaacowitz & Charles, 1999; Hess, Germain, Swaim 
& Osowski, 2009; Hess, Leclerc, Swaim & Weatherbee, 2009). Overall, the findings for 
Typical Intellectual Engagement as specifically referring to cognitive engagement resemble 
the trends that are usually found with respect to a general openness to new experiences in 
personality research. Across a time interval of almost 50 years (Study 1), the plasticity of 
Typical Intellectual Engagement showed in the higher and lower levels of the subfactors of 
Typical Intellectual Engagement. The stability that was found across 5 years in Reading and 
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Abstract Thinking underscores the idea of Typical Intellectual Engagement being a rather 
stable, trait like construct that is not subject to rapid, mood-dependent changes. The results 
that are not in line with research on Openness to Experience emphasise the eligibility of 
Typical Intellectual Engagement as an independent construct. It does contribute information 
that cannot be covered by assessing only Openness to Experience with which Typical 
Intellectual Engagement is closely connected (e.g., Rocklin, 1994).  
However, our studies also exhibited findings that are controversial not only 
concerning the literature on Openness to Experience, but concerning the results of the two 
studies itself. While the longitudinal evidence showed that Intellectual Curiosity decreased 
across 5 years and Problem Solving increased (Study 2), higher levels of Intellectual 
Curiosity and lower levels of Problem Solving in the old in comparison to the young resulted 
from the cross-sectional study. Hence, depending on time interval covered and 
methodological approach taken, the results for Intellectual Curiosity and Problem Solving are 
different between the cross-sectional and the longitudinal study. Besides the possible 
conceptual implications that will be discussed below, a methodological concern also needs to 
be addressed to explain the contradictory results of Intellectual Curiosity and Problem 
Solving in Study 1 and Study 2. It has been discussed in the literature that correct inferences 
on individual trajectories from the shape of a cross-sectionally derived curve of mean values 
only is admissible if the entrances from the population are random, the error variances are 
constant and the developmental trajectories are completely parallel (Hofer & Sliwinski, 2001; 
Kraemer, Yesavage, Taylor & Kupfer, 2000). Because we know from Study 2 that at least the 
assumption of parallel trajectories is violated (as is exhibited in differential change), the 
reliability of the inferences concerning lifespan development from Study 1 is limited.  
How can the results of Intellectual Curiosity and Problem Solving be interpreted 
conceptually? Turning to the interpretation of the slight increase in Problem Solving across 
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five years, this could possibly depict an effect inherent in the conceptualization of the data 
collection (Zimprich et al., 2008). Because the test battery exclusively consists of cognitive 
tasks, the engagement in the tasks as such could have led to an increasing interest in and/or a 
greater salience of Problem Solving. Because some of the tasks were reasoning tasks, it 
seems possible that solving the tasks in the testing situation could have acted as an 
³LQFHQWLYH´ WR HQJDJH LQ FURVVZRUGSX]]OH ZKLFK LV UDWKHUNQRZOHGge than reasoning) and 
6XGRNX¶VLQWKHWLPHEHWZHHQWKHPHDVXUHPHQWRFFDVLRQV In a meta-analysis on the effects of 
cognitive training, Martin, Clare, Altgassen and Zehnder (2011) found that in some studies, 
cognitive trainings were as effective as being in an active control group with different, non-
cognitive activities. From this, one might conclude that being part of a psychological 
experiment DQGHQJDJLQJDIWHUWKDWLQD³VHOIGHVLJQHG´WUDLQLQJ(which would resemble being 
in an active control group) may have an effect on cognitive function. Of course, Typical 
Intellectual Engagement is not a cognitive ability, still individuals could put on record that 
they enjoy problem solving more and that they do it more often. This could either be due to 
an actual increase of engagement in problem solving activities or as an effect of salience. 
Being more aware of an activity due to the testing situation and the practiced activity after 
that, might lead to the report of higher levels of Problem Solving (cf., Hess, Waters & 
Bolstad, 2000). 
Turning to Intellectual Curiosity, how can the results of longitudinal decrease and 
cross-sectional higher levels in the old be interpreted? Results rendered by both studies 
deserve attention and have conceptual implications. Two possible explanations of the present 
findings will be given in what follows.  
The first, rather methodological interpretation refers to possible sample selection 
effects. Although all participants attended the tests voluntarily, sample recruitment was 
different for the young and the old. While the old were recruited in a time consuming 
GENERAL DISCUSSION   106  
procedure (see Zimprich et al., 2008 for details) via newspaper, senior college courses and 
records from the central register, the young sample was a convenience sample recruited at a 
university lecture. Because all individuals were psychology students who received course 
credit for participation, this could have functioned as an incentive and led to differences in 
the motivational baseline between young and old adults. It is known from the literature that 
people who are highly interested in cognitive activities are also more likely to participate in 
psychological studies (e.g., Cooney et al., 1988). Hence, the higher levels of Intellectual 
Curiosity in the old as opposed to the young could reflect sample peculiarities rather than real 
developmental results. The decrease found in Intellectual Curiosity across the five years 
FRXOG WKHQ EH LQWHUSUHWHG DV WKH ³UHDO GHYHORSPHQWDO´ ILQGLQJ LQGLFDWLQJ WKDW, on average, 
across the lifespan, Intellectual Curiosity decreases and interests become narrower. This is in 
line with motivational selectivity and cognitive resource selectivity (Hess, 2006; Riediger & 
Freund, 2006). 
Another possible explanation for the controversial results concerning Intellectual 
Curiosity could be that the developmental trajectory of Intellectual Curiosity is curvilinear 
with reaching its peak late in adulthood. Typical Intellectual Engagement has been found to 
be related to crystallized intelligence in young and old adults (Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008; 
Wilhelm et al., 2003). It is possible that Intellectual Curiosity as representing a general non-
VSHFLILFLQWHUHVW LQQHZWRSLFV LV WKH³PRWRUEHKLQG´OLIHORQJNQRZOHGJHDFTXLVLWLRQ In the 
course of the necessary allocation of limited resources, the general curiosity in new topics 
decreases. Investment is centred upon areas that already are of high relevance to an individual 
(cf., Hess, 2006). This could be represented in the longitudinal decline and still integrates the 
cross-sectional finding of higher levels in the old as compared to the young. For both 
explanations references in existing literature can be found (Cooney et al., 1988; Dellenbach 
& Zimprich, 2008; Martin et al., 2002). However, because to the best of our knowledge no 
GENERAL DISCUSSION   107  
developmental research on Typical Intellectual Engagement exists, these interpretations 
remain speculative and need further research to decide which of the interpretations given suit 
the ± then available ± additional data best. 
Change of divergence 
Another parameter that describes differences and changes on the group level and, 
hence, is well-suited in adding to a general understanding of the development of a construct is 
change or differences in variances (e.g., Martin & Zimprich, 2005; Zimprich & Mascherek 
2010). In the present studies, larger variances in the old as compared to the young emerged 
for all factors except for Intellectual Curiosity, whereas longitudinally, no changes in 
variance were found across five years. Assuming that the findings in the cross-sectional Study 
1 represent reliable findings and are no spurious results due to sample specificities, the 
findings imply that across the lifespan, interindividual difference become larger, however, 
changes occur rather slow and across a long period of time. Developmental theories suggest 
that idiosyncrasies become more pronounced and interindividual differences become larger 
with ongoing time as individuals seek and create environments that suit them best, which in 
turn reinforces idiosyncrasies (Cattell, 1987; Scarr & McCartney, 1983; Schooler, 1984; 
Schooler & Mulatu, 2001; Stanovich, 1986). This assumption is mirrored in the greater 
heterogeneity, that is larger variances, in the old as opposed to the young sample in Study 1. 
The results of Study 2, namely stability in variances also fit into literature of personality 
psychology. While Allemand, Zimprich and Martin (2008) found change of divergence in 
Openness to Experience across 12 years, Small et al. (2003) found stability of divergence 
across six years. Hence, the 5-year interval in the present study might have been too short to 
exhibit reliable changes in variances. Another measurement occasion in the ZULU study in 
five years could show an increase in variances across the respective time span. 
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Differential change 
A parameter that describes interindividual differences in development is characterized 
by differential change. Differential change is indicated by a test-retest correlation and can 
only be assessed longitudinally. It is independent from means or variances (Martin & 
Zimprich, 2005). Note that perfect test-retest reliability usually is not achieved due to 
measurement errors. However, because our analyses were conducted on the latent level, 
measurement errors are accounted for and, hence, any deviation from perfect test-retest 
correlations, that is r = 1.00, can be interpreted as differential change (Zimprich & 
Mascherek, 2010). Differential change indicates to which extent the rank-order changes 
between individuals. That is, differential change describes whether individuals differ in their 
rate of change. For Typical Intellectual Engagement, significant deviations from r = 1 
emerged, indicating interindividual differences in the amount of change (correlations were: r 
= .84 for Abstract Thinking, r = .83 for Problem Solving, r = .88 for Reading, and r = .81 for 
Intellectual Curiosity). This leads to the conclusion that across five years, different 
developmental trajectories emerged for different individuals with respect to the amount 
and/or direction of change. Interindividual differences in the amount of change require an 
interpretation that includes idiosyncrasies. It has been argued that continuous small change 
reflects the adaptation to normative developmental tasks or changes in the environment in 
order to maintain well-being (e.g., Staudinger & Kunzmann, 2005). Larger individual 
changes, in turn, might reflect nonnormative changes in the direct context of an individual 
and its attempts to cope with and adapt to it (e.g., Baltes et al., 1999; Roberts et al., 2002). 
Possible nonnormative events might have been physical (i.e., health impairments), social or 
mental, but are specific in time of manifestation and specific to the extent to which they 
happen to the individual. Although overall, only healthy adults participated in the study, 
changes that severely affect the self reported extent of Intellectual Engagement could have 
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happened (e.g., the birth of a grandchild might shift attention and interests away). Martin, 
Long and Poon (2002) found lower stability of personality in centenarians across 18 months 
than in sexa- or octogenarians across five years. This could indicate that in the presence of 
more and more diminished resources personality traits become more prone to change again. 
The lower stability might indicate higher levels of vulnerability in the presence of diminished 
resources. Hence Typical Intellectual Engagement seems to be a construct that, although on 
the group level rather stable over five years, is prone to significant change within individuals. 
However, this is presumably rather due to individual, nonnormative influences and resource 
allocations and does not mirror the normative developmental trajectory.  
Structural change 
Structural change refers to the question of the strength of the relation between factors 
across time or groups (Zimprich & Martin, 2010; Martin & Zimprich, 2005). Although this is 
a question that rather addresses the configuration than the function of a construct, it is still a 
question worth asking above and beyond concerning measurement properties (see MI 
discussed above). In cognitive research, this question is subsumed under the question of 
differentiation and dedifferentiation (e.g., Ghisletta & deRibaupierre, 2005; Ghisletta & 
Lindenberger, 2003; Zimprich & Martin, 2010). It describes whether, with increasing age, 
different aspects of a construct become more strongly related. In research on personality, this 
question has also been addressed with mainly finding structural stability both, at cross-section 
and longitudinally (Allemand et al., 2007; Caspi & Roberts, 2001; Srivastava, John, Gosling 
& Potter, 2003; but Allemand, Zimprich & Martin, 2008). Hence, the structural stability that 
was found in Typical Intellectual Engagement longitudinally fits into present research on 
personality. However, the cross-sectional finding of Study 1 showed higher interfactor 
correlations in the old, implying dedifferentiation (Zimprich & Martin, 2010). In old age, the 
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correlations between the different facets of Typical Intellectual Engagement were stronger 
than they were in young age.  
All older study participants were already retired. One might argue that this leads to an 
organisation of daily living that is mainly unaffected by institutional restraints which exert 
influence on an individual in workplace and educational institutions. Interests and abilities 
may not necessarily be allocated to specific and differential tasks and environments. Rather, 
an individual may focus on environments that suit her best. This selected environment 
reciprocally effects the development and display of individual characteristics (Gestsdottir et 
al., 2009; Lerner, 1982; Schooler, 1984). Also, increasing correlations between the subfactors 
could represent the deliberate alignment of resources on fewer, highly prioritized goals (see 
Riediger & Freund, 2006). The concentration of decreasing resources on a few meaningful 
goals and activities, hence, could result in resources becoming itself more homogeneous as 
would be reflected in higher correlations between factors. 
Specific versus general change  
To fully analyze a multifactorial construct from a developmental perspective, the 
question of whether the factors change together or independently also needs to be addressed. 
Again, this can only be assessed longitudinally (Martin & Zimprich, 2005). For Typical 
Intellectual Engagement, change factors shared between 9% and 50 % of variance. This 
indicates, firstly, that for different factors the commonality in change was differentially 
strong and, secondly, that even for factors sharing the most variance (Abstract Thinking & 
Problem Solving), half of the change in each factor occurred independently from change in 
the other factor. An interesting aspect of the change correlations compared to the level 
correlations is that the change correlations in some factors were higher than the static 
correlations at baseline (Study 2). This finding might be interpreted as hinting at 
dedifferentiation that was already found in Study 1 across almost 50 years. Although 
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structural stability was found in Typical Intellectual Engagement across five years, the fact 
that the change correlations were in part even higher than the factor correlations at baseline 
could, over long time spans, lead to a convergence of the factors. Here, again as found in 
research on personality (e.g., Allemand et al., 2007), changes that do occur might only occur 
slowly across a longer period of time.  
After all, what do Study 1 and Study 2 exhibit concerning the development of Typical 
Intellectual Engagement across the adult lifespan? On the one hand, results underscore the 
conceptualization of Typical Intellectual Engagement as a trait-like construct (Goff & 
Ackerman, 1992). In line with research on other aspects of personality (Caspi & Roberts, 
2001), changes in Typical Intellectual Engagement do occur across the adult lifespan, 
however, rather slowly. On the other hand, Typical Intellectual Engagement also seems to fit 
into research on motivation as increases in some factors have been found, maybe reflecting a 
deliberate selection of goals that are related to intellectual engagement and highly focused 
invested effort to attain these goals (Riediger & Freund, 2006). The interindividual 
differences in intraindividual change indicate that the development of Typical Intellectual 
Engagement is influenced by unique, nonnormative influences. Finally, Studies 1 and 2 
underscore WKH ³UDLVRQ G¶rWUH´ RI Typical Intellectual Engagement as an independent 
construct, because the multidimensionality and multidirectionality (Baltes, 1987) of this 
individual differences variable has not been captured in other related constructs such as 
Openness to Experience. 
Future implications 
The strongest call that can be made in terms of specific future research on Typical 
Intellectual Engagement is connecting developmental trajectories of Typical Intellectual 
Engagement with cognitive variables. This has been done in young adults where Typical 
Intellectual Engagement has been mainly tested as a potential predictor for academic 
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achievement (Furnham, et al., 2008; Furnham & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2006; Wilhelm et al., 
2003). Only few studies have investigated Typical Intellectual Engagement in old age. 
Namely, the relation between Typical Intellectual Engagement and intelligence and between 
Typical Intellectual Engagement and Openness to Experience, respectively, were investigated 
in cross-section (Dellenbach & Zimprich, 2008; Zimprich et al., 2009). However, to the best 
of our knowledge, developmental studies on mutual development of both constructs have not 
been conducted. Also, future research should expand the scope of longitudinal data on more 
than five years. The longer the time interval that can be studied longitudinally, the stronger 
the inferences that can be made concerning the development of Typical Intellectual 
Engagement across the lifespan.  
Another line of future research on Typical Intellectual Engagement could focus on the 
relation to motivation. Goff and Ackerman (1992; Ackerman et al., 1995) conceptualized 
Typical Intellectual Engagement at the intersection of personality and motivation. While 
specific hypothesis have been formulated for the relation between Typical Intellectual 
Engagement and knowledge, this has not been done concerning the development of Typical 
Intellectual Engagement. Hence, in order to fully understand the concept of Typical 
Intellectual Engagement and in order to make specific predictions about how Typical 
Intellectual Engagement might contribute to successful ageing and the maintenance of high 
levels of cognitive functioning, the stable, dispositional aspects of Typical Intellectual 
Engagement that should presumably be less changeable and the more motivational aspects of 
Typical Intellectual Engagement that should presumably respond well to deliberate alteration 
even over a rather short period of time need to be disentangled. Although the results of Study 
1 and Study 2 suggest that, overall, Typical Intellectual Engagement is not a construct prone 
to rapid change, this are results from individuals who made no previous attempts to 
deliberately alter Typical Intellectual Engagement. Hence, one might argue, that normatively, 
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Typical Intellectual Engagement might not be subject to rapid changes. However, the 
interindividual differences that were also found in Study 2 give rise to the question whether 
nonnormative, specific events and individual intentions could specifically change Typical 
Intellectual Engagement.  
Hence, a more applied line of research on Typical Intellectual Engagement could 
focus on intervention studies. In intervention studies the quest for disentangling motivational 
and personality aspects could be addressed as well as the question whether and how Typical 
Intellectual Engagement could be changed intentionally. As Typical Intellectual Engagement 
entails a motivational component (Ackerman et al., 1995; Goff & Ackermann, 1992; Kanfer, 
1990), we would hypothesize that, within dispositional boundaries, Typical Intellectual 
Engagement should be susceptible to interventions that seek to change Typical Intellectual 
Engagement. It is known from the literature that the successful investment of motivational 
resources is related to a salient goal that is perceived as important (e.g., Kruglanski et al., 
2002). Unimpaired cognitive functioning is of great value to individuals (cf., Lawton et al., 
1999). Emphasising that individuals can - within certain boundaries - influence their own 
cognitive functioning should act as an important goal. The stronger Typical Intellectual 
Engagement is anchored in personality the less it would be changeable in such an 
intervention. If Typical Intellectual Engagement would be changeable in interventions, this 
would give evidence to Typical Intellectual Engagement being stronger anchored in 
PRWLYDWLRQ DQG LQWHUHVWV 7KH KDELW RI ³LQWHOOHFWXDO HQJDJHPHQW´ RQ D UHJXODU EDVLV ZRXOG
then eventually show as a trait-like characteristic of an individual, however, its conceptual 
origins would lie stronger in motivation than in personality. It is also possible to hypothesise 
that increasing the motivation of engaging in intellectual activities could be an outcome of an 
intervention study without concerning levels of Typical Intellectual Engagement in a post-
intervention assessment. This is another possible scenario which would hint at Typical 
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Intellectual Engagement being a stable, motivation-independent aspect of personality that is 
unaffected by a temporary concentration on and a focused investment of motivational 
resources in intellectual activity. This conundrum, however, cannot be solved by mere 
theoretical considerations or correlations of Typical Intellectual Engagement with other 
constructs. The questions posed call for practical, applied intervention studies and long-term 
longitudinal assessment to explicitly test those hypotheses. 
4.2. What do subjective cognitive ratings reflect in relation to objective cognitive 
performance? 
In Studies 3 and 4, the question of what subjective self-evaluations of cognitive 
functioning reflect with respect to objectively measured cognitive performance was 
examined. While in Study 3 the question of what subjective cognitive complaints reflect was 
addressed in different groups of memory clinic outpatients, in Study 4 this question was 
approached from a more methodological perspective, suggesting that maybe the most 
informative way to look at the relation would lie in examining the commonalities in change 
rather than assessing the relation at a static time point. In what follows, I shall discuss what 
both studies reveal about self-evaluation and cognition in older adulthood. 
The frameworks of successful ageing (Rowe & Kahn, 1997; Weir et al., 2010), SOC 
(Baltes & Baltes, 1990), and cognitive reserve (Scarmeas & Stern, 2003), as well as studies 
showing the benefit of engagement in the course of attenuating or postponing cognitive 
decline (Hultsch, et al., 1999; Scarmeas et al., 2001; Schaie, 2005; Willis, et al., 2009) all 
require that an individual actively and deliberately engages in any activity (Weir et al., 2010). 
Self-evaluation and judging RQH¶VRZQFRJQLWLYHSHUIRUPDQFHis a crucial point in the course 
of expediently managing resources and regulate cognitive activities. If an individual is aware 
of her own strengths and weaknesses, interventions, training, and the use of strategies can be 
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applied expediently in order to maintain and stabilize the desired functional level facing real 
cognitive decline. So far, the validity of cognitive self-evaluation in relation to objective 
cognitive performance has been questioned (cf., Cavanaugh & Poon, 1989; Jorm et al., 2001). 
The results of the present thesis add evidence to the point that this might partly be an issue of 
the match between the specific domains being addressed subjectively and objectively. Also, 
the findings of the present thesis suggest that another reason for the repeatedly found small 
relation between subjective and objective cognitive performance might lie in the way the 
constructs are assessed: rather than assessing both constructs at a static, given time point, our 
results suggest that the longitudinal assessment of commonalities in change might be better 
suited to describe the relation. 
Study 3 revealed that, overall, the relation between cognitive complaints and cognitive 
performance was small, even in a group of individuals who came to a memory assessment to 
explicitly seek help in coping with perceived cognitive problems. In samples in which 
cognitive complaints are assessed in the course of a scientific study, the question of cognitive 
complaints might appear artificial to the individual, hence might not be answered with RQH¶V 
own functioning as reference, but rather with the use of easily accessible heuristics. Research 
has shown that older adults rely more on heuristics, using easily accessible or salient 
information in a judgment task of low personal relevance. However, manipulating the 
relevance revealed that the age effect disappeared when the task is of importance to older 
adults (Hess, 2006; Hess, Germain, Rosenberg, Leclerc & Hodges, 2005). Additionally, 
judgement accuracy was enhanced in older adults by increasing the personal meaningfulness 
of a task (Hess, 1990; Hess et al., 2001). In a group of outpatients, the question of cognitive 
complaints should thus be of high importance and directly refers to the individuals¶
afflictions in everyday life. Although self evaluations and the evaluation of others are 
different tasks, one might speculate that the high relevance of cognitive performance in a 
GENERAL DISCUSSION   116  
group of outpatients would lead to a higher accuracy in terms of evaluating RQH¶V own 
performance.  
However, the strongest predictor for cognitive complaints was depression. This 
finding is in line with recent research (Mowla et al., 2007; Slavin et al., 2010), underscoring 
the strong affective component in evaluating RQH¶V performance. Global cognitive 
functioning (as assessed with the MMSE) was not significantly related to cognitive 
complaints. Taking into account manifold studies that advocate different developmental 
trajectories for different cognitive domains (Schaie, 1996; Singer et al., 2003), this finding 
could reflect that early stages of decline might not be ascertainable with global measures. 
Developmental trajectories of cognitive abilities have been found to differ as early as 10 to 5 
years prior to diagnosis of dementia for fluid and crystallized measures, respectively, in 
healthy and later diseased individuals (Thorvaldsson et al., 2011). This finding suggests that 
an overall cognitive measure might not be distinct enough to detect subtle changes. Severely 
cognitively impaired individuals reported fewer complaints in the presence of objective 
severe memory impairments. This indicates that a global cognitive measure might not 
adequately address difficulties that influence the report of cognitive complaints. When 
cognitive impairments are as severe that they manifest in the MMSE, cognitive complaints 
might not be related to that anymore. This idea is supported by the fact that the MMSE is 
conceptualized as a screening instrument for dementia (Folstein et al., 1975). Additional 
support comes from the finding that the specific domain of executive functioning as 
operationalised in verbal fluency was significantly related to cognitive complaints (see also 
Benito-León, 2010). Executive functions are an important cognitive component in managing 
everyday activities (Hart & Bean, 2011). Cognitive self evaluation could hence be more 
strongly related to specific cognitive functions. To summarize, Study 3 gives evidence that 
even in a group of individuals in which the level of cognitive functioning should be of high 
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relevance and highly salient, accuracy in evaluating cognitive performance is not necessarily 
high. The sample of the present study consisted of a group of objectively cognitive impaired 
individuals who experienced difficulties in everyday activities. Hence, cognitive demands of 
typical and stable everyday activities that usually imposed no maximal demands on the 
individual turned into high demanding tasks presumably reaching the maximal cognitive 
limits of an individual. In the presence of the transition where non-demanding, everyday 
activities turn into highly demanding, maximal performance tasks, cognitive functioning and 
its management should be highly salient to individuals in order to seek help or to stabilize 
and, ultimately maintain, individual functioning and well-being. However, because even in 
this extreme group, the relation between subjective and objective cognitive performance 
remained low with only 18% explained variance by cognition and affect, the question arises 
whether cognitive complaints at all serve the purpose of precisely monitoring cognitive 
functioning or if they are rather related to different internal processes that are necessary to 
maintain psychological well-being and intellectual functioning.  
The second question addressed in chapter 3 of the present thesis (Study 4) was 
whether the small relation between subjective and objective performance might be partly a 
result of the assessment approach. Differences in affect, personality, and reference points 
(Albert, 1977; Arnkelsson & Smith, 2000; Kliegel & Zimprich, 2005; Metternich et al., 2009) 
could confound the assessed relation between the constructs. This could especially be true for 
constructs that are not assessed on the latent level, that is, assessed without measurement 
error (Meredith & Horn, 2001). In longitudinally assessing the commonality in change one is 
able to address and to account for those methodological difficulties (Zimprich et al., 2003). In 
other words, while in cross-section relations can only be assessed on the absolute level, 
longitudinally, individuals serve as their own reference group, hence the relative level of 
functioning can be depicted. Hence, in assessing the commonality in change, possible 
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absolute level differences are controlled for. The explained variance in the change 
correlations was about three times larger than in the correlation between the levels in Study 4. 
Thus, the results of the present study give evidence that individuals do rather monitor change. 
Note however, as a limitation of Study 4, that the commonality in change was only relatively 
larger compared to the relation at a given time point (r = .23 for levels, r = .39 for slopes). 
Overall, the relation found was moderate, which does not exceed usually reported 
correlations between the constructs (e.g., Cavanaugh & Poon, 1989). However, as the 
difference proved to be significant, the claim that assessing commonalities in change would 
be more informative remains warranted. Integrating the results of Study 3 might partially 
explain the small correlations. If individuals report cognitive complaints as a function of 
importance of the special domain in which losses occur, than the results of Study 4 could 
reflect that the importance of special domains was not controlled for. Cognitive complaints 
were assumingly assessed too unspecific. Hence, individual differences with regard to the 
importance of each domain were not controlled for but might have significantly biased the 
magnitude of the reported complaints.  
4.3. The subjective side of cognitive development ± integrating the 4 Studies 
All four studies of the present thesis aimed at contributing knowledge to the field of 
non-cognitive aspects that can account for interindividual differences in cognitive 
development across the lifespan. Theories on lifespan development (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; 
Baltes & Schaie, 1976) as well as theories on cognitive development stress the importance of 
non-cognitive variables and the deliberate influence of an individual on the development 
across the lifespan (Ackerman, 1996, 2000; Hess, Leclerc et al., 2009; Scarmeas & Stern, 
2003; Willis et al., 2009). In the present thesis, Typical Intellectual Engagement and self-
evaluations of cognitive performance were investigated as non-cognitive variables. How can 
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the main findings of the present thesis be integrated and which future research questions can 
be derived from the overall findings? This is what I shall discuss in what follows. 
Typical Intellectual Engagement (Ackerman, 1994; Goff & Ackerman, 1992) is 
conceptualized at the interface of intelligence, personality, motivation and interest. If this 
holds to be true, than the development of Typical Intellectual Engagement should comprise 
characteristics of all of these aspects. Results of the present thesis provide empirical support 
for this theoretical assumption (see above, 4.1.). Within the framework of SOC, cognitive 
reserve, and selective engagement (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Baltes & Schaie, 1976; Hess, 
Germain et al., 2009; Scarmeas & Stern, 2003), Typical Intellectual Engagement can be seen 
as person characteristic that influences the amount and orientation of deliberately directed 
intellectual activity. Mechanisms that influence the orientation and the magnitude of Typical 
Intellectual Engagement might be abilities, lifelong habits, external environments (Hess, 
2005; Schooler, 1984) but also the subjectively perceived necessity and capability of 
intellectual activity. Unimpaired as opposed to impaired cognitive functioning has 
empirically been found to be essential for subjective well-being in old age (Lawton et al., 
1999). It has also been implemented into the definition of successful ageing (e.g., Rowe & 
Kahn, 1997). However, to be able to influence cognitive functioning within the boundaries of 
possibility, D YHULWDEOH LPDJH RI RQH¶V RZQ FRJQLWLYH SHUIRUPDQFH is the mandatory 
prerequisite. Nevertheless, research on the validity of cognitive complaints in relation to 
objective performance has only exhibited small to moderate relations (e.g., Cavanaugh & 
Poon, 1989). Inferring from the findings of the present thesis, in what follows, I shall discuss 
suggestions that could contribute to the understanding of this small relation.  
The report of complaints might be ability specific. It seems reasonable that processes 
that are strongly grounded on everyday activities are highly salient to individuals. Hence any 
deviations that are detected in these processes are experienced as a threat and may lead to 
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significant cognitive complaints. In future research, it could be informative to take into 
account not only affective states (and dispositions) and objective losses but also the 
subjective importance of a special (cognitive) domain in which losses occur. Hence, 
investigating interindividual differences in perceived importance of different domains that 
could contribute to the report of overall complaints might lead to a better understanding of 
the purpose of subjective complaints. The report of cognitive complaints might, overall, be a 
function of subjective importance. If this hypothesis was true, controlling for differences in 
importance should also result in higher correlations between subjective and objective 
cognitive performance in future analyses.  
Interindividual differences in cognitive complaints might be stronger related to 
differences in motivation and interest (such as Typical Intellectual Engagement) that 
influence the personal importance of one domain over another than to differences in actual 
performance in this ability. While one individual might prioritize reading over problem 
solving, this might be the other way round for another individual. Hence, both might evaluate 
decline in cognitive mechanisms that underlie those activities differently with regard to the 
potential threat to personal well-being. The severity of reported cognitive complaints should 
vary as a result. In an extreme example, the same pattern of cognitive decline could lead to 
complete different subjective evaluations, and hence different reports of cognitive 
complaints. The interindividually different pattern of reported complaints and assessed 
performance might be interpreted as a lack of coherence between the two constructs. 
However, this interpretation would only be true if the purpose of cognitive complaints was 
GHILQHGDV³reflect the objective environment as precisely as possible´ 
One direction of future research, hence, could lay in the re-evaluation of the purpose 
RIFRJQLWLYHFRPSODLQWV:KLOHLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRPRQLWRURQH¶VRZQfunctioning, the question 
arises: is it necessary to monitor RQH¶V own performances as a perfect replication of the 
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objective environment or is it more adaptive to monitor RQH¶V cognitive functioning in terms 
of matching RQH¶V priorities, necessities, and interests (see Hess, 2006). In the course of 
allocating overall reduced resources to maintain subjective well-being, domain specific 
monitoring RI RQH¶V RZQ SHUIRUPDQFH PLJKW EH PRVW DGDSWLYH Baltes et al., 1999; Hess, 
Germain et al., 2009). Depending on individual differences in motivation, interest and 
personality (e.g., Typical Intellectual Engagement) as well as distal environmental factors 
(see Hess, 2005) different specific domains should be evaluated as especially important. 
Interindividual differences in ability levels could manifest and influence cognitive complaints 
in a way that high ability individuals should report complaints in more domains. High ability 
individuals presumably have more resources for compensating deficits in more than one area 
at their disposal. Hence, concentration on more than one area of cognitive functioning could 
be possible for those individuals and hence several domains would remain important (see 
Lang, Rieckmann & Baltes, 2002, on the influence of resources). Another hypothesis 
concerning the influence of ability levels on cognitive complaints could result in the 
assumption that high level individuals report fewer cognitive complaints in general because 
they should be able to compensate declines longer and might also be more able to more 
effectively allocate declining resources. Different patterns of reported complaints could also 
emerge as a function of personality traits or levels of depression (Kliegel & Zimprich, 2005). 
Or, more generally spoken, instead of reliably reflecting cognitive functioning, cognitive 
complaints could rather reflect or be a part of the process of maintaining, regaining, or 
enhancing well-being. 
Related to the point that depicting the ³UHDO world´ might not be the most important 
purpoVH RI HYDOXDWLQJ RQH¶V RZQ FRJQLWLYH SHUIRUPDQFH (see above), it could be more 
adaptive for an individual to monitor changes rather than static levels at a given time point. 
Thus, in order to adequately assess the functional relation between subjective and objective 
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cognitive performance, research could adopt and concentrate on the commonality in change 
between the respective constructs rather than assessing levels of both constructs at a given 
time point. Although the concept of correlated change is not a new one (e.g., McArdle & 
Nesselroade, 1994) and correlated change in subjective and objective memory performance 
has been addressed elsewhere as well (see Lane & Zelinski, 2003; Taylor et al., 1992; 
Zimprich et al., 2003), results were inconsistent and the topic has not been addressed as 
explicitly as in Study 4. Although the change correlation found in Study 4 was significantly 
higher than the level correlation, the overall effect was only in the medium range.  
On the one hand this might be due to the long time interval covered (12 years). On the 
other hand, the medium relation could be taken as an indicator for the assumptions made 
above, because assessing commonalities in change, that is assessing the dynamics of the two 
constructs, does also not account for the fact that subjective and objective evaluations might 
not be measuring the same. Subjective ratings could still be a function of specifically 
monitoring the most important aspects of cognition to an individual in order to adapt the 
engagement and the investment of resources in the most effective way concerning the 
maintenance of well-being (see above). 7KLVNLQGRI³focussed DWWHQWLRQ´could facilitate the 
preservation of cognitive activities in domains that are prioritized over others by an 
individual. Indirect support for this idea comes from studies by Touron, Swaim and Hertzog 
(2007). They showed that the effectiveness of strategy use in older age was a function of the 
³DWWUDFWLYHQHVV´ RI DQ LQFHQWLYH WKDW ZDV JLYHQ DV D UHZDUG DIWHU XVLQJ WKH VWUDWHJ\ or 
obtaining the goal which depended on the use of the strategy. This illustrates the fact that 
motivation plays a crucial part regarding cognitive performance as an outcome and also 
regarding monitoring cognitive operations and investing resources into attaining specific 
cognitive outcomes. Although the above argument addresses subjective self-evaluations 
within a different context, one still could use it as a hint that the purpose of subjective 
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memory performance ratings might be rather related to self-regulation and motivation than to 
the pure assessment of objective performance. 
Of course, the formulated hypotheses and research questions are speculative and 
would need future research. The implications for future research that were developed in 4.3 
emphasise the potential benefit of changing the theoretical perspective for understanding the 
relation between the constructs. Turning to a more social cognition perspective might be 
fruitful (e.g., Cavanaugh et al., 1998; Hess, 1990). The assumptions made are thought of as 
one possible way for research to gain additional knowledge of the purpose of subjective 
ratings over and above further attempts of explaining the mere relation between subjective 
and objective ratings. They are supposed as one possible future perspective to shed some 
more light on the underlying processes driving the relation between the constructs. The 
general concern underlying these ideas is that maybe in order to fully understand the relation 
between subjective and objective cognitive performance, one might need to adjust and start 
looking from a different perspective (cf., Hess et al., 2001; Hess et al., 2005; Touron et al., 
2007). 
4.4. Conclusion 
The empirical evidence resulting from this thesis provides the following main 
messages: First, Typical Intellectual Engagement is a unique definable construct that differs 
from related constructs in its developmental trajectory across the adult lifespan. Second, the 
personality component as well as the motivational component of Typical Intellectual 
Engagement is reflected in its developmental trajectory; however, much more research in 
detail is needed to disentangle the personality and motivation components of Typical 
Intellectual Engagement. Third, cognitive self-evaluations might be related rather to specific 
abilities than global cognitive performance. Fourth, the commonality in change is a more 
GENERAL DISCUSSION   124  
informative approach to investigate the relation between subjective and objective cognitive 
performance. 
Finally, the central questions arising from the present thesis are: What are the basic 
constituents of Typical Intellectual Engagement and how do they develop and interact? What 
is the purpose of subjective cognitive performance ratings regarding successful development 
and the maintenance of high subjective well-being of an individual? 
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Die vier Studien, die in der vorliegenden Doktorarbeit vorgestellt werden, beschäftigen sich 
mit der übergreifenden Fragestellung wie und mithilfe welcher Prozesse Individuen ihre 
eigene kognitive Entwicklung managen, regulieren und aktiv beeinflussen. Zwei Aspekte 
wurden in der vorliegenden Arbeit genauer untersucht: Erstens wurde die Entwicklung von 
interindividuellen Unterschieden im Ausmaß in dem sich Individuen gezielt und bewusst 
intellektuell betätigen und somit ihre eigene kognitive Leistung beeinflussen näher 
untersucht. Zweitens wurde die Entwicklung von interindividuellen Unterschieden in der 
metakognitiven Fähigkeit die eigene kognitive Leistung einzuschätzen und der potentielle 
Einfluss dieses Prozesses auf die kognitive Entwicklung untersucht. Nach der fundierten 
Darstellung des theoretischen Hintergrundes in Kapitel 1, werden in Kapitel 2 die folgenden 
Fragen detaillierter adressiert: Gibt es Unterschiede in Typischem Intellektuellem 
Engagement zwischen jungen und älteren Erwachsenen? Ähneln diese Unterschiede 
bekannten Alterseffekten in theoretisch verwandten Konstrukten? (Studie 1). Wie entwickelt 
sich Typisches Intellektuelles Engagement über fünf Jahre im höheren Erwachsenenalter? 
(Studie 2). In Kapitel 3 wird die Genauigkeit von subjektiven Gedächtnisbeschwerden in 
einer Population von Individuen, für die das Management ihrer sich verringernden kognitiven 
Ressourcen entscheidend für ihre Funktionstüchtigkeit im Alltag sein mag, näher beleuchtet 
(Studie 3). In der untersuchten Population von ambulanten Gedächtnisklinikpatienten könnte 
die Genauigkeit von subjektiven Gedächtniseinschätzungen den Prozess darstellen, bei dem 
besondere Anstrengungen initiiert werden, die schlussendliche ein unauffälliges 
Funktionieren im Alltag zu gewährleisten. An sich hoch automatisierte Prozesse benötigen im 
Lichte abnehmender Ressourcen eventuell nun explizite Anstrengung und den gezielten 
Einsatz von Ressourcen. Aus diesem Grund sollten diese Prozesse in einer Gruppe 
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ambulanter Patienten salienter und besser erfassbar sein. In Studie 4 wurde die Frage 
adressiert ob der Zusammenhang zwischen subjektiver und objektiver Gedächtnisleistung 
präziser erfasst werden kann, wenn das Ausmaß der gemeinsamen Veränderung über die Zeit 
analysiert wird. Die empirischen Ergebnisse aus Studie 1 und 2 zeigen substantielle 
interindividelle Unterschiede in Typischem Intellektuellem Engagement, die nicht mit 
etablierten Intelligenz- oder Persönlichkeitsmessinstrumenten abgebildet werden können. 
Studie 3 und 4 zeigen, dass subjektive kognitive Beschwerden stärker mit spezifischen 
kognitiven Domänen als mit globalen kognitiven Tests im Zusammenhang stehen. Zusätzlich 
ist der Zusammenhang zwischen subjektiven und objektiven Gedächtniseinschätzungen 
höher, wenn das Ausmaß der gemeinsamen Veränderung erhoben wird. Trotz allem bleibt der 
absolute Zusammenhang zwischen beiden Konstrukten nur moderat. In Kapitel 4 werden die 
Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Dissertation in eine übergreifende Diskussion integriert. 
Einschränkungen der durchgeführten Studien werden ebenso wie ihre theoretischen 
Implikationen diskutiert. Ideen für zukünftige Forschungsprojekte, die sich auf die 
funktionale Relevanz von kognitiven Funktionen, metakognitiven Fähigkeiten und 
Intellektuellem Engagement konzentrieren, werden diskutiert und vorgestellt.
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